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Digital technologies have come to frame the everyday interactions of our world, meshing together 
public and private spaces into seamless singular platforms for work, socialisation and leisure. At the 
centre of these transformations are the market imperatives of companies who trade in predictions 
based upon behavioural data, utilising a range of surveillance strategies to capture information that 
helps to craft the most effective interventions into the state of play of our lives. While surveillance 
technologies, data mining practices and algorithm-based marketing have become increasingly 
ubiquitous over recent years, the implications of their operations - including how data is used, who 
has access to it, and how far privacy laws are able to protect against its potential harms - are less clear. 
Shoshana Zuboff’s 2018 book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at 
the New Frontier of Power provides a thorough overview of these issues, constructing a new 
vocabulary with which to identify the oppressive digital processes which quietly shape behaviour on a 
colossal scale.  
 
Although the book has experienced a high level of visibility, briefly becoming a bestseller in 2019, 
recent critical reflections point towards a number of shortcomings in Zuboff’s analysis - including her 
commitment to the argument that the current regime takes the form of a political and economic 
system ‘gone rogue’ from the capitalism of history. This dissertation argues that speculative fiction 
offers a particularly valuable space to test out Zuboff’s predictions and conclusions. By identifying 
the overlapping theoretical strands which converge in Surveillance Capitalism and mapping these 
onto an array of contemporary literary texts, including Dave Eggers’ The Circle, Lauren Beukes’ 
Moxyland, Margaret Atwood’s The Testaments, Richard K. Morgan’s Altered Carbon and Alex 
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The power struggles between industrial capital and labour in the twentieth century have been 
transformed by new and insidious market forms. As the future technological landscape of the digital 
age moves into sharper focus, political mechanisms of democracy and control are perpetually re-
shaped in the changing light of information capitalism. Building upon an infrastructure of increased 
state surveillance under the pretext of national security, widespread CCTV coverage, and the 
availability of new technologies which facilitate a constantly interconnected digital society, we are 
witnessing the growth of a thriving ecosystem of data accumulation on a phenomenal scale which 
intrudes upon every aspect of our social, political, and private lives. The omnipresence of surveillance 
technologies, alongside the invisibility of their inner mechanisms and processes, has led to a 
phenomenon where individuals willingly and actively participate in the regulation of their own 
behaviour and that of others, surrendering privacy as payment for the services which have become 
necessary for participation in social life. The mediation of reality by virtual modes of communication 
plays an increasingly important role in the shaping of individual and national identity, whilst existing 
forms of sociality and subjectivity recede under the emergence of multifarious methods of self-
representation. At the turn of this new decade, it is difficult to imagine a future where digital 
surveillance will not frame the interactions of everyday life.  
 
Science fiction holds a unique capability to express the experiences of oppression under digital 
modernity and test out otherwise intractable philosophical ideas in an innovative realm, ideally 
positioning the genre to engage with established and emergent theories of surveillance. This genre is 
valuable for its ability to foster innovative political imagination, oriented towards the negotiation of 
unprecedented global crises and the confrontation of exploitation and violence which 
disproportionately targets marginalised social groups. By understanding the critical theories which 
shed light upon the architecture of surveillance society, science fiction acts as a particularly effective 
form of political intervention into contemporary debates about human rights, control, and inequality 
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through its shared concerns with power and oppression. Jessica Langer proposes that the genre has 
close links to the objectives of postcolonial studies in this regard: 
The instability of science fiction is not a weakness but rather a strength; it has shown itself 
capable of including a wide variety of texts and voices, including those characterised by 
hybridity in genre. [Its] edges have been blurred and smudged, and it has shown itself 
flexible enough to include the subversion, generic and ideological, that postcolonialism 
represents.1 
 
Science fiction presents opportunities for resistance against assimilation to the imperial centre, as Bill 
Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin assert in The Empire Writes Back, ‘demonstrating the 
counter-discursive potential of the tools appropriated from the colonisers’ and revealing an ability to 
occupy and undermine binarily opposite, conflicting categories such as Western scientific discourses 
and indigenous modes of knowledge production.2 Fredric Jameson’s influential book Archaeologies 
of the Future takes an alternative view of dystopian science fiction, suggesting that ‘the mass-cultural 
sub-genre like SF […] can sometimes express realities and dimensions that escape high literature,’ 
and pointing out that although science fiction is typically described as ‘an attempt to imagine 
unimaginable futures, [its] deepest subject may in fact be our own historical present.’3 Further, Darko 
Suvin argues for sf to be re-defined as ‘the literature of cognitive estrangement’, which recognises 
that the ‘imaginative framework’ of sf ‘has always been wedded to a hope of finding in the unknown 
the ideal environment,’ yet remains ‘distinct from […] utopianism.’4 In the face of interconnected 
patterns of capitalist- and surveillance-framed power, an exploration of the kinds of cultural work 
undertaken by texts which fall within the flexible parameters of cognitive estrangement provides 
insights into our current reality and the political trajectories we may yet create. I will begin by 
mapping out the key critical debates which have shaped theorisations of surveillance, capitalism, and 
resistance, and how these have developed over time to arrive at the epoch which is currently 
 
1 Jessica Langer, Postcolonialism and Science Fiction (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,  2011) p. 2. 
2 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, The Empire Writes Back (New York: Routledge, 2002) p. 
199. 
3 Fredric Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and Other Science Fictions (London: 
Verso, 2005) p. 345. 





The most penetrating and sustained analysis of surveillance remains Michel Foucault’s widely-cited 
and profoundly prescient text Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison.5 Foucault appropriates 
Jeremy Bentham’s model of the ‘Panopticon’, a prison designed around the surveillance of inmates 
with the goal of influencing self-regulatory behaviour, to develop a broader critique of the movement 
towards much more subtle and standardised methods of control in the modern nation-state. Bentham 
himself recognised the panopticon’s capacity to influence and coerce populations, defining 
surveillance as ‘a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without 
example’; Foucault built upon this concept of power to foreground the nuanced forms of control 
embedded in institutional processes and systems which are deliberately obscured from public view.6 
In Stopping the Spies, Jane Duncan credits Foucault’s conception of power with ‘depart[ing] from 
monolithic, state-centric conceptions [of power], which fail to explain adequately how social order is 
maintained in nominally democratic, non-authoritarian societies.’7 For Duncan, the massive 
expansion of the scope of surveillance through digital technology means that there is no longer ‘one 
single point where surveillance takes place, but multiple points’, opening up new ways to read 
panoptic power in light of online phenomena like social networking, e-commerce, and virtual reality.8 
Recent scholarship has traced the evolution of the Panopticon metaphor through an increasingly 
digitised cultural environment from Foucault to today; a ubiquitous example from the past decade can 
be found in the inner mechanisms of social media websites and apps, such as Facebook’s ‘Like’ 
button. Superficially, this function is an innocuous method for social media users to engage with 
shared online content. However, the technology behind the function facilitates surveillance on 
multiple levels, primarily by performing the deeper purpose of gathering information about the 
external websites its users are visiting, the online purchases they are making, and the media they are 
 
 5 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin UK, 2019) 
6 Bentham, Jeremy The Panopticon Writings ed. Miran Bozovic (London: Verso, 1995) p. 29. 
7 Jane Duncan, Stopping the Spies: Constructing and Resisting the Surveillance State in South Africa (Wits 
University Press: Johannesburg, 2018) p. 23. 
8 Duncan, p. 25. 
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engaging with. Facebook’s algorithms use this data to create a feedback loop, where businesses who 
have secured advertising space are at liberty to aggressively display promotional content interspersed 
with social content – a marketing strategy which has come to be described as ‘behavioural 
retargeting’.9 Crucially, Facebook’s users’ interactions – social, commercial, and political - are not 
only repeatedly shown to the user themselves in a bid to increase click-through and conversion rates, 
but are revealed to their entire Facebook-mediated online community.10 Matthew Lawrence expands 
on the ramifications of this trend which combines the economic imperatives of late capitalism with 
the proliferation of computerised surveillance strategies: ‘the argument that neoliberalism is the 
encoding of all fields of activity within an economic register, that transforms every action into a 
market action, finds its most complete form (so far) in the fact that almost all digital activities are 
transformed into an act of profit […] all of society [is] turned into a site for digital labour and an 
engine of accumulation.’11 The shift between Foucault’s panopticon and Facebook’s ‘Like’ here 
reveals an extension of the trajectory Foucault envisioned, where power is no longer exerted upon the 
body through violence but through constant observation. The ability of this kind of power to gradually 
shape human behaviour through multi-directional flows of data gives way to what Lawrence sees as a 
‘hyper-Benthian attention-harvesting behavioural-modification Panopticon.],’ radically altering both 
the physical structure of Foucault’s model of surveillance and the nature of the spatial zones it 
percolates into. 
 
Given the significant emphasis this kind of model places upon accumulation of information for profit, 
we might inquire whether the new economy of data demands a deeper engagement with Karl Marx’s 
interpretations of the operations of knowledge, power, and subjection. Foucault’s theory of panoptic 
power, a movement away from punitive, subjective punishment toward a new model of monitored 
 
9 Anja Lambrecht and Catherine Tucker, ‘When does retargeting work? Information specificity in online 
advertising’, Journal of Marketing Research 50.5 (2013) 561-576 (p. 561). 
10 Juan Carlos Perez, Facebook’s Beacon more intrusive than previously thought 
<https://www.pcworld.com/article/140182/article.html> [Accessed 12 February 2020]  
11 Matthew Lawrence, Control under surveillance capitalism: from Bentham’s panopticon to Zuckerberg’s 
‘Like’ <http://www.perc.org.uk/project_posts/control-surveillance-capitalism-benthams-panopticon-
zuckerbergs-like/> [Accessed 28 January 2020]  
10 
rehabilitation, demonstrates an invasive regulation of society according to specific institutional rules 
and processes, centring upon the reduction of bodies back to productive forces of labour. This bears 
striking similarities to Marx’s critique of the machine and the factory in Chapter 15 of the first 
volume of Capital: the subjective differences between efficiency and skill amongst workpeople is 
replaced by standardised, scientifically measured mechanical processes, contributing towards a 
broader de-skilling process in a bid to increase competition between unskilled workers and boost 
productivity through highly regulated organisational structures. Marx’s classic image of the factory 
presents a convergence of Foucault’s concerns with productive power and knowledge formation as 
the worker is ‘subordinated’ to the machine’s ‘alien power’, whilst being monitored by human 
‘overlookers’: 
The technical subordination of the workman to the uniform motion of the instruments of 
labour, and the peculiar composition of the body of workpeople […] give rise to a barrack 
discipline, which is elaborated into a complete system in the factory, and which fully 
develops the before mentioned labour of overlooking, thereby dividing the workpeople into 
operatives and overlookers, into private soldiers and sergeants of an industrial army.12 
 
The nullification of intellectual power and individual specialism, combined with the disciplinary and 
regulatory processes of surveillance which are exerted by human and nonhuman observers, sets up a 
fraught relationship between workers and technology, recently manifested through the emergence of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies which threaten to replace living labour. 
While public perspectives on AI and its impact on the future of work continually shift from optimism 
to pessimism,13 the present trend of deploying algorithms to predict customer demand and reduce 
costs has renewed concerns about the propensity of monopolistic organisations to exploit workers and 
create greater insecurity in the job market. We have seen from the practices of Uber14 and Amazon 
that the optimisation of recruitment and working practices through automation and gamification stand 
 
12 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy - The Process of Capitalist Production (London: 
Penguin UK, 2004) p. 463. 
13 Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Committee, Automation and the future of work (House of Commons, 
2019) p. 3. 
14 Uber: Future challenges in the era of AI and ML (2018) <https://digital.hbs.edu/platform-
rctom/submission/uber-future-challenges-in-the-era-of-ai-and-ml/> [Accessed May 15 2020] 
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to severely detriment their employees.15 From the perspective of surveillance studies, the exploitative 
potential of these modern technologies are manifold; computer algorithms access data collected via 
surveillance, augmenting human learning with the goal of reinforcing and deploying ever more 
optimised surveillance tactics. 
 
Recent research has expanded our understanding of the ways in which labour-power and subjectivity 
itself has transformed since the late part of the twentieth century. Jason Read examines the 
relationship between Marxist and post-structuralist theory to make the case for a new 
conceptualisation of capitalist production in his text The Micro-Politics of Capital. Read writes that 
due to machinery, ‘it is no longer necessary for the worker to know what is going on, [driving] the 
demand to extract more relative surplus value, to intensify the productivity of labor [and] to reduce 
the need for labor in the productive process.’16 Read argues that capitalist production has ‘taken on a 
dimension that could be described as “micro-political”, inserting itself into the texture of […] 
subjectivity itself,’ recalibrating the traditional understanding of physical labour power to encompass 
‘knowledges, affects, and desires’.17 This ‘micro-political dimension’ of capital has significant 
implications for envisioning contemporary panoptic power in the multivalent, fractured structures of 
modern nation states, where multiple discrete surveillance systems coalesce to collect data from 
scattered, diverse sources.18 Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson develop this concept further by 
introducing the concept of the ‘surveillant assemblage’ to interrogate the blind spots in major features 
of surveillance, such as the Panopticon and George Orwell’s dystopian fiction, revealing how ‘both 
state and non-state institutions are involved in massive efforts to monitor different populations.’19 
‘The Surveillant Assemblage’ builds upon the philosophies of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to 
 
15 Amazon ditched AI recruiting tool that favored men for technical jobs 
(2018)<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/oct/10/amazon-hiring-ai-gender-bias-recruiting-engine> 
[Accessed 15 May 2020] 
16 Jason Read, The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present (Albany: State University 
of New York Press, 2003) p. 118. 
17 Read, p. 2 
18 Ibid. 
19 Kevin Haggerty and Richard Ericson, ‘The Surveillant Assemblage’, British Journal of Sociology 51.4 (2000) 
605—622 (p. 607). 
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distinguish between nuanced processes of contemporary data-gathering and and observation, where 
‘fluid and mobile states become fixed into more or less stable and asymmetrical arrangements’ to 
form a ‘rhizomatic’ model of expansion and regeneration that is distinct from its predecessors.20 
Surveillance can no longer be imagined as merely a top-down, state-led model undertaken by humans; 
computers and other forms of technology are now able to automate the operations of surveillance 
beyond institutional boundaries, opening the phenomenon up to any organisation with vested financial 
or political interests. Read’s vision of ‘the powers of the intellect objectified’ as a basis of 
contemporary production,21 alongside Haggerty and Ericson’s conception of the ‘distinctively hybrid 
composition’ of the observed body ‘reassembled’ by data flows, provides a conceptual apparatus with 
which to understand new theoretical links between Marxism and Foucauldian power within the 
context of digital modernity.22 
 
The convergence of these theoretical strands and images – Marx’s factory, Foucault’s panoptic power, 
surveillant assemblages and critiques of capital on a micro-political scale – form a useful site to 
interrogate the distribution and manifestation of power within modern digital society. However, there 
are some critical pitfalls to this framework that must be addressed; first of all, the challenges that have 
been posed to the hybridisation of Marxist and Foucauldian thinking. In Foucault with Marx, Jacques 
Bidet appraises at length the extent to which Foucault and Marx share common ground at different 
points in their theoretical texts, arguing that whilst ‘an essential moment of [Foucault’s] work in 
progress falls within the framework of [Marx’s] “historical materialism”, which each of them, in 
diverse ways, pertains to’,23 there is also a tendency to ‘dissolve Foucauldian critique and analytics in 
Marx’s conceptuality, [and] Foucault’s politics in Marx’s’.24 In Chapter 1, Bidet assesses the Marxist 
affinities of Foucault’s ‘disciplinary society’, ‘class society’ and ‘governmentality’ with the Marxist 
view of the State, concluding that ‘each of these partial theoretical constructions […] awaits the 
conceptual conditions of a unitary reconstruction’.25 Despite these limitations, Bidet points out that 
 
20 Haggerty and Ericson, p. 606. 
21 Read, p. 119. 
22 Haggerty and Ericson, p. 606. 
23 Jacques Bidet, Foucault with Marx trans. Steven Corcoran (London: Zed Books, 2016) p. 13. 
24 Bidet, p. 22. 
25 Bidet, p. 25. 
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the ‘panoptic apparatus’ that is presented in Discipline and Punish ‘does not fail [to] refer to Marx’s 
analyses and concepts’, building upon a ‘“classist” connection between economic exploitation and 
political domination.’26 Bidet notes that Foucault highlights ‘an analytical and conceptual renovation 
with the ability [to] trigger a crisis in, or reset in motion, the heritage of Marx’; with this in mind, I 
will maintain an awareness of the obstacles and complexities inherent in any analysis which unifies 
Marxist and Foucauldian theories, and propose that recent developments in data capitalism constitute 
the suitable ‘conceptual conditions’ to which Bidet refers.27  
 
A further issue that must be addressed is the reliance of surveillance theories upon the presumption of 
a highly individualised subject, and a universal understanding of privacy as a human right. There are 
several problems within this formulation - while privacy is often understood intuitively and 
straightforwardly as an everyday condition of private choice, contemporary criticism reveals the term 
to be far more complex and contested in practice. In Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide? Anita 
Allen details ‘physical’, ‘spatial’, ‘informational’, ‘locational’ and ‘proprietary’ privacy as distinct 
varieties with unique implications, ultimately developing her theory of ‘unpopular’ privacy.28 
Through a feminist critique of the intersections of privacy, gender and democracy, Allen points out 
that certain kinds of privacy, particularly when government-mandated or enforced under the guise of 
privacy rights, could easily be used to facilitate and conceal abuse, coercion, and exploitation.29 
Further to this, Duncan points out that under the inequality of capitalist forms of production, ‘the 
ability to individuate is available to a select few’, calling into question the Marxist-oriented 
philosophies of privacy activists.30 Invoking Isaiah Berlin’s conceptual delineation of negative 
freedom and positive freedom as facets of liberal thought, consolidated in Marxist terms as ‘the 
freedom primarily of those who own the means of production’ and the ‘freedom [which] comes about 
through working-class struggles’ respectively, Duncan references Marx’s advocacy for both freedoms 
in a bid to improve broader social conditions, ‘as the former creates spaces for the latter to be 
 
26 Bidet, p. 35. 
27 Bidet, p. 71. 
28 Anita Allen, Unpopular Privacy: What Must We Hide? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 4. 
29 Allen, p. 8. 
30 Duncan, p. 34. 
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advanced.’31 Applying this to the realm of privacy, Duncan concludes that individual privacy rights 
should be fought for ‘as a negative freedom - that is, as a freedom to protect [individual] spaces’ in 
the interests of society at large.32 Finally, it is important to consider the presumptions that are made 
when considering the legal and political dimensions of privacy rights and fair information practices, 
such as the complex relationship this has with citizenship in the modern nation-state; Giorgio 
Agamben writes at length on the impact of the ‘state of exception’, or the potential for the state to 
suspend its own laws and strip the political rights and protections of specific social groups, subjecting 
them to increased exploitation based upon existing prejudices. Failures in data protection can facilitate 
the oppression of vulnerable communities, recently demonstrated by violence in North East Delhi 
where public access to a government database was reportedly used to target Muslims.33 
 
Shoshana Zuboff’s recent book The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at 
the New Frontier of Power, a thorough account of the growth and impact of newly commercialised 
digital realms which briefly became a bestseller in 2019, acutely addresses these concerns.34 
Extending far beyond the purview of data privacy, Zuboff develops a broad and useful vocabulary 
with which to begin making sense of the digital mechanisms of economic and political power in the 
twenty-first century, beginning with ‘surveillance capitalism’ itself. This term is used to refer to a 
malignant capitalist regime sustained by large-scale, invasive digital surveillance and a logic of data 
accumulation – crucially, a logic that has different processes and consequences to traditional models 
of industrial capitalism.35 Zuboff outlines the duality of this new market form: outwardly, 
technological corporations present their data-gathering activities as a minor, peripheral element of all 
online spaces, complementing their effort to deliver ever-more-efficient and personalised ‘free’ 
services to users. This strategy obscures the significant value attached to personal data, the manner in 
which it is subsequently bought and sold on the marketplace, and the potential for behavioural 




33 Sreemoyee Mukherjee, How Poor Data Protection Can Endanger Communities During Communal Riots 
(2020) <https://thewire.in/rights/vahan-database-protection-riots> [Accessed 25 May 2020] 
34 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of 
Power (London: Profile Books Ltd., 2019). 
35 Zuboff, p. 18. 
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the idea of a proprietary ‘behavioural surplus’, Zuboff explains that the information which individuals 
willingly volunteer when they sign user consent policies is in fact only a fraction of the total wealth of 
data they produce, which is collected and traded ‘in a new kind of marketplace for behavioural 
predictions’ to companies with vested interests in the precise anticipation of human activities.36 In this 
way, users of networked devices are revealed not to be customers as internet giants would have them 
believe, nor products in themselves. They are rather the producers of a highly valuable raw material 
which has emerged into the market through a tripartite of preconditions: the ready availability of vast 
amounts of data, the infrastructure of data flows through artificially intelligent softwares, and the 
ubiquity of surveillance culture enabled by liberal exceptionalism.37 For Zuboff, the potential for this 
commercial model to give way to tyranny is twofold: it is simultaneously ‘unknowable’, hidden 
behind utopian pretences of technological liberation and leisure which mask gross disparities in 
knowledge, and ‘radically indifferent’, using impassive machine learning technologies to accelerate 
growth, no matter the human cost.38 Developing her argument through multiple accounts and analyses 
of the rise of the information economy and its impact on sovereignty and human rights to date, Zuboff 
introduces the concept of ‘instrumentarianism’, a novel mode of political and economic control which 
shares ideological roots with totalitarianism but is instead driven by competitive markets under a 
neoliberal regime, ‘in which automated machine processes not only know our behaviour but also 
shape [it] at scale.’39 Zuboff argues that for internet giants and the markets they participate within, ‘it 
is no longer enough to automate information flows about us; the goal is now to automate us,’ 
breaking away from older forms of tyranny as data capitalism offers extraordinarily subtle, invisible 
and ostensibly non-violent methods of control.40 Zuboff aims to bring these activities into the light by 
developing a terminology that exposes the pursuits and end goals of technological corporations, 
producing a text that not only stands as a chilling account of the capitalist landscape that underpins 
the ‘third modernity’ of digitally-augmented neoliberalism and its social order, but provides an 
 
36 Zuboff, p. 20. 
37 Ibid. 




intellectual framework to navigate the complex relationship this will have with an increasingly 
individualised subject.41  
 
Although Surveillance Capitalism is still relatively new to the market there is no shortage of critical 
scholarship which engages with the text, offering diverse insights from the fields of political 
economy, surveillance studies, feminism, postcolonialism, and others. Evgeny Morozov’s meticulous 
appraisal investigates the origins of Surveillance Capitalism across four decades of Zuboff’s prior 
research, which began as a study of information technology within the workplace. Morozov traces 
major shifts in Zuboff’s reasoning since the release of her 1988 book The Age of the Smart Machine, 
in which she proposed that automation and other digital technologies would bode well for ‘boosting 
workers’ capacities for abstract and imaginative thinking and reversing the de-skilling process.’ 
Notably, this refutes the contemporary Marxist reflections on the modern workplace under capitalism, 
and points towards a pivotal shift in Zuboff’s perspective around the turn of the millennium 
associated with the proliferation of internet-based activity.42 From here, Morozov raises a number of 
issues with The Age of Surveillance Capitalism’s critical position: while Zuboff states that her book 
undertakes an ‘initial mapping of a terra incognita’ – a mapping, in other words, of the internal 
physics of an allegedly ‘rogue’ mode of capitalist exploitation - she does not engage with the 
substantial theoretical corpus of both surveillance and capitalism. Consequently, Zuboff’s 
commentary on the specific ways in which the two forces traffic together presupposes that the 
exploitative socioeconomic and political outcomes of ‘instrumentarianism’ only manifest within the 
parameters of the network.43 Lawrence captures this problem particularly well: ‘by seeking to 
explicate, and denounce, the novel dynamics of surveillance capitalism, Zuboff normalises too much 
in capitalism itself.’44 As though corporate manipulation, deception, and indifference were unique to 
the current technological phase, Zuboff’s text curiously resists against the possibility that other 
historical and philosophical models may be adapted to fit the requirements of a new discourse on 
 
41 Zuboff, p. 40. 
42 Evgeny Morozov, Capitalism’s New Clothes <https://thebaffler.com/latest/capitalisms-new-clothes-morozov> 
[Accessed 17 January 2020] 
43 Zuboff, p. 17. 
44 Lawrence. 
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power, knowledge, and control - including Foucault’s ‘governmentality’,45 Antonio Gramsci’s theory 
of cultural hegemony,46 Deleuze’s ‘society of control’ and others.47  
 
This reveals the first major problem with Zuboff’s project: lacking a foothold within the much-
contested but intellectually and politically engaged literature, she stresses in superlative terms the 
‘unprecedented’, ‘unrecognisable’, and ‘universal’ nature of her model,48 Zuboff denies that the 
landscape she sees is in fact the ‘system working as intended.’49 Contrasting Silicon Valley 
developers - described as ‘conquistadors’, set on a course to colonise the last vestiges of human 
experience in a virtually lawless online sphere – against the utopian capitalist ‘digital dream’ which 
she anticipated in the latter part of the twentieth century, Zuboff reveals that her interpretation of the 
information economy is not informed by decades of scholarship, which shows a very different 
picture.50 This leads us to the most surprising of omissions in Zuboff’s commentary: her text only 
invokes Marx’s ‘old image of capitalism as a vampire that feeds on labour’ as a metaphor to launch 
her own distinct vision of data capitalism which ‘feeds on every aspect of every human’s 
experience.’51 Blayne Haggart, among others, takes issue with these separate images, asserting that 
'[behavioural surplus] bears some resemblance to Marx’s notion of “surplus labor” — but Zuboff also 
contends that behavior and human experience are raw material, not labor, without quite explaining the 
differences’.52 Zuboff’s oblique references to Marx only draw into sharper focus the gaps between 
Surveillance Capitalism’s claim to novelty and the existing critical work that has been done to apply 
Marx to the contemporary workplace and society at large, which provides useful insights into the 
shifting parameters of contemporary labour. 
 
45 Bruce Curtis, ‘Foucault on Governmentality and Population: The Impossible Discovery’, The Canadian 
Journal of Sociology 27.4 (2002) 505-533 (p. 505). 
46 Adam Morton, Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony and Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy 
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Read identifies the micro-political nature of labour and subjectivity as it is transmuted under the 
current capitalist mode of production, which goes some way to simplify the complications in Zuboff’s 
work. Read explores the ideas outlined in a discarded draft of Capital to understand how the 
exaggerated continuation of capitalist logic of accumulation has surpassed the boundaries of the 
workplace, subordinating all social interactions to the operations of Marx’s factory: 
Marx argues that as the cooperative and social powers of labor develop, the capitalist mode 
of production becomes increasingly dependent on social knowledge, cooperation, and 
communication. Wealth is no longer produced by bodies put to work in the closed spaces of 
the factory but by knowledge, communication, and interactions throughout society. This 
simultaneous recognition of subjectivity as pure “subjection” and subjectivity as collective 
power, combined with the fact that all of this is developed in an abandoned draft, would 
seem to suggest that we are at a, if not the, “limit” of Karl Marx’s thought.53 
 
Read’s argument points towards a further lacuna in Zuboff’s teleological construction of surveillance 
capitalism: the relevance of concepts such as cognitive capitalism and immaterial labour, arising from 
a heterodox ‘post-workerist’ strand of postwar Italian Marxism. Maurizio Lazzarato, a prominent 
sociologist and philosopher of the Autonomia Operaia movement, notes that capitalism ‘seeks to 
involve even the worker's personality and subjectivity within the production of value’, drawing 
emotions and personal dispositions into the same practice of intellectual objectification and 
compelling workers to ‘express oneself, [to] speak, communicate, and so forth’ through a ‘discourse 
that is authoritarian’.54 This assimilation of individuality into the managerial hierarchies of modern 
organisational structures causes ‘the worker's soul to become part of the factory,’ positioning Zuboff’s 
‘behavioural surplus’ as an extension of established capitalist pursuits facilitated by the surveillant 
assemblages embedded in digitised life, such as productivity monitoring software, the recording of 
worker/customer conversations, and so on.55 Lazzarato also notes that the internal constitution of 
immaterial labour in technologically advanced workplaces has ‘expressed itself as a clash between 
social classes within the organization of work’, revealing the inherent disparities between social 
groups at differing levels of the factory hierarch, who are impacted by and subjected to operations of 
 
53 Read, p. 104. 
54 Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Immaterial Labour’, Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics (1996) 133-148 (p. 
136). 
55 Lazzarato, p. 134. 
19 
immaterial labour extraction and surveillance more broadly in varying ways.56 The work of Silvia 
Federici, Selma James, Mariarosa Dalla Costa, and others advance this conceptual point through the 
lens of gender, drawing unpaid domestic labour and the performance of specific gender roles for 
profit into debates on wage labour, launched by the Italian feminist movement lotta femminista.57 ‘To 
have a wage means to be part of a social contract,’ writes Federici in Wages Against Housework, ‘but 
it has been transformed into a natural attribute of our female physique and personality, an internal 
need, an aspiration, supposedly coming from the depth of our female character.’58 This indicates a 
further body of work left under-examined in Zuboff’s construction of behavioural surplus as an 
entirely unprecedented invention of surveillance capitalists. 
 
The second notable issue in Zuboff’s text is the sharp distinction between totalitarian and 
‘instrumentarian’ power. The history of state surveillance is largely ignored here; while Zuboff notes 
that digital corporations are increasingly coming to resemble tyrannical states, comparing their 
imperatives for growth to Hannah Arendt’s well-known analyses of totalitarianism, she concludes that 
instrumentarian power is unique because it only originates in the commercial sphere.59 Setting aside 
the issue of increasing public/private partnerships, Zuboff goes so far as to blame the societal 
ignorance of surveillance capitalism on the ‘imagined threat’ of institutional surveillance, which has 
increasingly permeated into public discourse over recent decades. However, this does not take into 
account the origins of some of the most recognisable surveillant features of digital life, including 
location technologies like Global Positioning Systems (GPS), which developed out of the investment 
of state actors.60 Christian Fuchs’ useful reflection on the definitional complications of surveillance 
stresses that the term ‘is inextricably bound up with coercion, domination, and (direct or indirect; 
physical, symbolic, structural, or ideological) violence’, raising the question of how far 
instrumentarian power can be seen to be a departure from either liberal-democratic capitalist or 
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totalitarian systems of exploitation.61 Fuchs points out that in spite of the surfeit of market interests in 
data collection, both corporations and states continue to constitute ‘central surveillance actors’, 
pointing us back towards the continued existence of the traditional, institutional panoptic model’s 
limitless visibility – sharing a fundamental philosophy with the omniscient ambitions of 
totalitarianism. While Zuboff implies that political and economic surveillance should be thought of as 
separate phenomena with vested interests in different objectives, the shared foundation of human 
exploitation means that they are not so easily separated.  
 
The relationship between state and corporate entities is neither wholly cooperative nor 
straightforwardly separable - drawing attention to the lack of attention The Age of Surveillance 
Capitalism pays to the productive disagreements that have shaped contemporary understandings of 
totalitarianism and surveillance, such as those present within the field of political economy. Fuchs 
assesses the normalisation of contemporary surveillance through the positive or neutral definitions 
theorists ascribe to it, arguing that although surveillance can constitute ‘harmless information 
processes that do not inflict damage on humans’, distancing ‘new’ digital surveillance from existing 
models of exploitation obstructs effective criticism of it.62 In a similar way, whilst Zuboff draws upon 
biopolitical theory, such as Agamben’s concept of the ‘state of exception’ to demonstrate the tactics 
of liberal ‘exceptionalism’ which surveillance capitalists exploit in order to operate undetected in the 
online spaces outside of international law,63 she deploys the model without reflecting upon the lively 
critical debates which interrogate Agamben’s formulation of the human in his view of ‘human rights’, 
and which challenge his notion of exception which does not refer to the inseparable history of colonial 
exploitation.64 The relationship between surveillance, human rights and sovereignty in Zuboff’s work 
therefore requires a much more nuanced exploration, rather than a straightforward dismissal of 
totalitarianism as an outdated, obsolete predecessor to the new iteration of instrumentarian power. 
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This leads to the third shortcoming in Surveillance Capitalism: Zuboff’s historical analysis is 
anchored almost exclusively in the global North. At length, she stresses a vision of a ‘battle for power 
and profit as violent as any the world has ever seen […] ready to colonise technical developments for 
the sake of [capitalist] imperatives and growth.’65 It is all the more surprising, then, that Zuboff does 
not pause to consider how the financial exploitation of online space and human experience is 
modelled upon patterns of colonial occupation and extraction, bent towards the maximisation of 
profits and disregard for human freedoms. The philosophical mainstay of Zuboff’s various assertions 
relies upon (supposedly) universally egalitarian ‘western liberal democracies’, therefore its attempts 
to expose surveillance capitalism as a phenomenon with worldwide ramifications fails to take into 
account the unevenness of the capitalist global system, and the implications this will have across 
communities who use information technology in markedly different ways.66 Rafael Evangelista’s 
review of the text in Surveillance and Society notes: ‘There is a reason to believe that, just as 
industrial capitalism has a logic of […] exploitation of determined territories and populations - one for 
the centres of power and consumption, another for the periphery and production - the same happens 
with surveillance capitalism.’67 Zuboff’s insistence upon the ‘unprecedented’ comes apart when held 
up against a deeper understanding of the role of race in surveillance studies. In Dark Matters: On 
the Surveillance of Blackness, Simone Browne writes that ‘[s]urveillance is nothing new to black 
folks. […] Rather than seeing surveillance as something inaugurated by new technologies, such as 
automated facial recognition or unmanned autonomous vehicles (or drones), to see it as ongoing is to 
insist that we factor in how racism and anti-blackness undergird and sustain the intersecting 
surveillances of our present order.’68 While Zuboff’s work powerfully interrogates the movement 
towards greater inequalities in knowledge and power in specific spaces in the West, its emancipatory 
potential is seriously curtailed by its lack of an intersectional paradigm which would explore global 
variances and the condition of subalternity upon theories of surveillance and subordination, expressed 
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by Duncan’s call to ‘emphasise the privacy rights of those at the bottom of the power structure, and 
[refuse to] allow those who exercise power to conceal themselves.’69 As we have seen, fictional texts 
– particularly those which align to different conventions of sf and cognitive estrangement – are 
particularly well-equipped to represent experiences of exploitation and resistance, gesturing towards 
an opportunity to experiment with not only Zuboff’s text but other philosophical concepts relevant to 
the digital milieu through a broader frame of reference. 
 
The task of this dissertation is to engage with Zuboff’s concept of ‘instrumentarianism’ and its the 
associated concepts through a variety of analytical lenses to assess and recalibrate the book’s key 
shortcomings, arriving at an appraisal of Zuboff’s conclusions which gesture towards exit routes out 
of the dystopian trajectory she illustrates. Drawing the text into a productive dialogue with readings of 
contemporary fictional texts, philosophical and political theories, and relevant areas of literary 
criticism, I propose that the theoretical infrastructure Zuboff constructs nevertheless provides a useful 
vantage point from which to reflect on developments in capitalist exploitation, with its limitations 
gesturing towards the rich potential for future interrogation of these issues which literary studies can 
facilitate. I will begin by setting out the digital-spatial construction of the overlapping power systems 
of commercial and institutional surveillance, exploring how technological developments have altered 
the philosophical spheres of public and private space which established theories ordinarily rest upon. I 
will explore one representation of this new type of public space in Dave Eggers’ novel The Circle, 
examining the operations of immaterial labour within a fictional Silicon Valley and uncovering the 
unprecedented digital methods of exploitation and control that arise there. Next, I will consider the 
Zuboff’s view of ‘novel’ instrumentarianism against a biopolitical reading of Lauren Beukes’ 
Moxyland, a text that represents a peripheral digital landscape under an advanced form of post-
apartheid neoliberal rule. By expanding my topological analysis of public, private, and digital space 
along the lines of exceptionalism, I will consider the dimensions that exist outside of Zuboff’s view of 
instrumentarianism, which offer opportunities for subversion beyond the oppressive surveillant gaze.    
After considering Zuboff’s conceptual blueprints, in the second half of the dissertation I will turn my 
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focus to the proposals Zuboff makes in her concluding chapters, and consider how far her 
technologically regressive, liberal framework holds up against the exigencies of financial, political 
and environmental crisis. Comparing the two speculative worlds imagined in Margaret Atwood’s 
post-apocalyptic novel The Testaments and Richard Morgan’s futuristic cyberpunk thriller Altered 
Carbon, I will recast Zuboff’s argument against current debates on technological accelerationism, 
determining whether the digital network produced by a neoliberal infrastructure of oppressive market-
oriented surveillance may in fact offer the resources with which to undermine and break capitalist 
relations. Finally, I will consider the implications of AI and posthumanity on the trajectories Zuboff 
forecasts, exploring how the emergence of new kinds of cognition and networked collective action 
may impact the growth of surveillance capitalism beyond its current phase. 
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Chapter 1: Mapping the spaces of surveillance capitalism 
 
In 2016, one of Facebook’s most senior executives, Andrew Bosworth, circulated an internal memo 
assessing the impact of the company’s mission to ‘connect people’, concluding that the benefits of 
this imperative negated any criticism targeted towards the company’s position of neutrality. Titling 
the memo ‘The Ugly’, Bosworth wrote:70  
We connect people […] Maybe it costs a life by exposing someone to bullies. Maybe 
someone dies in a terrorist attack coordinated on our tools. And still we connect people. The 
ugly truth is that we believe in connecting people so deeply that anything that allows us to 
connect more people more often is de facto good.71  
 
The memo arrived within days of the real-time broadcasting of the murder of Facebook user Antonio 
Perkins. Perkins was using the recently-implemented Facebook Live function, which enables 
individuals connected within a social network to view a live feed of the user’s smartphone camera, to 
broadcast himself socialising with friends on a roadside in Chicago.72 Six minutes into the video, 
gunshots can be heard before the camera falls to the ground; Perkins was pronounced dead later that 
day. Against the wishes of the victim’s family, Facebook refused to remove the video because it was 
considered not to violate the company’s community standards, which only aim to protect against the 
‘glorification of violence’ or ‘celebrat[ing] the suffering or humiliation of others.’73 The video also 
attracted over one million views in the time it remained publicly available, generating significant 
traffic to the website.74 In the absence of industry-wide standards to identify and remove such content, 
‘The Ugly’ reveals Facebook’s relentless scaling of an interconnected ‘bigger picture’ which justifies 
any means for growth, viewing all human expressions as so many data points which are rendered 
universally lucrative in the eyes of its investors and advertisers.75 
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Through Facebook’s assimilation of life into a vast information system, Nikhil Sonnad sees 
connections between the company’s apathetic approach to the content it allows to be shared and the 
facilitation of ethnic and religious violence across the world, writing that ‘there are certain things you 
do not in good conscience do to humans, [but] to data, you can do whatever you like.’76 Sonnad’s 
description of Facebook’s ‘bumbling obliviousness to real humans’ as a ‘banal kind of […] evil’ 
recalls Hannah Arendt’s widely-cited expression in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, which assessed 
the court testimonies and historical evidence provided during the trial of Nazi bureaucrat Adolf 
Eichmann for his major operational role in carrying out the Holocaust.77 While it was widely held that 
the Nazi party’s leadership belonged to the depths of a conscious, monstrous form of evil, Arendt 
found that Eichmann was in fact a profoundly ‘average’ careerist who was motivated by personal 
advancement rather than ideology, over-stated his own levels of education, intelligence, and skills, 
and revealed a fundamental inability to think independently from the ‘stock phrases and self-invented 
clichés’ of the regime to which he belonged.78 According to Arendt, it was Eichmann’s lack of 
judgment and a chasm of difference between his line of reasoning and the reality of his actions – a 
‘word-and-thought-defying banality’ - which laid the foundations for a flagrant normalisation of 
cruelty, and the ‘long course in human wickedness’ which ensued.79 While the Israeli court grappled 
with the question of ‘fulfilling the demands of justice’ for war crimes so diabolical and extensive, 
Arendt developed an approach to the inner contradictions and remorselessness of Eichmann’s defence 
which, for her, fit the seriousness and abnormality of the event.80 Arendt’s incorporation of irony and 
humour as a ‘vehicle of resistance’ to the bureaucratic evil committed by Eichmann, in spite of 
widespread outrage from her readership, proved to be an effective ‘platform for passing judgment’ 
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Kerstin Steitz finds Arendt’s facetious humour a vital feature of her ‘political rhetoric’, which serves 
to undermine the broader Nazi ideology through an ‘insistence on the moral imperative of judging, 
thinking independently, and resisting evil’.82 At once illustrating her own ‘intellectual and moral 
superiority to Eichmann’ and ‘transform[ing] her readers into accomplices in the matter of passing 
judgment,’ Arendt introduces a lens which obliterates the idea that all evil-doers must possess the 
‘demonic depth’ of a Shakespearean villain; in the modern world, tyranny and mass murder can be 
carried out by highly ordinary people.83 The concept has not been treated uncritically in contemporary 
reflections – Steven Miller writes that Arendt’s rationale is implicitly deterministic, leading to the 
suggestion that ‘evil is less a choice than the outcome of certain circumstances’ – yet Eichmann in 
Jerusalem’s nuanced confrontation of the individuals responsible for industrial-scale persecution 
yields a useful point of departure to begin thinking through the capacity for evil at the hands of ‘Big 
Tech’ in our present.84 Sonnad concedes that the irresponsible business objectives of social networks 
cannot be equated to the horrors of the Nazi’s pursuit of a racially singular utopia, but he argues that 
the fundamental problem remains the same: internalised propagandising of an ideology which 
alleviates individual moral responsibility, and an organisational culture which sedates critical thinking 
in favour of personal reward and an arbitrary ‘de facto good’.85  
 
While the circulation of disturbing social media content was nothing new at the time of Bosworth’s 
memo, one of the examples he identified as a potential consequence of the company’s steadfast 
neutrality has since proven to be catastrophically prescient, striking at the heart of Facebook’s 
particular brand of ‘banal’ evil. In 2019, far-right terrorist Brenton Tarrant live-streamed two separate 
attacks on mosques in Christchurch during Friday prayers, murdering 51 people.86 The video was 
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nationalism and anti-immigrant rhetoric, encouraging others to carry out similar acts of mass 
violence, which was distributed online shortly before the attack.87 That this violence – and its roots in 
‘alt-right’ discourse, white separatism and hate speech - was anticipated by Facebook’s executives 
years prior but shrugged off as ‘operational scaling issues’ foregrounds Zuboff’s appeal for 
accountability over the responsibilities and authority of internet companies, so we might more easily 
recognise and pre-empt new forms of tyranny and political evil on the horizon.88 Meanwhile, the 
relevance of Arendt’s intellectual legacy in the information age provides us with an opportunity to 
reorient our understanding of evil away from ‘demonic profundity’, considering with greater clarity 
the ‘nature and function of human judgment’ and the often ‘administrative’ qualities of modern 
atrocities. 89   
 
There are several passages in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism where Zuboff’s blueprint for 
navigating the present issues are anchored within certain elements of Arendt’s writings. Zuboff 
dedicates an entire chapter of her text to the implications of humanity’s ‘right to a future tense’, a 
right she argues is now under threat from ‘behaviour futures markets’ and ‘prediction products’, 
drawing upon Arendt’s understanding of free will to present an image of unprecedented behavioural 
manipulation and control.90 At length, she equates her own concerns for the future with Arendt’s, 
riffing off a widely-cited quote from the The Origins of Totalitarianism: ‘the true problems of our 
time cannot be understood, let alone solved, without acknowledgement that instrumentarianism 
became this century’s curse only because it so terrifyingly took care of its problems’.91 While these 
components of Arendt’s thinking are useful counterpoints to call attention to the unique ways in 
which totalitarian ideology operates within a digital network, Arendt’s theoretical corpus is 
significantly under-utilised in other parts of the text as Zuboff attempts to chart the territories of social 
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human-technology relationships, and the languages and theories required to shape successful 
intervention strategies.  
 
Zuboff insists that we live within a historically novel political-economic system, similar to 
totalitarianism in the scope of its utopian ideological foundations and the threat it poses to democracy, 
but characterised by a ‘radical indifference’ to the information it collects or the consequences of its 
business practices.92 Unlike twentieth century totalitarianism and fascism which found its roots in an 
ideology bent on racial hierarchies, instrumentarianism proceeds from neoliberal foundations, 
achieving growth through a fundamental disinterest in the qualities of the data being extracted. Led by 
corporations rather than political parties, behavioural modification and control is achieved through a 
total assimilation of individual identity, social interactions, and biological data into a readable 
‘electronic text’ to be fed into the profit-making directives of automated instruments. Ideal behaviours 
are defined by corporate interests belonging to ‘the owners of the means of behavioural modification 
and the clients whose guaranteed outcomes they seek to achieve.’93 While Zuboff’s references to The 
Origins of Totalitarianism offer a useful historical grounding to her book’s concepts, Arendt’s other 
theoretical writings on power, political evil, imperialism, and tyranny offer many more relevant 
resources which can be applied to launch an effective critique on the preconditions and spatial 
dimensions of surveillance capitalism. If surveillance capitalism’s pursuit for limitless growth 
replicates Arendt’s model of imperialism, wherein ‘[e]xpansion as a permanent and supreme aim of 
politics’ signalled a ‘surprising’ change within a ‘long history of political thought and action’, it 
stands to reason that the processes of ‘Big Other’ are a logical continuation of capitalism but are 
operating within a fundamentally altered sphere – an essential point that is not made clear in Zuboff’s 
book.94 Interrogating the specific technological terrain which has shaped the architecture of the 
current regime of power emerges as an important first step to consider the ‘unprecedented’ nature of 
instrumentarianism.  
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The relationship between public and private realms is one of the most salient aspects of Arendt’s 
influential text The Human Condition. It establishes a useful structure to investigate how the new 
geographies of social media have blurred the boundaries and terms of reference for political and 
social zones. Originally articulated as a space of ‘democratic and rational’ discourse by Jürgen 
Habermas,95 the public sphere in Arendt’s account draws upon classical Greek philosophy to develop 
her notion of a ‘space of appearance’, or ‘wherever men are together in the manner of speech and 
action’.96 Arendt defines this space as always ‘potential’, only actualised by the power which is 
generated by the productive actions of ‘acting and speaking’ individuals, ‘where words are not used to 
veil intentions but to disclose realities, and deeds are not used to violate and destroy but to establish 
relations and create new realities.’97 Arendt locates political life or bios politikos in the production of 
culture and community that outlasts the end of bare human existence, ‘rooted in a world of manmade 
things which it never leaves or altogether transcends.’98 Arendt’s theory of action is based upon two 
key terms: freedom, defined as the ‘capacity to begin, to start something new, to do the unexpected’, 
and plurality, understood as the ‘presence and acknowledgment of others’ to provide context and 
meaning without which the political assertion of action would be impossible.99 Conversely, the private 
realm corresponds to the ‘sphere of the household and the family’ which Arendt associates with 
humans’ status as the animal laborans, or the labouring animal, which predates politics and the 
existence of the public sphere.100 This is a state in which humans labour in order to sustain their basic 
existence, and a state which Arendt acknowledges is essential; nevertheless, in her view it is 
antithetical to political life.101 Through this distinction between the two facets of human activity, 
Arendt introduces a logic to the trajectory of modernity that runs counter to the heavily idealised 
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‘state of nature’ held at the centre of a dominant philosophical tradition dating back to Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau.102 Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves summarises her line of thought: 
For Arendt modernity is characterized by the loss of the world, by which she means the 
restriction or elimination of the public sphere of action and speech in favor of the private 
world of introspection and the private pursuit of economic interests […] the modern age, by 
elevating labor, the most natural of human activities, to the highest position within the vita 
activa, has brought us too close to nature. Instead of building and preserving the human 
artifice and creating public spaces for action and deliberation, we are reduced to engage in the 
activity of sheer survival and in the production of things that are by definition perishable.103 
 
Arendt suggests that the ‘dividing line’ between the public and private has become ‘entirely blurred’ 
through the emergence of the social sphere, enabling labour - an activity previously held solely within 
the household - to ‘assume public significance’,104 transforming ‘all modern communities into 
societies of labourers and jobholders.’105 In this way the private realm, in a few short centuries, has 
encroached upon the political capabilities of freedom and plurality, bringing to the fore a collective 
preoccupation with isolating work in place of meaningful collective action and giving rise to the 
‘bureaucratic administration […] elite domination and the manipulation of public opinion […] [and] 
homogeneity and conformity’ which she extensively critiques across her other writings.106 
 
As widespread domestic use of networked media beckons the events of the outside world into devices 
that are now within immediate reach for significant parts of the population, Arendt’s spatial theory 
requires modification in light of changing technological capabilities and modes of communication. At 
face value, the space of appearance produced by social media could be assumed to be a powerful 
force in facilitating and actualising Arendt’s vision – a democratising platform where equal 
participation and visibility is now possible for many, providing fresh opportunities for human 
togetherness and action within digital communities. However, within this period of remarkable global 
political polarisation there has been a renewed critical interest in The Human Condition’s ‘loss of the 
world’ in the light of current technological developments. Sean Norton, for example, points out that 
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whilst Arendt demonstrated a concern with the way the private sphere ‘overpower[s]’ the public, this 
evolution has since experienced a reversal; social networks, a complex machinery geared specifically 
towards the instantaneous sharing of messages and media, now forms an ‘exact copy’ of the space of 
appearance located ‘everywhere’, including within the private spaces of the home and work.107 The 
manner in which participation operates within this ‘digital public square’, a space where individuals 
must continually answer to the prompt of ‘who we are’,108 has obliterated the possibility of Arendt’s 
original view of the private as a zone protected from the constant demands for self-definition and 
differentiation ‘implicit in both [our] words [and] deeds.’109 Norton concludes that increased political 
radicalisation and ‘partisan tribalism’ within the actual public square can be traced back to the 
assimilation of media, and especially the immediacy of social media, into everyday life, where ‘every 
person lives almost entirely within the space of appearance’, ultimately becoming trapped in an 
addictive stimulus-response loop.110 Further to Norton’s contemporary reflection on Arendt, the 
concept of the ‘echo chamber’ also changes the dynamics of what Arendt called the ‘public’. 
Distinguished from existing concepts like groupthink and confirmation bias due to its unique 
provenance within digital spaces, an echo chamber forms within a closed network or community 
borne out of the repeated exposure of particular news media and messaging reflected back onto the 
existing values and beliefs of the group, insulating members from critical challenge and reinforcing 
individual worldviews and prejudices.111 In addition to this, as we have seen from Zuboff’s text, the 
algorithms which work to create these spaces are premised explicitly on a competitive demand for the 
growth of market share. Arendt could not have predicted the shifting parameters of what now 
constitutes the experience of the public square for many people, which will remain an important factor 
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in my own exploration of the multiple valences of digital visibility and power, and the psychological, 
political, and economic impact this will have on communities now and into the future. 
 
I have highlighted the importance of Marxist and Foucauldian traditions of thought - as well as 
subsequent updates to their theoretical models - to Zuboff’s project; I will now revisit these concepts 
to explore how a political-spatial approach to social networks and the internet interfaces with this 
theoretical apparatus, capturing the complexity of relationships of power under information 
capitalism. Following Zuboff, the central impetus of the ‘Big Other’ is to secure and trade vast 
amounts of personal data by invasively monitoring its users.112 Notably, the top rungs of the most 
valuable dot-com technology companies by market share are occupied both by social media 
companies and websites which do not appear to be social in nature but provide an opportunity for the 
space of appearance to become actualised through information capture and exchange. Consequently, 
top tech companies represent a significant proportion of the total activity of surveillance, automation, 
and advertising, and dominate the current global landscape of digital expansion.113 Arendt’s space of 
appearance and the spaces of surveillance conceived by Foucault are thus manifested in digital 
communities, with important ramifications for our understanding of the relative egalitarian and 
oppressive qualities of visibility within these spaces. Xavier Marquez has developed a useful 
approach to the ‘different but complementary’ strands of thought by suggesting each conception of 
space is insufficient within most contemporary contexts on its own, but that there is potential for the 
two theories to act as a corollary to one other, identifying an important distinction between 
‘horizontal’ and ‘vertical’ relationships of visibility and power:114 
Power in spaces of appearance depends on and reproduces horizontal relationships of 
equality, whereas power in spaces of surveillance depends on and reproduces vertical 
relationships of inequality. Moreover, the horizontal relationships characteristic of spaces of 
appearance enable participants in such spaces to escape the roles and rules that normalize or 
even oppress them in other spaces of social life, whereas the vertical relationships and 
oppressive visibility of spaces of surveillance tend to reinforce normalizing roles and rules, 
imposing particular identities on participants.115 
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Although Arendt and Foucault share a notion of power as circulatory, emerging only out of 
interactions as opposed to something that can be acquired and held, the role of visibility as a 
‘characteristic of social spaces and of the people who interact within them’ in their separate models 
produce a variety of outcomes for the individual subject depending on the context of the power 
relationship visibility expresses itself within.116 For Foucault, power is generated between institutions 
and hierarchical organisations; his more specific concepts of ‘biopower’ and ‘biopolitics’ relate to a 
strategic form of power expressed through the control and manipulation of populations by the state 
through ‘diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies’.117 These theories feed into an 
increasingly urgent concern over the biopolitical nature of technologically-empowered state and non-
state partnerships, cultivating a normalisation of biometric and biorhythmic data capture through 
tracking devices, as well as mainstream ‘datafication’ of public health systems and clinical care.118 
Foucault ‘remind[s] us to be suspicious enough to keep in mind that even normatively positive 
instances of collective power are or can become dangerous in their own way,’ delivering a useful 
counterpoint against the idealism of collective, revolutionary power formulated by Arendt.119 At the 
same time, when it comes to developing interventions for resistance against the current phase of social 
control, Foucault’s approach tends to result in perpetual dead ends, suggesting humans are fated to be 
‘trapped in an iron cage’.120 Reading Arendt and Foucault together enables a conceptual linkage of 
oppressive and egalitarian relationships in ways that are useful to my investigation of the terrain of 
social media and the internet more broadly, as new forms of visibility are cultivated digitally – for 
instance in the context of ‘sousveillance’, a term coined by Steve Mann which refers to the ‘inverse of 
surveillance’ where individuals reflect the top down model of the Panoptic gaze back onto their 
watcher, ‘using ‘wearable computing devices […] as a counter to organizational surveillance’.121 My 
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analysis develops out of an understanding that the two axes of power relationships in actual political 
and social spaces – and the quadrants of visibility which are perceptible within them, namely visibility 
which empowers or subjugates, and invisibility which empowers or subjugates – are inherited by the 
digital ‘copy’ of the public square, coexisting in ways which alternately resist and reify Zuboff’s 
illustration of social media and instrumentarian power.122 
 
The first half of this dissertation will subsequently proceed through an analysis of the fictional texts The 
Circle and Moxyland, which take the themes of privacy and publicity, political manipulation and 
control, and resistance to surveillance, and diverge along two very different dystopian trajectories. Each 
text illustrates an alternative world which conceptually similar to our own, with an all-pervading 
presence of social networks, life streaming, virtual relationships, and profit-making modes of 
surveillance, but with some key differences. The Circle takes place at a fictional eponymous 
organisation situated at the very heart of Zuboff’s surveillance capitalist system in Silicon Valley, while 
Moxyland presents an alternate-reality Cape Town in 2018, where the after-effects of apartheid 
encourage intense social stratification based on an individual’s financial, medical, and social data. The 
analytical lenses I will maintain throughout this section are threefold: the patterns and deviations from 
the processes Zuboff claims are now occurring globally, and the practical outcomes this will have upon 
individuals and communities; the real-world applications of the models put forward by Arendt, 
Foucault, Marx and others by assessing how far their theoretical diagnoses align to – or are subverted 
by - the situations actualised within the texts; and the practical outcomes these findings have for a range 
of critical fields which are actively developing modes of resistance against oppressive digital 
surveillance. By connecting the theoretical territories of post-workerism, postcolonialism, and 
biopolitics to surveillance studies, I will bring to light new ways of interpreting the shared spaces of 
Zuboff’s instrumentarianism and Arendt’s totalitarianism, and advance them beyond the limitations of 
Surveillance Capitalism.   
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Chapter 2: Instrumentarianism and the artificial public sphere in The Circle 
 
 
The surveillant assemblage is designed to pervade both the public and private spheres as they flow 
into one another through social, political, and financial processes. Biological and behavioural 
surveillance accounts for the new level of visibility, voluntary or not, which now goes hand in hand 
with access to the space of appearance, both of which are situated within a capitalist regime that 
profits from activities of production and consumption. Zuboff uses Google’s ‘Aware Home’, a system 
which would ‘constantly monitor’ the home’s inhabitants, to exemplify that the dynamic new modes 
of internet use which no longer require mediating devices will come to transform the ‘ancient’ notion 
of privacy and the ‘human-home symbiosis’ beyond recognition as part of our everyday existence.123 
It is this loss of the home as a ‘refuge’ and subsequent corporate absorption of private life which The 
Circle sheds light on, tracing the journey over the threshold from ‘home’ to ‘exile’.124 Social media 
companies are uniquely placed within the broader system of information capitalism to hold a 
particular influence on political and ethical issues, at once facilitating extraordinarily invasive 
surveillance strategies to capture the data of its users for its own ends, and ignoring the 
responsibilities concomitant with the platform’s capacity to enable harm on a massive scale. The 
exploitative tendencies of social media growth, a totalising project of assimilation and data mining 
which hides behind the superficial altruism of ‘bringing the world closer together’, is extended to its 
philosophical limits in The Circle.125 The text centres upon the interior ‘utopia’ of the eponymous 
mega-corporation ‘the Circle’, which in an alternate reality has come to subsume Apple, Facebook, 
Google, Twitter, Amazon, and virtually every other online competitor.126 The novel traces the shift in 
the company’s grand mission from an unsettlingly persistent technological optimism, where 
‘communication should never be in doubt’ and ‘understanding should never be out of reach’,127 to 
increasingly Orwellian levels of surveillance, including introducing compulsory voting laws linked to 
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each citizen’s public online profile, using social media polls based on ‘smiles’ and ‘frowns’ to 
determine whether or not to deploy a drone strike to the Middle East, and mapping the entire terrain 
of the globe with live-streaming button cameras.128 This development unfolds through the eyes of 
Mae Holland, a young woman who initially joins the Circle’s ‘Customer Experience’ department in 
what is presented as the lowest level of the company hierarchy, before being groomed into a poster 
child who embodies the organisation’s pursuit of knowledge and visibility at all costs.129 
 
The crux of the Circle’s success is straightforward enough: modelled upon the ubiquitous images of 
Silicon Valley startup figures, developer and CEO Tyler Gospodinov founded the Circle ‘after a year 
in college, with no particular business acumen or measurable goals.’130 Described as a ‘boy-wonder 
visionary’, Tyler’s main innovation, the ‘Unified Operating System’, assimilates all of the discrete 
elements of online life, including ‘users’ social media profiles, their payment systems, their various 
passwords, their email accounts, user names, preferences, every last tool and manifestation of their 
interests’ into a seamless single account which is inseparable from the real identity of the user.131 The 
phenomenon of internet ‘trolls’, which in The Circle’s universe ‘had more or less overtaken the 
Internet’, vanishes overnight, alongside the anonymous use of any online service.132 The system, 
named ‘TruYou’, transforms networked interactions to a state of universal civility with such 
immediacy that it is welcomed by companies and users alike, ‘crush[ing] all meaningful opposition’ 
from data privacy activists.133 The Circle subsequently holds endless tangible resources which it 
harnesses to create a workplace and broader digital architecture that resembles a pyramid scheme of 
visibility, where each level relies upon the recruitment of others to feed into the company’s total sum 
of content and data, ‘the Circle cloud’ which is ‘accessible to anyone’, presenting a juncture between 
both the democratisation of knowledge and the destruction of democratic process as we currently 
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know it.134 A number of elements that support the novel’s premise are unconvincing as a form of 
social commentary from the start: the practicalities of this overwhelming transformation are not 
clarified, drawing into question Eggers’ presentation of the drastic impact of transparency upon 
individual accountability and behaviour. In a similar manner, Eggers’ construction of the character Ty 
attempts to replicate a stereotypical figure of a white male Big Tech founder, without interrogating 
Ty’s culpability over the events of the novel, his assumed pseudo-genius image contrasted with an 
utter lack of foresight into the ethical implications of his digital innovations, or his feeble attempts to 
reverse the Circle’s ideology after implementing and personally profiting from it. In spite of these 
limitations, the text’s construction of a new rapidly-expanding space of visibility, forged in an 
explosion of US-based digital innovation, provides valuable insights into the rise of a new set of 
values rooted in the acts of ‘seeing and being seen’.135 Several aspects of Eggers’ novel offer 
particularly pertinent opportunities for analysis in relation to the political dimensions of surveillance 
capitalism. Mae is gradually and obliviously assimilated from a position of financially disempowered 
subjectivity into a well-paid role which nevertheless requires constant recording and measurement of 
all aspects of employee affectivity. Meanwhile, the company’s relentless pursuit of ‘solutions global 
and elegant and infinitely scalable’ resonates deeply with the culture of growth articulated by 
Facebook’s own senior executives.136 
 
The text reconstructs elements of panoptic power in a space of specifically top-down, oppressive 
surveillance at a physical and digital level in several clear ways. Most of the novel’s activity takes 
place at the Circle’s San Francisco headquarters or ‘campus’, which houses a workforce of ‘over ten 
thousand employees’.137 The transparent or otherwise highly visible aesthetics of the campus itself are 
stressed in superlative terms, calling attention to its physical similarities to the Panopticon: ‘four 
hundred acres of brushed steel and glass’ form a set of buildings arranged around a central lawn and 
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‘stone amphitheatre’,138 with every office ‘fronted by floor-to-ceiling glass, the occupants visible 
within’.139 While ‘neon’ lighting and a ‘lack of fingerprints, of any blemish whatsoever’ upon the 
building interiors suggest a clinically modern environment,140 each floor is framed by a ‘narrow 
catwalk of steel grating’ which is reminiscent of the industrial setting of a factory or prison.141 Even 
the company’s recreational areas, including outdoor seating ‘arranged in concentric circles’ and a 
cafeteria where ‘all of the floors and walls [are] glass’ limits the campus inhabitants’ spaces for refuge 
at any point in their working day.142 The establishment of this backdrop of transparency lays the 
foundation for the company’s ambition to grow their model outwards to the rest of the world, 
mirroring the psychological impact of constant public visibility and performance through the TruYou 
apparatus, and eventually through other surveillance tools. Eggers invokes pithy, informal titles for 
each successive innovation launched by the company, like ‘ChildTrack’ and ‘Demoxie’ – ‘democracy 
with your voice, and your moxie […] coming soon.’143 Despite the messaging of equality implicit in 
the various circular motifs integrated into the Circle’s branding and infrastructure, Eggers is at pains 
to emphasise its deeply hierarchical nature through a distinct set of processes. 
 
Eggers uses nicknames for each professional group to signal different levels of importance, obscuring 
the company’s many exploitative practices by departing from corporate conventions. While lower-
status staff are a monolithic group of ‘Circlers’, the three executives are referred to as the ‘Three Wise 
Men’,144 bestowed with Biblical and patriarchal significance – echoing Mae’s first impression of the 
campus as a ‘heaven’.145 The most important inner group of senior leadership is called the ‘Gang of 
40’, an ominous reference to the Chinese Communist Party ‘Gang of Four’ who were ‘convicted for 
implementing the harsh policies [of the] Party’ during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution, which also, 
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notably, provides the name of one of the campus buildings.146 Beyond setting up included and 
excluded groups by both seniority and specific occupations like ‘programmers’, ‘CE [Customer 
Experience] people’,147 and so on, the organisation maintains a vertical relationship of power through 
its ‘Participation Rank’ or ‘PartiRank’ algorithm, providing a public numerical rating for each 
employee calculated from their productivity, online and offline interactions, and general popularity.148 
Internal incentive systems designed to drive competition for profit are not new, however in the Circle 
the stakes are much higher; the top two thousand people, or ‘T2K’ are ‘maniacal in their social 
activity’ in order to keep their score and the level of visibility this affords them.149 To integrate this 
into working activities, the company provides each employee with at least three screens: one for 
work, one for their ‘Inner Feed’ of company-related social networking, and one for ‘intra-office 
messaging’ to the outside world.150 The relevance of this signifier of social status to one’s success is 
just one of the Circle’s many contradictions to ensure ‘totally optional’ events are compulsorily 
attended, keeping employees present either at the campus or online as long as physically possible.151 
The text’s landscape offers a theoretical extension of the shifting boundaries of labour identified by 
Read, where it is ‘no longer isolated in the factory or in other spaces but is extended across the social 
fabric to include the productive powers of knowledge, desire and communication.’152 Eggers’ book 
demonstrates the magnification of this dynamic when applied to women employees compared to men: 
from the moment she sets foot on campus, Mae regulates her emotions to convenience others and to 
improve her company performance as she repeatedly ‘twist[s] her mouth into a smile’, even when 
Tyler - under the guise of ‘Kalden’, removed from his superior professional status - ‘sense[s]’ her 
discomfort and asks to sit and watch while she works.153 She ‘feel[s] very unsettled’ but ‘laugh[s] 
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nervously’ to avoid telegraphing her feelings as he leans ‘close to her, far too close’,154 positioning 
Mae as ‘a servant relation with respect to the whole male world.’155 For the ‘utopian’ patriarchal 
company, the benefits of this exploitative culture - one which, notably, disproportionately demands 
the emotional labour and visibility of women - are threefold: maximum productivity in terms of timed 
waged labour, additional value from unpaid work to market the company via online presence, and the 
ready availability of the employees’ lucrative raw behavioural data.156 
 
The Circle’s internal hypocrisy crystallises an important connection between Zuboff’s concept of 
behavioural surplus and the theory of surplus value originally identified by Marx, and how both of 
these interact within Foucault’s conceptualisation of the institution. Zuboff discusses in detail the 
institutional context through which the rise of business models geared towards behavioural surplus 
flourished – namely through the liberal ‘exceptionalism’ of the US government, temporarily 
suspending privacy laws in the wake of the September 11th terror attacks to enable Google and other 
companies to test the limits of their data mining capabilities.157 However, Zuboff never reaches a 
complete understanding of the continued institutionalisation of behavioural surplus alongside extant 
theories of surplus value in the context of the information society she describes, for the latter concept 
has not come to eclipse the former but exists in symbiosis with it. In applying elements of Marx’s 
value theory to the transformative impact of digital technologies on the dynamic system of capitalism, 
Fuchs suggests that a focus on the dimension of time is critical in order to develop a ‘digital labour 
theory of value’ which recontextualises Zuboff’s preliminary ideas. He develops an illuminating 
model based on this principle:158 
Social media are expressions of the changing time regimes that modern society has been 
undergoing, especially in relation to the blurring of leisure and labour time (play labour), 
production and consumption time (prosumption), new forms of absolute and relative surplus 
value production, the acceleration of consumption with the help of targeted online advertising 
and the creation of speculative, future-oriented forms of fictitious capital.159 
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These key concepts are essential in demarcating the entrance into a new culture of work in the West, 
with changes to not only the spatial zones of work and home life as Arendt suggested with the ‘loss of 
world’, but now also to the essentially temporal organisation of leisure and wage labour, which the 
strategic powers behind the Circle have renovated through wearable devices, equipment, and a 
coercive culture which bears down upon the employee’s entire concept of privacy and personal 
time.160 Perhaps the most dangerous element of these changes is the manner in which exploitation is 
re-fashioned as desirable, progressive, and egalitarian; Mae sees a ‘visceral’ appeal in the ‘company 
dorms’, the on-site ‘mini-golf area, the movie theater, the bowling alleys’.161 During Book 1 of The 
Circle, Mae is still coming to terms with the growing levels of corporate oppression shaping her life, 
and struggles to navigate the ‘calibration between […] online life here at the company and outside 
it.’162 A point in the text which captures this tension particularly well is the interaction between Mae 
and her colleague Gina, who chastises her for failing to participate sufficiently on social media. When 
Mae refers to this as an ‘extracurricular’ task, Gina informs her that the company ‘sees your profile, 
and the activity on it, as integral to your participation here […] this company exists because of the 
social media you consider “extracurricular.”’163 This process of manipulation and assimilation into 
the contemporary capitalist organisation is effectively summed up by Chris Land and Scott Taylor: 
‘“work” – understood as a value producing activity – is increasingly concerned with communication 
and social reproduction, and often takes place outside formally designated employment time/space, 
leading to the idea that we live and work in a “social factory”.’164  
 
The Circle’s campus represents a zone where public and private time and space is assimilated into a 
culturally homogeneous whole and harnessed towards economic pursuits. The company’s messaging 
to present an idea of desirability around this culture is reinforced at every turn within Mae’s work 
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environment; for example, through screens which show ‘the day’s featured [social] activities’ on 
‘every elevator wall’.165 As Mae looks around she ‘felt her stomach cinch’, demonstrating the physical 
impact of the space the Circle constructs as she is overwhelmed by the intensity of the information.166 
Mae’s discomfort is amplified by the company’s refusal to set clear parameters between domestic, 
social and workplace activity and relationships, for instance through Eggers’ satirical reflection on 
excessively invasive approaches to disciplinary action; when an employee complains due to Mae’s 
failure to attend a trivial social event, the situation is all the more disturbing when a manager instructs 
the colleagues to ‘hug it out’, masking the violence inherent in the organisation’s forcible 
capitalisation of the private spheres of its workers.167 Understanding these instances of manipulation 
within the context of Foucault’s surveillance society and the institutional dynamics of power adds a 
further layer to the accelerated extraction and accumulation of not only surplus value but also the 
economically viable collateral data captured through social channels that the ‘Circlers’ both use and 
promote to others.168 Foucault observed that it was the Enlightenment’s discovery of ‘the liberties’ 
which caused it to ‘[invent] discipline’ in response, ‘constitut[ing] the technique, universally 
widespread, of coercion’.169 This is reflected in the duality of the Circle’s goals, at once working 
towards ‘equal access to the sights of the world […] the knowledge of the world […] all the 
experiences available in this world’, and committing itself to extremely exploitative methods to 
achieve these ends.170  
 
The manipulation of time and the abstraction of labour represented in The Circle accords with Fuchs’ 
observations of the ‘digital theory of value’ to such a degree that physical and digital presence 
becomes a kind of currency in and of itself, with little clarity over the units or speed of work which 
must be produced in the working day, typically associated with industrial modernity and the figure of 
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the ‘Fordist worker’.171 The company implements a new system called ‘CircleSurveys’, an automated 
headset and microphone system which gleans data from Mae about her ‘tastes, her preferences, her 
buying habits and plans, for use by the Circle’s clients.’172 Although answering the system’s prompts 
is presented as ‘a reward, an honour, and an enjoyable one’ and not a task included within her waged 
work, competition is still encouraged, as ‘most people can do five hundred in an hour.’173 This 
triggers the first expressions of Mae’s psychological distress when her attempts to multitask leave her 
drained, ‘feeling the familiar tear, the growing blackness’ which revisits her throughout the text.174 In 
a moment Mae considers ‘blasphemous’, she pauses briefly to consider the consequences of her job 
on her mental state, only to push the thought away as quickly as it arrives: 
Her brain contained too much […] the volume of information, of data, of judgments, of 
measurements, was too much, [and] having all of it constantly collated, collected, added and 
aggregated, and presented to her as if that all made it tidier and more manageable – it was too 
much. But no. No, it was not, her better brain corrected. No.175 
 
Eggers’ stylistic use of syndetic and asyndetic coordination in the excerpt above evokes Mae’s state 
of being psychologically overwhelmed at many points in the text, only to reject her growing 
realisation with the repetition of ‘no’, constructing a sense of fragmentation and cognitive dissonance 
as her inconsistent thought patterns only lead her to commit herself more fully to the organisation.176 
At another point when she is enrolled into a ‘special program’ to improve her productivity, Mae’s 
sudden sense of self ‘disgust’ at having only done the ‘bare minimum’ triggers a period of obsession 
with her performance metrics which bleeds through into the third person narrative, blurring the 
distinction between Mae’s internal voice and the perspective of the narrator.177 As she desperately 
tries to improve her ‘PartiRank’ score, every sentence across a series of pages is punctuated by 
numbers and repetition, listing the various statistics that needed to be monitored:  
There was the number of recent invitations to Circle company events, 41, and the number 
she’d responded to, 28. There was the number of overall visitors to the Circle’s sites that day, 
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3.2 billion, and the number of pageviews, 88.7 billion. There was the number of friends in 
Mae’s OuterCircle, 762, and outstanding requests by those wanting to be her friend, 27.178 
 
The conclusion to this long section of listing leads Mae to an opposite affective response to the panic 
this section evokes: Mae believes that ‘what had always caused her anxiety, or stress, or worry, was 
not any one force […] It was internal: it was subjective: it was not knowing.’179 Bolstered by the 
messaging from her senior managers that ‘[w]e’re not automatons. This isn’t a sweatshop,’180 Mae 
repeatedly assures herself that the source of the ‘wave of despair’ which visits her ‘a few times a 
week’ is not caused by the obvious stressors she is subjected to through her work, but from being 
unable to access knowledge about everything – which neatly aligns to the Circle’s own narrative of its 
fundamental importance to the world.181  
 
As Mae’s data ‘self’ gradually engulfs her, so too does the company lay claim to her perspective on 
the world around her, and her mental state begins to deteriorate, manifesting as a ‘[tear] opening up 
inside her, a blackness overtaking her. She closed her eyes and heard underwater screams.’182 Again, 
the gendered implications of this process of exploitation is made clear: when Mae’s colleague Francis 
films and streams a sexual encounter between them without her consent, the organisation disregards 
Mae’s horror: ‘We don’t delete here, Mae.’183 As a result, Mae’s only recourse is to offer him ‘the 
beginnings of a smile’ to ‘pacify him’.184 Mae’s constant excoriation of natural public responses of 
discomfort and the subordination of her subjectivity to capitalist exploitation and surveillance propels 
further damaging behaviours of impulsivity, self-destruction and addiction, gesturing towards the 
still-emerging relationship between digital visibility, the workplace, and and psychological harm. 
Nevertheless, Eggers often implements incongruous reasoning for Mae’s behaviour, describing her 
response to Francis as a ‘surge of feeling for him, some mix of empathy and pity and even 
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admiration’, which problematises the gendered commentary Eggers attempts to undertake even as he 
critiques the patriarchal nature of corporate exploitation.185 
 
As it perpetuates and entrenches the belief that its economic imperatives – thinly veiled by ideological 
and humanitarian goals - will fix the problems of its workers, the Circle provides a useful 
philosophical arena wherein the concepts developed in autonomist Marxist theory can be extrapolated 
and actualised. Returning to the concept of immaterial labour, Lazzarato explains how organisations 
have evolved to ‘[conceal] the fact that the individual and collective interests of workers and those of 
the company are not identical’.186 Lazzarato expands upon the ‘new power relations’ engendered by 
the centralisation of communication to the processes of work, which now constitute ‘a series of 
activities that are not normally recognized as “work” – in other words, the kinds of activities involved 
in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, and, more 
strategically, public opinion […] [which] have since the end of the 1970s become the domain of what 
we have come to define as “mass intellectuality”.’187 Many of these activities can be seen taking place 
in The Circle; as a byproduct of the workers’ social media activity and ‘CircleSurveys’ contributions, 
‘Circlers’ are provided with ‘Conversion Rate’ and ‘Retail Raw’ statistics which reveal the ‘gross 
retail price of the commerce’ influenced by each individual, and subsequently show workers ‘how to 
provoke, how to stimulate purchases […] Leveraging your credibility to spur action.’188 This reflects 
research into the impact of influencers upon ‘viral’ marketing campaigns dating back to at least 2011, 
importing ‘consumer norms’ into the context of social media.189 Zuboff also argues that the ‘social 
influencer’ performs a key role in the digital organisation’s customer-facing marketing apparatus, set 
to deploy ‘emotional’ content which not only steers consumers towards specific choices but also 
assists in determining ‘how and when to intervene in the state of play which is your daily life’ by 
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stimulating users to reflect specific behaviours and emotions.190 Crucially for Lazzarato, ‘[w]hat 
modern management techniques are looking for is for “the worker’s soul to become part of the 
factory”’;191 this is perhaps the most successful element of Eggers’ text in making tangible the 
‘curious paradox’ of work in the information age, which ‘far from eliminating the antagonism 
between hierarchy and cooperation, between autonomy and command, actually re-poses the 
antagonism at a higher level, because it both mobilises and clashes with the very personality of the 
individual worker.’192 The duration of Mae’s employment within Customer Experience sets up this 
paradox as her manager reminds her that ‘no robots work here’, placing enormous value on the 
quality of the relationship between the Circle and its clients and the ‘satisfying, human and humane 
[customer] experience’, at the same time as using ‘boiler-plate answers’ to increase speed and 
pressuring customers for quantitative feedback.193 Paradoxically, the customer must therefore perceive 
the worker as human, while the worker must provide a service reduced to numerical values.  
 
Lazzarato describes immaterial labour as an ‘[interface] of a new relationship between production and 
consumption’ which ‘involves the permanent search for new commercial openings that lead to the 
identification of always more ample or differentiated product lines.’ For Zuboff, then, immaterial 
labour serves as one of several conduits for the extraction of surplus value from behavioural and 
biological data, by monitoring workers themselves and through the surveillance tactics that are 
attached to the ‘creative process’ of the ‘postindustrial commodity.’194 Reading The Circle in light of 
Lazzarato’s observations opens up a line of inquiry which assesses the finer points of Marquez’ 
delineation of spaces of appearance and surveillance: according to Marquez, one of the shortcomings 
of Arendt’s conceptualisation of visibility which ‘always’ empowers is its insistence upon the 
egalitarian potential of power through appearance which ‘both connects and separates people’, in that 
each individual recognises themselves as distinctly visible individuals and are thus equalised through 
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this logic, as opposed to oppressive visibility which is designed so that one cannot communicate with 
or identify the watcher.195 In this view, ‘the normal status and class distinctions that regulate 
interaction in everyday life are temporarily (albeit imperfectly) suspended and no longer pose large 
obstacles that prevent participants from treating each other as equals’, disregarding the material 
inequalities which allow or prevent access to different spaces of appearance, and thus access to the 
generation of power.196 The limits of the notion that ‘power is […] independent of material factors’ in 
the space of appearance are explored by Eggers with varying degrees of success.197 Ironically the only 
characters in The Circle who are permitted refuge from constant visibility are the powerful men who 
run the company and eradicate privacy for everyone else: Tyler disguises his true identity by adopting 
the alter ego of ‘Kalden’, interacting with Mae at his whim and remaining elusive on the social 
networks and company tools he created, which causes Mae distress and leads her to suspect that he is 
‘some kind of corporate spy.’198 Bailey, despite basing his leadership on an ideology that no 
knowledge or experience should ever be off-limits, nevertheless has a secret office and library hidden 
from the rest of the campus, which Annie is extremely cautious to reveal to Mae – ‘you have to give 
me a verbal non-disclosure agreement, okay?’199 Whilst the TruYou technology would suggest, 
through its removal of online anonymity and equal visibility for all users, a horizonal relationship of 
power, the fact that optional invisibility is only afforded to the most superior (male) members of the 
hierarchy replicates the Panopticon model, with the viewer - in Zuboff’s words – being ‘unknowable 
to us’.200 While there may be an illusion of permeability throughout the organisation, ‘the immaterial 
labour of creation is limited to a specific social group and is not diffused except through imitation’, 
and in this fictional example creation is associated with access to private refuges and with the symbols 
of patriarchal leadership.201 
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Where these aspects of the text provide an effective commentary on the factors which drive workers 
into becoming complicit in one another’s oppression in the ‘social factory’, Eggers concludes each 
breakdown in Mae’s limited social and familial relationships with the same reasoning: her religious 
dedication to the Circle is toxic to those around her.202 While Mae’s more modest socioeconomic 
background is compared to Annie’s extraordinarily privileged one towards the end of the text – ‘Mae 
had to win, or at least do well, to justify the subsidy the college had provided her’,203 whereas 
‘Annie’s family line went back to the Mayflower’ – Eggers only dedicates minimal parts of the text to 
exploring the financial pressure and interlinked gendered expectations put upon Mae to make the 
choices that she does.204 Eggers implies that Mae’s actions are a result of selfish ambition, 
overzealous loyalty, and ignorance, as opposed to a complex set of factors including financial need, 
being a young adult whose parents are facing destitution as a result of ‘unnecessarily cruel’ healthcare 
insurance policies.205 This minimises the depth behind Mae’s desire to be ‘no burden’;206 when she 
negotiates company cover for her father’s multiple sclerosis healthcare costs, her mother tells her that 
she has ‘saved not just your father’s life but my life, too’,207 and when she next returns home she 
observes the ‘various ways the health of [her] father had improved’.208 Mae’s subsequent 
estrangement from her parents plays out as though the Circle’s invasion of their privacy would not 
result in enormous internal conflict for both parties due to the emotional, financial, and health-related 
consequences of cancelling the arrangement. In Eggers’ bid to amplify the totalising power of the 
Circle, he therefore fails to sufficiently capture the nuances of immaterial labour and visibility as 
subtle, coercive tools for social control, often operating in much more insidious and understated ways 
than the Circle’s outright dogma. Further to this, Mae’s strikingly naïve attitude towards the wider 
world beyond her Circle colleagues, ‘a Third World experience, with unnecessary filth, and 
unnecessary strife and unnecessary errors and inefficiencies’, points towards a significant omission in 
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the text which reveals further limitations in Eggers’ attempt to present millennial life under 
information capitalism: the total absence of discussion about people who are affected by the Circle, 
but who do not occupy space within its exclusive community.209 For instance, the company’s 
maintenance and service staff, who must surely be present and thus highly visible around the campus 
to keep it in its ‘immaculate’ state, are surprisingly not considered important to the text, despite the 
fact that the existence of this sub-group draws into question the Circle’s authoritarian approach to 
equality, and challenges Mae’s privileged, single-minded view that the whole world must share and 
benefit from the totalising ideology of her echo chamber.210 
 
Also strikingly absent from the text is any degree of recognition of the varied populations who are 
affected by the Circle’s methods for the accumulation of wealth; Silicon Valley’s aggressive 
neocolonial extraction of natural resources from the global South is certainly a key part of its 
destructive power, offering a conspicuous counterpoint to its pseudo-humanitarian efforts. Since 
Eggers draws several parallels between the Circle and Apple, the recent revelations of inhumane 
conditions imposed upon mineral miners who provide the raw materials for iPhones offer a pertinent 
example.211 These diverse implications of technological oppression are blanched from Eggers’ text, 
rendering his social commentary less convincing. It is not clear whether the lowest paid members of 
the workforce are included in the ‘10,981 staffers’212 who participate in the ‘closing of the Circle’, 
leaving one to conclude that the dangers of the technologies augured in The Circle should only 
concern those wealthy enough to own it.213 While Eggers commits to the notion that visibility renders 
individuals vulnerable to oppression, the point is lost when we turn our attention to the status and 
relative power of figures who are not visible within the text itself. The Circle also fails to come to any 
conclusions about the nature of racial inequality in its construction of a dystopian near-future; when it 
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is revealed that Annie is ‘a descendent of slave owners’ through the ancestry tracing technology 
‘PastPerfect’, she panics that ‘half the people of color I hired over the years are now suspicious of me. 
Like I’m some genetically pure intergenerational slave owner!’214 One of the few women of colour 
described in the text, Annie’s ‘go-to’ assistant Vicky, loses her job as a result of Annie’s discomfort 
with the truth of her ‘unimpeachable lineage’: ‘I’m letting her go tomorrow.’215 Annie’s racism and 
privilege is casually addressed in this manner at a few discrete points in the text, but only serves to 
propel her character arc, as the ‘stress, or shock, or simple exhaustion’ caused by the PastPerfect 
revelations leave her ‘catatonic’;216 elsewhere, the Circle and the world around it is presented as post-
racial, notably due to the fact that major structural inequalities like racism and sexism are not one of 
the many solutions the company’s ‘geniuses’ seek to address, and there are few distinct voices from 
people of colour in the text.217 For a novel which deals with the global dominance of an organisation 
with consequences for a vast part of humanity, Eggers limits his scope to the obvious oppression 
arising from the panoptic power operating within the campus and its social networks; Lazzarato points 
out that new forms of exploitation are ‘not obviously apparent to the eye, because [they are] not 
defined by the four walls of a factory […] [they are] outside in the society at large, at a territorial level 
that we would call “the basin of immaterial labour”.’218 Although his limited gendered critique 
provokes a widened understanding of the nuanced guises oppression takes within the information age, 
Eggers remains bound to the ‘image of the organisation of work and its social territory’ within Silicon 
Valley and the gleaming new products it offers.219 However, this analysis usefully provokes a 
reconsideration of the understanding of power I have constructed, as the relational power conceived 
by Foucault and Arendt is at cross-purposes with theories that deal with the most recent phases of 
work in the information age set out by Lazzarato and Fuchs. For Fuchs, power is something which 
can be accumulated, but it operates in three distinct areas: ‘money capital or economic power, 
 
214 Eggers, pp. 428-434. 
215 Eggers, p. 434. 
216 Eggers, p. 489. 
217 Eggers, p. 61. 
218 Lazzarato, p. 136. 
219 Lazzarato, 138. 
51 
decision-making institutional power, and meaning-making or cultural power’.220 Fuchs argues that 
this leads to ‘a multidimensional class society, in which economic, political and cultural elites control 
economic, political and cultural power.’221 Despite this, Fuchs points out that the process of 
accumulation can be ‘threatened by social struggles and economic, political and ideological crises’ 
which ‘break down the reproduction of accumulation’.222 There are therefore multiple conceptions of 
power which can be applied to this investigation: static, transferable economic power which enables a 
concomitant accumulation of power within cultural and political zones; relational institutional power 
which is ‘diffused and embodied’ in normalising and oppressive discourses; and relational positive 
power within spaces of appearance, which generates resisting discourses but disappears the moment 
collective action ceases.223 Where Arendt ‘struggled to account’ for the ‘essential connections’ 
between public, private, social, and political spheres, Fuchs and Marquez’ observations of power, 
time, and space reveal the porous conceptual boundaries between each zone within digital society.224 
 
The Circle is a text situated at the origins of surveillance capitalism in Zuboff’s terms, ‘an American 
invention’,225 born out of the ‘neoliberal zeitgeist that equated government regulation of business with 
tyranny.’226 In this chapter, I have detailed some of the most effective areas of commentary it offers, 
including its shortcomings which resonate with the problems in Zuboff’s text. Surveillance capitalism, 
when its exploitative pursuits are finally identified, appears to constitute a break with the traditional 
capitalist regime to those positioned at the imperial centre. The absence of alternate voices which 
could both identify and challenge this ‘unprecedented’ system of exploitation mean that the self-
propagandising narrative of the Circle succeeds in its totalitarian goal. Mae is set on a solitary course 
towards the book’s conclusion, without properly interrogating how the company has managed to 
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super-state Oceania in the final line of 1984 - ‘He loved Big Brother’227 -  Eggers sets up a similar 
moment of peripeteia, concealing the outcome of Mae’s decision to overthrow or succumb to the 
oligarchy until the final lines, where it is revealed that she has rejected Tyler’s warnings: ‘Completion 
was imminent, and it would bring peace, and it would bring unity, and all that messiness of humanity 
until now [...] would be only a memory.’228 However, the lack of any real potential for opposition and 
resistance throughout the text means that this moment loses its pivotal tension and fails to capture the 
nuances of political evil which assimilate Mae, curtailing Eggers’ social commentary. Comparatively, 
the 2017 film adaptation invokes a twist where Mae still aligns to the Circle, but overthrows its 
duplicitous leaders as she does so: ‘Every email from Tom and Eamonn’s accounts […] even their 
super-secret scrambled code accounts that nobody, not even their assistants or wives knew existed 
[…] [has] all been sent to you already […] Privacy was a temporary thing, and now it’s over.’229 
Nevertheless, both texts align to the conventions of Western dystopian fiction identified by M. Keith 
Booker, primarily the ‘oppositional confrontation between the desires of a presumably unique 
individual and the demands of an oppressive society that insists on total obedience and conformity in 
its subjects’, revealing ‘quintessentially bourgeois’ concerns.230 Booker argues that by comparison, 
peripheral dystopias resist an ‘individualist bias’ and tend more toward ‘a suppression of genuine 
collectivity than to a suppression of individualism by collective tyranny.’231 From this, we can 
understand that fictional dystopian texts which represent peripheral sites of discourse expand beyond 
the limited scope maintained by Western dystopias by framing the ‘collective experience’ as an 
ambiguous experience, depending on factors of identity and power interacting within it.232 In the 
following chapter, I will move beyond the Eurocentric limitations of Eggers’ and Zuboff’s texts by 
exploring how postcolonial dystopian literary representations can illuminate the experiences of 
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different individuals and groups who are erased in Western accounts of technological surveillance and 
oppression.  
54 
Chapter 3: A biopolitical view of the ‘unprecedented’ in Moxyland 
 
Zuboff deploys a number of rhetorical strategies in between her historical analysis to call attention 
back to the central argument running through the book: we will not know the true cost of the current 
regime until it is too late. The ‘unbearable yearning’ of ‘separation from the homeland among 
emigrants across the centuries’ will come to ‘[engulf] each one of us,’ dislocating the whole of 
humanity from its search for a viable home.233 The ‘universal story’ Zuboff subsequently 
propounds,234 a destruction of the ‘right to the future tense’ through instrumentarian processes which 
transform all actions into surveilled, predicted, market-oriented actions, is premised upon a two-
dimensional formulation of the individual, which erases the multilayered and heterogeneous nature of 
human-technology relationships.235 Zuboff’s reliance upon synthetic personalisation and inclusive 
language to illustrate her point – ‘By the time you read these words […] [y]our entire life will be 
searchable’ – obscures the text’s absence of commentary on the historical antecedents of 
instrumentarian society for specific individuals and communities.236 Locating the target of 
surveillance capitalism within readers themselves rather than tangible figures serves as a persuasive 
rhetorical tool which brings to life the scale of devastation the book foretells. This, alongside the 
book’s unyielding focus on the ‘unprecedented’, serves to reject a culture of ‘inevitability’ which has 
been gradually shaped and instilled through technologically-empowered capitalist discourses, 
asserting that ‘fresh observation, analysis, and new naming are required’ in order to adequately 
construct an ‘effective contest’ to them.237 However, this rhetoric is also symptomatic of Zuboff’s 
largely technodeterministic approach to capitalist exploitation, which suggests that the ideology of 
instrumentarianism is, at its core, exclusively premised upon and facilitated by digital surveillance 
tools and algorithms within the digital public sphere. In the absence of a rigorous critique of 
interlinked historical colonial and patriarchal structures which play a key role in the unmitigated 
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surveillance and exploitation of specific populations, Zuboff situates her text within a Eurocentric, 
provincial framework of criticism which fails to capture the true scale and complexity of the corrupt 
and oppressive politico-economic regime she describes. The book's limited engagement with the 
reality of unevenly distributed access to digital technologies and spaces, as well as the propensity for 
instrumentarian logic to extend and bolster existing structural inequalities, raises a number of 
questions about the invisible impact of the ‘universal story’ she describes.238 The description of 
surveillance capitalism as a ‘rogue’ capitalism suggests that its concomitant social ills can be traced 
back to the de facto powers of Big Tech, rather than the legitimated de jure powers built into Western 
institutions.239 As a result, Zuboff buys in to the established narrative propagated by capitalist 
discourses, which holds that the structures of economic power built into the bedrock of surveillance 
capitalism - the ‘combination of markets and democracy’ - have ‘served humanity well’; it is only the 
specific alliance of capitalism and very contemporary digital technologies which are a cause for 
concern.240 In a bid to emphasise the book’s strategic goals - namely, to launch the novel concept of 
instrumentarianism, which insists upon a universal departure from political and social norms 
regardless of national and local contexts - Zuboff ultimately restricts herself to a myopic and two-
dimensional view of the ‘societal territory’ which data capitalism operates within.241 
 
 
Although Zuboff encourages political imagination that is not beholden to retrospective explanatory 
strategies, this theoretical position presents a dilemma which the book never fully reconciles. The 
gender- and race-blind approach framing Surveillance Capitalism is inadequate to capture the 
necessarily intersectional reality of the subject matter the book explores. Zuboff is committed to 
exposing the rise of surveillance capitalism because its operations fundamentally ‘demean human 
dignity’, which raises two issues.242 First, Zuboff’s structuring of the new ‘species of power’ as a 
force which irrevocably changes the democratic dynamics of the twentieth century presumes that the 
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legitimated liberal-democratic institutions of the modern Western nation-state represent ‘our greatest 
moral and political achievements’ as a kind of idealised state to retrospectively aspire towards.243 
Second, the text suggests that a return to these values and processes would signal a return to the 
preservation of human dignity, primarily through the increased regulation of internet companies, 
without interrogating the terms of her vision of ‘human dignity.’ Jacques Rancière, writing on the 
contradictory inner dynamics of the ‘irresistible movement’ towards the ‘formalism’ of human rights, 
critiques the kind of logic espoused by Zuboff as it presumes ‘a peaceful posthistorical world where 
global democracy would match the global market of liberal economy’.244 Without a thorough 
analytical foundation from which to assess the structural oppression that has historically paved the 
way for oppressive power, Zuboff presents liberal democracy as a heal-all that subdues, rather than 
legitimates, the systemic violence of capitalism. Crucially, our focus should not only be trained on the 
ways surveillance capitalism has surreptitiously appropriated, misused, or otherwise deviated from the 
‘safe and prosperous’ technologies and practices Zuboff describes, but also on the socially accepted 
and normalised surveillance practices which seek to privilege some while undermining the dignity of 
others.245 Second, Zuboff’s insistence that Big Other’s operations and goals are unique to the 
information age erases the long history of the ‘loss of home’ and destruction of ‘psychological 
sovereignty’ felt by different social groups,246 captured by Sareeta Amrute’s pertinent question: ‘for 
whom exactly does surveillance capitalism signal a radical aberration?’247 Zuboff’s vision of a sudden 
worldwide alienation of the ‘right to the future tense’ can only be actualised by those who have access 
to a home protected by democratised forms of power to begin with.248  
 
 
243 Zuboff, p. 524. 
244 Jacques Rancière, ‘Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?’ The South Atlantic Quarterly 103.2 (2004) 
297-310 (p. 297). 
245 Zuboff, p. 439. 
246 Zuboff, p. 36. 
247 Sareeta Amrute, Sounding the Flat Alarm (Review of Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism) 
(2020)  <https://www.boundary2.org/2020/01/sareeta-amrute-sounding-the-flat-alarm-review-of-shoshana-
zuboff-the-age-of-surveillance-capitalism/> [Accessed 10 July 2020]  
248 Zuboff, p. 36. 
57 
There are further problems with Zuboff’s linear, teleological view of history: from her perspective, 
the West’s sudden ‘weakening attachment to democracy’ through surveillance capitalism is expressed 
through a collective ‘lament’ of the ‘members of the second modernity’, or those born within the 
‘second half of the twentieth century’: “My children will not see the life that I lived”’.249 This 
suggests that the acceleration of digitisation and globalisation are the sole causes of a radical shift in 
contemporary forms of power and political community. In his 2019 essay ‘Postdemocracy and 
biopolitics’, Roberto Esposito asserts that the movement towards ‘postdemocratic’ discourse as a 
‘byproduct of the dynamics of globalization that have for the past 30 years slowly eroded the 
foundations of modern democracy’ fails to recognise the origins of this process in the eighteenth 
century, when ‘the life of the population ceased to be considered a resource for the sovereign to 
consume […] and became a precious resource that must be protected and developed.’ 250 Esposito 
asserts that the current political landscape is the natural conclusion to a longer term project which 
‘break[s] down […] the borders between the political and the biological’, and that the recent 
recognition of this fact has been precipitated by changes in public perception, rather than changes to 
politics in itself:251 
Questions of life and death, of sexuality and public health, of migration and security, have 
been forced upon and become fundamental to all political agendas. In turn, the political 
horizon has also become more expansive and complex; it has broadened and deformed. It is 
as if the entire modern lexicon that had framed politics for over three centuries had been 
shattered by the force of these events, lost its significance, and was thus no longer capable of 
representation. Since then, certainly not just the last 20 years, the semantics of democracy 
have increasingly encountered complications.252 
 
Esposito goes on to argue that a ‘new political language’ is necessary, ‘rather than continuing to 
deconstruct something that has already been thoroughly deconstructed’, but the language must 
account for differences in cultural and geopolitical contexts: ‘Of course, not all situations are equal. 
Not all regions have the same problems. […] In this sense, precisely in order to define their 
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differences, these people have a vital need to constitute their own identity.’253 That Surveillance 
Capitalism does not consider these differences important to its theoretical bedrock, despite its 
concerns being explicitly dedicated to issues of freedom and exploitation, has significant 
ramifications for the book’s ahistorical conclusions that institutional, liberal democracy has lifted 
‘humankind from millennia of ignorance, poverty, and pain.’254 The theoretical aperture of biopolitics, 
focused upon a conception of instrumentarian power that is firmly linked to both the new digital space 
of appearance and surveillance and to existing territories of institutionalised capitalist and colonial 
inequality, reveals itself to be a particularly useful counterpoint to Zuboff’s book. 
 
In this chapter, I will undertake reading of Beukes’ Moxyland, a peripheral dystopian work which 
maps an array of narrative threads onto the uneven political topologies of a near-future Cape Town. I 
propose that this text presents a challenge to the ‘universal story’ put forward by Zuboff and 
highlights the voices of marginalised people which are imperceptible in Surveillance Capitalism, The 
Circle, and often in society at large, developing a critique of the concept of instrumentarianism in line 
with biopolitical governmentality.255 Drawing upon Browne’s constellation of tools and concepts to 
recontextualise surveillance capitalism through a postcolonial and ‘racialized’ lens, this chapter 
explores the diverse voices set out in Moxyland to further interrogate Amrute’s proposition that 
instrumentarian power has long flourished outside of ‘the middle class enclaves of Europe and the 
United States’.256 My analysis is also guided by criticism that foregrounds the relationship between  
biopolitics, surveillance, and political rights, including Discipline and Punish and Agamben’s Homo 
Sacer. I propose that this synthesis of political, theoretical and literary texts redraws a permeable 
boundary that can account for the groups that Zuboff does not, recognising tangible and intangible 
differences in experience and deciphering opportunities for resistance which exist beyond the margins 
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Returning to the concepts set out in Dark Matters, Browne borrows terms from James Rule and Gary 
T. Marx to develop an image of ‘the new surveillance’, a ‘maximum-security society’ where 
‘increasingly choices are engineered and limited by social location.’257 In a manner similar to the 
complexity of Haggerty and Ericson’s surveillant assemblage, Browne argues that the ‘totalizing 
system’ or ‘theoretical extreme’ presented in 1984 - and reproduced in The Circle - no longer fits the 
current reality of computer-mediated institutional and corporate power, referencing Oscar Gandy’s 
concept of the ‘panoptic sort’ wherein data is ‘used to identify, classify, assess, sort’ individuals and 
groups to ‘control access’ to particular goods and services, ‘for example with the application of credit 
scores by lenders to rate the creditworthiness of consumers […] privileg[ing] some, while 
disadvantaging others.’258 Browne sets out these concepts in order to integrate them into the concept 
of ‘racializing surveillance’, which operates to ‘reify boundaries, borders, and bodies along racial 
lines […] where the outcome is often discriminatory treatment of those who are negatively racialized 
by such surveillance.’259 In contrast to the ‘nightmarish suppression of individual liberty’ and the 
‘horror of collective experience’ which form the thematic backbone of Western surveillance dystopias 
like The Circle, Beukes’ Moxyland is well-positioned to accommodate the intersectional view of 
suppressed collective experience under a regime of racialised surveillance as set out by Browne and 
Booker. The book’s prognosis of a future world centred entirely around smartphone use resonates 
remarkably well with current concerns over the impact of technological visibility and appearance 
upon interpersonal relationships. James Trimarco writes that Beukes captures the ‘peculiarly cynical 
voice of a generation that has absorbed so much branded messaging that it literally cannot imagine a 
gesture – not an utterance, not a political strategy, not even an act of violence – intended to do 
anything but stimulate the media for marketing-related purposes.’260 The text envisions spaces which 
replicate Foucault’s normalising power and disciplinary systems, tying together ‘the order of the 
crime, the order of sin, and the order of bad conduct’ to reduce or remove the liberty of groups 
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considered suspect, as well as ambiguous spaces beyond the scope of surveillance and appearance, 
including zones of total social exclusion through restriction of the digital public sphere.261  
 
Unlike the sleek, ideologically perfected aesthetics and technologies of The Circle, this text presents a 
metropolitan space where it is impossible not to confront the disparities between enormous corporate 
wealth and extreme poverty, and where the tools of computer malware, genetic engineering, and 
video games are developed and appropriated by characters for utilitarian and self-serving ends. 
Although the text is guided by the same key questions about the capabilities of technology to serve 
totalitarian ends, Moxyland’s hyper-powerful corporation-state demonstrates little interest in using its 
intellectual and financial resources to achieve dominance through the utopian global solutions 
satirised in The Circle, instead harnessing digital systems to ingrain social stratification through 
authoritarian violence. Each chapter, the narrative shifts between the perspectives of four key 
characters who are connected through mutual financial and political allegiances. Although the 
characters are around the same age and come from the same city, they each represent a different 
intersection of gender and race, and subsequently occupy cultural and spatial environments 
commensurate with their different degrees of social and economic privilege within post-apartheid 
Cape Town. All are affected by the flows of institutional power as they are considered to be 
potentially dangerous at different points in the text, but their individual storylines trace the divergent 
consequences of identity upon the surveilled body under a regime of enduring ideological 
concretisation of racial and gender binaries, and the different limitations to agency and freedom 
subsequently imposed upon them. Lerato, a black woman, is orphaned by a resurgence of the AIDS 
epidemic and grows up in the midst of the subsequent public health crisis, becoming the ‘brightest 
and most productive’ of her cohort and securing work as a particularly gifted programmer for a 
‘multinational conglom’ called ‘Communique’.262 Tendeka, a black man, comes from similar 
circumstances but occupies a space at the margins of the political order; considered a ‘Struggle 
revivalist’, he sustains a lifestyle in which he publicly presents the image of a community leader and 
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social activist, but operates anonymously within the digital realm as a political agitator or, in the 
State’s eyes, a terrorist.263 Kendra is a white woman and a photographer who has accepted a 
sponsorship deal with the energy drinks manufacturer ‘Ghost’, making her one of several ‘sponsor 
babies’ or living advertisements who work as corporate influencers within the text; she is injected 
with a biogenetic nanotechnology that gives her desirable side effects, such as preternaturally quick 
reflexes, healing time, and protection against illness, but becomes physically reliant on Ghost’s 
products in exchange.264 Toby, an economically privileged white man, drifts between trading drugs 
and other items on the digital black market, producing a live stream of his most personal moments to 
compete for online views, and occasionally using his platform and connections to support Tendeka’s 
activism plots.  
 
All of the narratives operate through a first-person, present-tense voice, except for Toby’s, where he 
speaks directly to his ‘streamcast’ viewers: ‘You’d be amazed […] or if you’re watching this, maybe 
you already know’.265 The lack of narrative retrospection foreshadows the text’s conclusion, as none 
of the characters have a viable future except for Toby, who simply finds new subjects to centre his 
livestream around. Beukes’ splitting of narratives into multiple discrete identities creates a template 
upon which the differential effects of surveillance can be mapped, indicating the text’s potential for 
the concerns laid out by Booker and Browne above. Beukes distances the formal construction of the 
novel from the solitary path of the figure featured in Western surveillance dystopias, and in so doing, 
draws attention to the commonalities between dystopian images of a ‘suppression of genuine 
collectivity’ and the realities of violence and punitive aggression which are justified by structures of 
systemic racism and misogyny.266 Beukes’ reconstruction of a conventional individual character arc 
does away with its hierarchy of narrative importance, privileging neither the voice of the individual 
nor a homogenous collective but rather the relationships between the two. Connectivity and 
disconnection therefore create a key structural component of the text, mirroring its thematic content 
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and offering insights into the lives of those who are included within the vertical and horizontal 
parameters of the digital public sphere, an those who exist beyond its margins. 
 
Unlike The Circle, where cultural norms of control are embedded exclusively within the ruling 
oligarchy and digital tools are shared with the state to leverage corporate influence, the technologies 
deployed in Moxyland operate at multiple, uneven levels of social control. The world is dominated by 
a collection of ‘multinationals’ which control the metropolitan landscape of Cape Town, but only to 
the degree that the interests of the elite ‘corporati’ are protected; companies are shown to have limited 
power over the availability of technologies, ‘outlaw[ing]’ undesirable innovations. Nevertheless, 
Toby points out that ‘notions of the illegal don’t extend to the developing’, in this instance referring to 
the poor communities populating an ‘overbridge tunnel market’ where imported ‘non-reg’ goods are 
sold ‘under the table’.267 Poorer communities that exist outside of the corrupt corporate influence of 
the city's pseudo-democratic government are granted refuge from active observation, but instead are 
subjected to inescapable sensory invasion from illegal advertisements, with ‘blaring logos and 
adboards’, ‘chatter flyers’ and ‘audio chips […] broadcasting slogans at decibel in most of the official 
languages’.268 Access to affluent parts of the city are means tested, requiring a ‘corporati pass or proof 
of income’, whereas ‘general access’ spaces are ‘dingy’ and ‘undesirable’ with poor security 
surveillance coverage – ‘the cams don’t work too well.’269 Despite the disparities in the quality of life 
afforded to people occupying different levels of the corporate hierarchy, unprotected spaces provide 
opportunities to temporarily become hidden, providing the ‘ideal venue’ for Toby to meet with 
Tendeka about a transactional political stunt, ‘which he’s being generous enough to allow me to guest 
on […] I score some quality vid that’ll push up my streamcast’s rankings, and he gets his exploits 
recorded for posterity.’270  
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The superstructure of surveillance described here is more fractured and diffuse than the Circle’s, 
presenting opportunities for invisibility and subversion in the spaces between highly-monitored 
privileged corporate zones, although subjection to physical violence from police is more likely. Social 
status - and its associated access to different zones of the city - is aligned with a vertical system of 
power distilled in numerical ratings similar to The Circle’s ‘PartiRank’: the ‘LSM’ or ‘Living 
Standards Measure’, a score attributed to every citizen.271 Although the new Cape Town purports to 
have moved on from the legacy of apartheid through its emphasis on equal opportunity and personal 
responsibility - ‘working for a living’ to become ‘smarter, better, more attractive’ promises the 
rewards of a ‘subsidised beachfront corp apartment and cushy job’ - the LSM represents a covert 
continuation of state-enforced racial categorisation and segregation, drawn from an existing market 
research metric that continues to exist in South Africa.272 The rating ‘divides the population’ into 
groups from 1 to 10 as an indicator of income inequality,273 recalling Browne’s identification of the 
ways ‘abstracted information’ about individuals ‘restricts them from consumer choices […] 
relegat[ing] them to second-class status because of their color or ethnic background’.274 That this tool 
was supposedly designed for marketing purposes resonates particularly well with the fictional version 
of the LSM, whose insidious vertical power is not linked to participation, popularity or visibility 
within online space as with ‘PartiRank’, but literally connects gender, racial category, and financial 
status to the spaces an individual is permitted to access within the segregated ecology of the city. The 
LSM’s implicit preservation of the early racial ‘pass laws’ introduced during the implementation of 
apartheid - ‘a basic system of identification and control […] the Nationalist government could [use to] 
determine where and how Africans would live, what rights they could enjoy and those they could not, 
whom they could marry, and so forth’ - is one of the clearest examples of a historical antecedent to 
pervasive ‘instrumentarian’ power, ‘a daily reminder for Africans of the often petty but also 
determined repression under which they lived.’275 Although the LSM is distinct from apartheid-era 
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laws and appears to be facilitated through the slightly accelerated digital infrastructure of surveillance 
capitalism, it provides evidence of different iterations of historical oppression emerging under a 
neoliberal regime with destructive consequences, featured in the text as a key determinant over an 
individual’s social mobility and, importantly, likelihood to be targeted by the police and other 
disciplinary forces.276 
 
The LSM, alongside a cache of personal data including physical appearance, ‘last known residential 
address’, marital and employment status, criminal record and so on, is located within individual ‘cell 
SIM cards’ which, whilst betraying a little of the reliance on technologies like physical storage 
present during the text’s publication in 2008, provides the first example of Beukes’ startlingly 
accurate predictive powers.277 An individual’s SIM effectively constitutes their passport to conduct 
any transaction, gain access to restricted spaces, and of course communicate in much the same way 
that smartphones are used presently. In this way, the destruction of anonymity and forced visibility 
represented through The Circle’s ‘Unified Operating System’ is taken in an entirely different direction 
in Moxyland. Where Eggers gestures towards internet trolls and the minor inconvenience of multiple 
online accounts as the main drivers behind this software, which only superficially address the 
desirability of such a system for corporate and government entities, Beukes’ anticipation of the 
violent capabilities of smartphone technology is much more incisive, envisioning the concentration of 
financial transactions, biopolitical data, and the artificial space of appearance into a single handheld 
device. Moxyland follows this to its logical conclusion by extending the omnipresence of mobile 
phone use to the legitimated ‘state monopoly on violence’ held by the police force.278 Each mobile 
device has a in-built ‘defuser’, delivering at least ‘170 to 180 volts’ to the individual who owns it, 
which can only be triggered by the police.279 Tendeka is targeted in this manner during his meeting 
with Toby when he becomes aware of Kendra’s job as a ‘sponsorbaby’ and grows agitated, raising his 
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voice and ‘starting to draw attention’.280 Police are quickly called to the building, with the officer 
scanning the room for Tendeka’s unique SIM and causing him intense pain similar to a taser, ‘his 
phone seething and crackling’.281 Tendeka describes the process as ‘shock therapy […] dampening 
down excitable behaviour, frying our brains’; unlike Zuboff’s assertion that ‘most users remain 
unaware’ of the consequences of monitoring and data sharing within her global view of 
instrumentarianism, Tendeka is constantly reminded of the pattern of surveillance and punishment he 
is disproportionately subjected to. 282 
 
In this incident, a bartender alerting the police to overpower a black man replicates a collection of 
concepts drawn together by Browne: Steve Mann’s ‘naming of the human eye as a “body-borne 
camera”’ and what Judith Butler terms the ‘racially saturated field of visibility’, alongside ‘what 
Maurice O. Wallace has called the “picture-taking racial gaze” that fixes and frames the black subject 
within a “rigid and limited grid of representational possibilities.”’283 The conjunction of these 
practices operating together forms a kind of ‘cumulative white gaze’ which facilitates omnipresent, 
oppressive ‘sousveillance’.284 Browne refers to the antebellum era, where ‘citizenry (the watchers) 
[…] deputized [for the sheriff] through white supremacy to apprehend any fugitive who escaped from 
bondage (the watched)’, which persists in post-slavery societies as racially aligned ‘inequities 
between those who were watched over and those who did the watching.’285 This drives home the 
unconvincing presentation of The Circle’s ‘SeeChange’ miniature cameras, through which Eggers 
satirises the values of ‘transparency’ and ‘sharing’ by extending them to human rights issues: ‘There 
would be instant accountability. Any soldier committing an act of violence would instantly be 
recorded for posterity. He could be tried for war crimes, you name it.’286 While it is feasible that the 
superlatively privileged and presumably white-majority community of the Circle would fail to 
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recognise that what constitutes a human rights violation or an act of protection is entirely shaped by 
the racially prejudiced laws and systems of the political landscape they occur within, it is difficult to 
accept that there are no voices from internal or external sources – i.e. the ‘billion-odd’ global Circle 
users connected digitally - present in the text to point this out.287 Eggers misses an opportunity to 
highlight the racially and culturally ignorant failures in critical thinking which lead to a necessarily 
‘racialised’ banality of evil within his text, which is drawn into even sharper focus against the 
backdrop of recent events in the U.S., including the murder of black citizen George Floyd by a white 
police officer – for which ‘instant accountability’ failed to materialise despite the publication of 
bodycam and smartphone footage, catalysing a global wave of protests and civil unrest.288 Beukes, by 
contrast, hones in on the lethal consequences of the cumulative white gaze acting in concert with 
state-sanctioned racist police brutality and a broader infrastructure of capital-oriented technologies: as 
the ‘garden-variety citicop’ stands over Tendeka’s ‘jerking epileptic’ body,289 he makes the ‘cheerful’ 
comment to the bartender who summoned him, ‘I’ll be happy to sic /379 here on him’ - in other 
words, to set his genetically-engineered ‘Aito’ police dog onto his unconscious victim.290 
 
Racial categorisation and punitive violence encapsulates the first and most obvious method of social 
control within Moxyland’s surveillant assemblage, but there are other examples of practices in the text 
which achieve the same ends, particularly ones which reflect the cost-efficient benefits of systematic 
surveillance technologies. This is implied by the follow-up police report to Tendeka’s ‘defusing’, 
which is visually presented on the page as an administrative form, with ‘Occurrence No.’ and 
‘criminal registration’ codes.291 Tendeka’s ‘cell SIM ID’ number is also provided, alongside a list of 
dates of prior offences and the police officer’s notes of the most recent incident, where it is revealed 
that ‘acting in an aggressive manner’ and ‘previous public disruptions and a juvenile record’ formed 
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the only legal justification required to leave Tendeka ‘adequately subdued’.292 What the report also 
reveals is that a ‘temporary disconnect’ has been applied to Tendeka’s phone, refusing him access to 
the subway: ‘my phone won’t scan. Or, rather, it does scan and blocks me outright in response to the 
police tag on my SIM.’293 The systematic logging of offenders’ data reflects Foucault’s comments on 
disciplinary measures present in the French penal colony Mettray, the ‘disciplinary form at its most 
extreme, in which are concentrated all the coercive technologies of behaviour’:294 
A body of knowledge was being constantly built up from the everyday behaviour of the 
inmates […] “On entering the colony, the child is subjected to a sort of interrogation as to his 
origins, the position of his family, the offence for which he was brought before the courts and 
all the other offences which make up his short and often very sad existence. This information 
is written down on a board on which everything concerning each inmate is noted in turn, his 
stay at the colony and the place to which he is sent when he leaves.” The modelling of the 
body produces a knowledge of the individual […] inextricably linked with the establishment 
of power relations.295 
 
Elsewhere in Discipline and Punish, Foucault observes that modern disciplinary methods, while being 
far removed from the ‘spectacle’ of historical public executions which break down the accused’s 
body, are now focused on the loss of liberty which facilitates more subtle, low-level forms of bodily 
torture. This ‘reduction in penal severity’ gives way to punishment ‘becom[ing] the most hidden part 
of the penal process’, creating a new ‘political anatomy’ that is subjected to ‘power that explores it, 
breaks it down and rearranges it’.296 This process of rearrangement is the underlying principle of the 
model of the surveillant assemblage, as a person’s body is reduced to digital data, captured, 
reassembled and channelled into different data flows, creating the foundation from which 
instrumentarianism derives its power. However, what the structure of Moxyland reveals is that the 
enmeshment of the disciplinary system with the societal network means that existing in spaces beyond 
the margins of instrumentarian knowledge - either physically, by being excluded from certain spaces 
inside the city, or in other ways by cutting off access to digitised currency and communication 
networks - constitutes a highly effective form of punishment. Beukes presents a society where visible, 
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physical punishments have also been recently re-introduced as an accepted part of the criminal justice 
system: ‘the tech was only approved, what, eighteen months ago?’297 Consequently, there is virtually 
no space in the new Cape Town that is not subject to the disciplinary whim of the corporation, 
including through institutional channels of police brutality, and by the process of expulsion from the 
digital public sphere. While Zuboff insists that the power of the current regime lies in its non-violent 
and understated modes of oppression and manipulation - ‘operat[ing] more like a taming’ that results 
in ‘less personal control and more powerlessness’298 - what we actually see unfolding in fictionalised 
South Africa is a dystopian combination of ‘violence directed at our bodies’ under state 
exceptionalism and exclusion, and the extinction of the ‘will to will’ through social media.299 These 
modes of exploitation serve the same ends of the neoliberal regime, as the state takes the most 
financially expedient routes to manipulate and coerce its population by breaking down both the data 
self and the physical body simultaneously.300 Since Zuboff does not consider Foucault's historical 
account of discipline or the potential coexistence of several different methods of control in her text, 
her assertion that instrumentarianism constitutes a novel system - and, in turn, the political route she 
frames as a preferable alternative - becomes increasingly unstable. 
 
Tendeka’s incident report highlights the need to recontextualise instrumentarianism and discipline in 
light of groups who are included and excluded from the digital public sphere, gesturing beyond the 
straightforward axes of power and visibility delineated by Marquez. In Beukes’ representation of a 
future digital penal system, the ‘trace of torture’ present in physical deprivation is no longer exerted 
through imprisonment but instead through disabling the offender’s phone SIM.301 Tendeka attempts to 
pay for a taxi, only to find that his ‘wallet is locked out along with all the other functions on [his] 
phone.’302 Physical cash is therefore shown to become obsolete in order to force citizens to use 
currency accessed through their digital devices, which enables a more efficient ‘economy of 
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suspended rights’ than the prison system Foucault presented by simply switching off a person’s entire 
independent livelihood.303 In Moxyland, ‘disconnect’ not only refers to the punishment carried out by 
the state for an offence, but is also used as a term to mark the untouchable social class of people who 
have permanently had their SIMs revoked. To be ‘disconnect’ is to exist in a state of total societal 
exclusion: ‘You can’t play nice by society’s rules? Then you don’t get to play at all. No phone. No 
service. No life.’304 The juxtaposition of smartphones as a superficial luxury for the purposes of 
entertainment and leisure with smartphones as a precondition for basic rights in the city-state sheds 
light on the online space of appearance as a compulsory zone. Far from the site of collective, 
equalising visibility as Arendt envisioned it, gateways to public space are now easily policed.305  
 
This feature of Beukes’ text opens up an interesting way to reflect on Zuboff’s strict separation of the 
terms ‘instrumentarian’ and ‘totalitarian’. Zuboff writes that totalitarianism initially gained the 
traction to ‘reconstruct’ humanity through ‘the dual mechanisms of genocide and the “engineering of 
the soul”, whereas the ‘utterly distinct’ methods of instrumetarianism ‘have no interest in murder or 
the reformation of our souls.’306 However, as we see in Moxyland, the process of exclusion from the 
digital sphere - which is, like other forms of political community, dependent on the operation of 
movement into and out of it - presents an important element of instrumentarianism that Zuboff does 
not identify. The ‘disconnects’ of Moxyland recall the forms of ‘social death’ identified by Orlando 
Patterson in his account of the dynamics of slavery, which operate as a ‘conditional commutation’ of 
a death sentence - whether that death is through ‘violence’, ‘punishment’, ‘exposure’ or 
‘starvation.’307 Patterson writes that the figure of the slave ‘had no socially recognised existence 
existence outside of his master, [becoming] a social nonperson’.308 We therefore can identify the 
capacity for ‘murder’ implicit in the exclusionary tendencies of instrumentarianism. This is taken a 
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step further in light of Claudia Card’s reflections on the relationship between social death and 
genocide, invoking the concept to describe the ‘special evil’ of the social and physical deaths caused 
by the Holocaust, ‘producing a consequent meaninglessness of one’s life and even of its 
termination.’309 The absence of social and political identity for those permanently disconnected in 
Moxyland is presented in a similar manner, as physical death becomes an eventual consequence of life 
outside of the ‘commerce loop.’310 The implications of totalitarian and instrumentarian systems are 
therefore shown to have a great deal more overlap than Zuboff would have it. 
 
Turning our attention to the ‘excluded’ zone of life under surveillance capitalism raises a number of 
other questions about the concepts Zuboff uses to advance her argument. The concept of 
‘exceptionalism’, originally introduced by Carl Schmitt and developed in Agamben’s influential book 
State of Exception, is a highly useful term for Zuboff. It captures the instability of privacy laws caused 
by the strengthening of partnerships between the U.S. government’s Electronic Privacy Information 
Centre, the NSA, and the electronic ‘business community’, manifesting as a ‘sudden reversal of 
privacy concerns’ following the events of 9/11.311 What Zuboff omits from her interpretation of 
Agamben is the fact that his text was primarily concerned with citizenship and the human cost of state 
exceptionalism, which enabled a ‘physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire 
categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated into the political system’.312 While 
Zuboff does not consider this underpinning aspect of Agamben’s logic necessary to her explanation, it 
is in fact deeply relevant to her view of alienation from ‘home’ through digital means; Beukes’ 
characterisation of the existence of ‘disconnect’ communities explores the varied impact of 
surveillance capitalism and state exceptionalism, both of which rely upon the existence of the 
distinctive classical figure of ‘homo sacer’ invoked in Agamben’s other major texts.313 Tendeka 
expresses a constant terror of having his rights removed through disconnection due to the risks of his 
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work: ‘we’re talking relegated to homeless, out of society, […] no phone.’314 In Moxyland, 
smartphones are therefore directly tied to bios, or active, political life; this is reflected in its capacity 
to provide users with access to the digital and real public spheres through its range of functions.315 
Zoe, on the other hand, refers to ‘bare life’, or purely biological life; citizens typically hold both kinds 
of life in Agamben’s view. Homo sacer – meaning, in Agamben’s interpretation, ‘destined to die’ - 
refers to the political tradition by which individuals are stripped of their bios, usually through the 
removal of citizenship, and forced into a ‘zone of indistinction between outside and inside, chaos and 
the normal situation’,316 pertinently represented by a refugee camp – or, in Moxyland, the ‘Rural’, 
where technologically disenfranchised communities constantly attempt to gain entry into the city-
state: ‘You can’t keep all of the Rurals out all of the time.’317 While a departure from conceptions of 
citizenship which are tied to the ‘old trinity [of] the state, the nation, and land’ could potentially have 
implications for Agamben’s vision of transformations to the constitution of nation-states which he 
envisioned unfolding ‘into the new realities and unforeseen convergences of the end of the 
millennium’ and beyond, the digital evolution of citizenship presented in this text only appears to 
tether it more explicitly to other oppressive value hierarchies.318  
 
While Agamben’s formulation fails to consider the significant implications of race, gender, and other 
social hierarchies, the process of homo sacer offers a useful metaphor for the invisible victims of 
instrumentarian power. The concept has significant implications for populations who are harmed by 
the technologically empowered state, but restricted from active participation within its legitimate 
spaces. Moxyland offers an example of homo sacer that is located in a context of increased 
technological capabilities, where effective political life can only be realised through a space of 
appearance that is bound up with other technologies geared towards reducing people to their bare 
biological data through vertical processes of tracking, analysing, collating, and sharing. This is shown, 
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again, in Tendeka’s incident report, which prioritises his biological details before ascribing numerical 
values to him. The combination of the extreme upper limit of both empowering and oppressive 
visibility transforms social capital to take on a form that is solely driven by political and economic 
demands. Although the report lists Tendeka as ‘Married’ to ‘Emmie Chinyaka. Malawi national. 
3/7/2018’, it is soon revealed that he is actually gay; his marriage to Emmie is purely for appearance 
as she is a pregnant refugee, ‘living hand to mouth with […] Emmie’s baby on the way’.319 
Superficially, this highlights the urgency of citizenship within the text’s fictional city and speaks to 
Tendeka’s complexity in spite of the dangerous, two-dimensional image of him encoded in his 
administrative data. However, it also reveals just how deeply transactions have come to pervade life 
in Beukes’ vision of 2018, in order to appear to fit into normalised roles and escape disconnection and 
persecution. Tendeka’s partner Ashraf dislikes that he wears a wedding ring to convince ‘Home 
Affairs’ of the legitimacy of his marriage, suggesting that his other ‘transgressions’ including ‘not 
being female-inclined’ would have far worse consequences if they were discovered by the 
authorities.320 It is therefore implied that only heteronormative relationships are legal in Moxyland, 
reinforced by the absence of a ‘Sexuality’ field within the incident report’s personal data.321 While 
Tendeka therefore holds at least a provisional link to basic rights and forms of political life despite 
being unfairly targeted for his race, he is forced to balance a public, institutionally-sanctioned 
relationship with a hidden one to protect him from being excluded by way of disconnection. Tendeka 
provides Emmie with citizenship in exchange for her cooperation in obscuring his sexuality, 
especially since her pregnancy makes the relationship credible. It is further revealed later in the text 
that Emmie has agreed to give her baby to Tendeka and Ashraf when she tries to extort money from 
them: ‘You are not going to put me at risk. And you are not getting our child – your child – 
deported.’322 While Tendeka tells Ashraf to ‘[h]ave some compassion’ towards Emmie, he does not 
seem to realise that his own actions are not motivated by selflessness, but from the opportunity for a 
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bargain within a state whose very citizenship relies upon hollow transactions.323 The text’s 
presentation of homo sacer as an experience shared by people who are geographically or legally 
prohibited from active political life, and those who are stripped of their political life within legitimate 
state borders, reveals that the central question of our time is not always ‘home or exile’ as Zuboff 
contends. For many, it is much more often a case of adherence to the neoliberal regime – the exile 
Zuboff conceives of - or social and physical death.324 
 
The fact that Beukes specifically anchors the text’s action in 2018, ten years on from its year of 
publication, is significant, as are the references to historical events that sketch out a political history of 
the fictional Cape Town. Tendeka points to the physical relics of apartheid represented by the ‘tin 
shacks’ and ‘converted shipping containers’ which are still inhabited and built upon by the city’s 
poorest, viewing the lack of change apathetically: ‘The same shit they’ve been promising to fix since 
the 1955 Freedom Charter or whatever it was.’325 In this timeline, the aftermath of the AIDS epidemic 
has led to the appearance of numerous dedicated orphanages and ‘corporate skills schools’ for 
‘Aidsbabies’.326 Most apt for our current scenario in 2020, a mysterious virus has infected the 
populations of the external ‘Rural’ expanse of South Africa, which exacerbates all of the existing 
institutional inequalities and brutalities: ‘[refugees] are sick as well, or, worse, trying to escape being 
sick and bringing it in with them from the Rural. And that leads to spates of outbreaks all over and 
crackdowns, just as bad as those bad old days when the police came storming in to quarantine and 
deport whole neighbourhoods.’327 The virus operates on a symbolic level as a marker of homo sacer 
in the text, as being infected becomes synonymous with being undesirable within the state and 
therefore destined to die outside its borders. This is reinforced when an ambiguous strain of the virus 
is deployed as an experimental riot control method to suppress a group of ‘terrorists’ in a busy train 
station: ‘Repeat. Do not be alarmed. The M7N1 Marburg variation is only fatal if you do NOT report 
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to an immunity centre for treatment within 48 hours. […] Vaccination is a free service offered by the 
South African Police Services.’328 Duncan has written on the importance of surveillance and 
particularly biometric monitoring to the preservation of national boundaries in South Africa: 
Borders are integral to the practice of surveillance. Borders help to define a ‘them’ and an 
‘us’, where ‘they’ are subjected to surveillance to prevent contamination with ‘us’. To that 
extent, surveillance is central to national identity management […] framing migration as a 
problem to be controlled, rather than as a basic human right and a resource capable of 
enriching a country’s socio-economic life.329 
 
The 2020 coronavirus pandemic brings the relevance of Beukes’ insight into an even more urgent 
context, as the various binaries of ‘included/excluded’ present within the zone of indistinction are 
concentrated into the explicit categories of ‘safe’ and ‘threat’, compounding the Othering of already-
marginalised individuals. Beukes’ representation also reflects the impact of public health crises on 
technologically excluded, ‘disconnect’ communities, as the absence of reliable information sources 
poses the greatest danger to people through a ‘circulation of misinformation, provoking fear and 
uncertainty’.330 
 
Characters in Moxyland do not possess the level of malleability or single-mindedness demonstrated 
by Mae, but pre-determined, state-sanctioned pathways continue to obliterate individual autonomy in 
Beukes’ representation. Kendra experiences a markedly increased level of social privilege compared 
to Tendeka; she is never subjected to corporal punishment and enjoys access to wealthy spaces due to 
her status as a ‘shiny brand ambassador.’331 However, this status comes at a price. The genetic 
‘nanotechnology’ provided by her sponsor forms a ‘[v]oluntary addiction with benefits’ as it triggers 
an intense high every time she consumes the brand’s products: ‘the girl is flying now, or drowning, in 
all the opiate happiness the body can generate: endorphins, serotonin, dopamine, the Ghost binding 
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with her aminos.’332 Kendra’s real purpose is therefore to promote the product’s capabilities to replace 
other kinds of substance abuse to young, poor communities: ‘You’ll never afford this high on your 
own change.’333 The mutation functions as an explicit symbol of Kendra’s privilege within the white 
supremacist regime as it protects her from the ‘new outbreaks, new strains’ of the epidemic: ‘It’s 
probably the last time you’ll ever get sick.’334 However, this privilege also transforms her into ‘just as 
much proprietary technology’, literally owned by the company on a genetic level.335 Control over 
Kendra’s body is nuanced, with small acts of coercion and violence that tread the boundary of 
consent, herding her towards choices which resonate with Mae’s narrative arc. Kendra is intensely 
self-aware of the way her circumstances have been targeted and exploited, ‘still reeling from the 
purgatory of dropping out, my dad’s cancer, wondering how I got here.’336 She observes the activity 
that happens to her dispassionately and objectively, reflecting her ‘documentary’ style of 
photography: ‘the bio-sig pen I signed with (here, and here, and here) had microscopic barbs in the 
shaft that scraped skin cells from the pad of my thumb to mix with the ink. Signed with blood. Or 
DNA, which is close enough.’337 Moments after signing the contract, Kendra is prevented from being 
able to change her mind: ‘“What did you have for breakfast?” says Dr Precious unexpectedly. Before 
I can think to answer, […] she snaps the autosyringe against my arm like a staple gun.’338 This is 
remarkably similar to an interaction Mae has with the Circle’s in-house medical team, when a doctor 
asks her, ‘Can you drink this? […] Okay, you just ingested the sensor that will connect to your wrist 
monitor’.339 The allegiance of technology and culture which work upon one another to ‘consistently 
put women’s bodies on display’ is highlighted here, 340 with both women being nudged through low-
level violence and biological manipulation into spaces of intense visibility for corporate marketing 
purposes, while being fed the message that their role is consensual, empowering and rewarding – 
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‘Making history, babes.’341 In Feminist Surveillance Studies, Rachel E. Dubrofsky and Shoshana 
Amielle Magnet write that women are ‘framed as empowered and agentic’ when they ‘voluntarily’ 
place themselves within the digital space of appearance, such as displaying images of themselves on 
social media, but crucially for the hyper-consumerist environment of Moxyland, ‘age-old sexist and 
racist tropes persist when self-fashioning in a consumer context is configured as a form of 
empowerment and active invitation of the male gaze is imagined as a form of agency.’342 When Toby 
attempts to film her without her consent for his live stream, she quickly takes a photo of him: ‘the 
camera catches me unawares […] I’m too preoccupied, caught in the flash, to catch the make.’343 In 
this way, whilst Eggers is reticent to explore the gendered implications of Mae’s movement towards 
‘transparency’ at the end of his book, Beukes confronts these themes head-on, providing Kendra with 
the tools to resist - even if only superficially - by reflecting the panoptic and patriarchal gaze back 
through her photographic skill. Kendra's perception of oppression, like Tendeka’s, comes from the 
blatant hostility of her environment which is not present in The Circle. Nevertheless, knowledge of 
the problem only offers her limited protection to violence, drawing the conclusions of Eggers’ text 
into question. 
 
Along with disconnection and infection from outbreaks, drug addiction is evidently another form of 
social exclusion rife in Moxyland, operating as a conduit for social control which carries Foucault’s 
logic of the disciplinary system even further away from the ‘trace’ of direct physical violence enacted 
upon the body yet retains its fundamental logic.344 Individuals are technically only ‘deprived’ through 
removal of the substance or stimulus, which can be justified through society’s moral and legal 
objection to substance abuse.345 Kendra’s privileged access to power within the space of appearance is 
conditional upon her continued addiction; when she is no longer of use to the elite, it is suggested that 
she is euthanised like an animal. As Dr Precious prepares to inject her with a chemical that she claims 
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is a ‘vaccine’ against the virus spread into the community by police, Kendra begins to question the 
fate of the similarly bioengineered police dogs when they are no longer able to fulfil their function. 
‘“What happens to the dogs afterwards?” […] “It’s our intellectual property. It’s very closely guarded. 
They put the dogs down.”’346 Although Kendra is initially protected from the virus that kills Tendeka, 
this protection is taken away as soon as it is discovered that she has transgressed the boundaries of her 
visibility as brand ambassador by associating with people exposed to it, revealing her limited role as a 
conduit for profit-making systems.  
 
While Kendra and Tendeka are killed, the juxtaposition of the other two characters Lerato and Toby 
epitomise the divide between instrumentarian pathways for different individuals: Beukes positions a 
life lived within corporate control as a fate worse than the social death of disconnection, because at 
least disconnects are ‘liberated […] from the swirl of the city’.347 When Lerato is caught ‘steal[ing] 
data’ to aid Tendeka, her employer reveals that they have permitted her to trangress the rules to 
capture incriminating information on her, ‘giv[ing] me just enough rope to loop around my neck.’348 
After destroying every ‘meaningful relationship’ she has, the corporation ‘creates [their] own 
terrorists’ to keep the state ‘under terrorist threat’ where ‘any action is justified.’349 Lerato is offered 
two options: execution, or a promotion. The new role involves identifying potential subversives 
online and radicalising them, before putting an end to their schemes - presumably by executing them 
in the same manner as Tendeka. As a result, there are only three possible routes presented for 
identities outside of the norm of the straight white male in post-apartheid Cape Town; corporate 
enslavement, social death, or physical death. While the artificial sphere that this occurs within may 
constitute a unique feature of capitalist technological development, the surveillance-based 
exploitation that percolates within it is far from novel, redeploying established strategies for the 
purposes of disciplining labour in different guises. 
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In the literary analyses this dissertation has undertaken so far, we see two facets of a potential 
instrumentarian future under surveillance capitalism. The ideological and institutional structures of 
the worlds presented deploy different strategic social interventions, yet both universes represent 
democratic nations which disintegrate under technological advancement and the lure of surveillance 
revenues, arriving at different but equally invasive forms of totalitarian rule. The Circle offers a 
limited insight into the social accelerations of the digital public sphere and the actualisation of some 
of the most salient observations made in Surveillance Capitalism, revealing the emergence of the 
artificial sphere, where the public/private distinction is blurred and the factory emerges outward into 
the rest of society, transforming the terms of employment and work. We can identify that this space 
certainly does offer new opportunities for exploitation and subversion as Arendtian currents of 
appearance are shaped by Foucauldian countercurrents of surveillance. Although the logic of 
instrumentarianism set out by Zuboff is particularly well-equipped to extract profit from the data 
rendered vulnerable by such a space, her positioning of the concept as a novel moment in the 
trajectory of technological development - a moment unilaterally responsible for the deconstruction of 
democracy - prevents her from undertaking a critical assessment of liberal democracy itself. Beukes 
applies a series of different lenses to the new landscape, recasting the question of 
instrumentarianism’s supposed originality against a broad collection of racial, gendered, and colonial 
modes of exploitation that persist under an authoritarian neoliberal regime. In so doing, Beukes 
cynically exposes Zuboff’s reliance upon a provincial conception of liberal democracy that is 
presumably egalitarian and relatively prosperous for those living beneath it. Having assessed the key 
terms of Zuboff’s argument, and having explored some of the ways we can reflect on the challenges 
the ‘digital milieu’ poses, I will now turn my focus to the concluding chapters of Surveillance 
Capitalism to understand where Zuboff points us toward in her formulation of an ‘exit’ out of the 
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Chapter 4 - An exit out of the ‘hive’: post-apocalyptic reflections on capitalist acceleration 
 
As we now understand, Zuboff finds that modern democratic values are in decline because of the 
precisely digital nature - and subsequent massive scale - of profitable surveillance and data mining 
that has broken loose from the safety rails of law. Surveillance Capitalism claims that the current 
manifestations of social and economic inequality are symptoms of the ills of digital surveillance, 
confining its analysis to a very selective historical frame of reference. My initial chapters explored the 
extent to which Zuboff’s instrumentarian society can be understood as an unprecedented and 
universalising force, concluding that this assertion cannot be reconciled with substantial evidence of 
established modes of oppressive surveillance that have often been limited to figures of subalterity; 
Zuboff risks erasing these important precursors in her argument. This conviction is one I share with 
Greg Sharzer, who writes that such technodeterminism stems from an ‘ahistorical, additive account of 
development factors’ that ignores ‘capitalism’s tendencies of motion.’351 Morozov, in his more recent 
reflection on Surveillance Capitalism, writes that Zuboff’s book lacks a ‘robust, theoretically and 
historically grounded conception of capitalism,’, which ‘choos[es] some prior stage’ before claiming 
that the current mode ‘is a stark departure from the previous one, and that drastic changes in 
information technology explain the transition.’352 Morozov claims that Zuboff ‘turn[s] to recent 
history only very selectively, mostly to bolster [her] presentist two-stage schema.’353 The second half 
of this dissertation will critically assess the efficacy of Zuboff’s conclusions, including her defence of 
liberalism and her proposal that democracy offers ‘our only channel for reformation.’354 I will explore 
speculative representations of what reform could look like when limited to the addition and 
subtraction of ‘brand-new’ technologies that appear to be responsible for the tyranny of the digital 
sphere, and the availability of the sphere itself.355 Over the following chapter, I will explore two 
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primary texts which express very different forms of life following economic and environmental 
cataclysm, offering diverging routes for post-digital societal reconstruction that follow the lines of 
either extreme technological retrogression or intensified acceleration. To progress in this direction, I 
will begin by considering Zuboff’s conclusions on capitalist technological acceleration against a 
backdrop of contemporary debates on the broader question of a post-capitalist future, before mapping 
the different theoretical prognoses onto the political and social coordinates of the literary texts. 
 
Describing instrumentarianism as a ‘bloodless coup’, Zuboff concludes that her analysis ‘instructs us 
in the irreplaceable value of our greatest moral and political achievements by threatening to destroy 
them’, leaving this information in the hands of ‘indignant citizens, journalists, and scholars drawn to 
this frontier project’ to recognise how ‘power untamed by democracy can only lead to exile and 
despair’.356 She proposes a partial retrogression of technological capabilities, geared towards a 
retrospective image of ‘the long-standing values of market capitalism and market democracy’, to 
intervene in the political crisis of instrumentarianism.357 In Surveillance Capitalism’s rather truncated 
concluding chapter, Zuboff proposes that under the protections of liberal democracy, ‘the debate and 
contest provided by still-healthy institutions can shift the tide of public opinion against unexpected 
sources of oppression and injustice, with legislation and jurisprudence eventually to follow.’358 
Beyond catalysing the political will of individuals with an unwavering faith in democratic process, 
Zuboff’s remarks say little about the material and political conditions which must align in order to 
effectively arbitrate the state of play set out by her book. One significant omission from the 
concluding chapter is its lack of critical reflection over the characteristically liberal process of 
exceptionalism, which Zuboff is at pains to express is partly responsible for rise of privacy 
infringement and data mining; this is particularly troubling when the one clear resolution she 
subsequently gestures towards rests upon the foundation of liberal democracy. Although Zuboff 
argues very well for the need for a departure from our current course, her conclusions resist the 
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possibility of radical alternatives to curtail the dominance of surveillance capitalism and recapture the 
right to the future tense, which, she suggests, form the bedrock of a functioning democracy. 
Esposito’s argument, introduced in Chapter 3, can be positioned as a challenge to Zuboff’s 
convictions about the steadfast nature of liberal institutions, arguing that the ‘horizon’ of democracy 
has ‘profoundly and irreversibly changed […] at this point, what is at stake is no longer a simple 
reform of its institutions; rather, we are faced with a socio-cultural transformation that runs much 
deeper than our entire political lexicon.’359 In line with Esposito's view that Europe’s ‘current, 
reputedly lethal, [democratic] crisis’ should be approached as an ‘exceptional opportunity and task 
that we must face’, it is also important to consider the interlinked impact of economic and 
environmental crises upon the Western political trajectory.  
 
The arguments put forward in Paul Mason’s book PostCapitalism emerge as a useful counterpoint to 
Zuboff at this point in her text. Mason approximately identifies the same harms of unrestrained, 
digital neoliberalism as Surveillance Capitalism, but his proposed solutions pull in the opposite 
direction. Instead of seeing the rise of an information economy as a symptom of ‘rogue’ capitalism 
and surveillance-based, instrumentarian dominance, Mason sees the networked infrastructure of this 
economy as a beacon for radical socialist change in the face of intractable global crises. Mason 
illustrates two potential scenarios in the wake of digitised neoliberalism where right-wing ideologies 
continue to hold on to the West: the first sees a world where the ‘global elite clings on, imposing the 
cost of crisis onto workers, pensioners, and the poor’ over the coming decades.360 In this instance, the 
global order ‘survives, but in a weakened form.’ The second scenario provides a much more grim 
view: 
Parties of the hard right and left come to power as ordinary people refuse to pay the price of 
austerity. Instead, states then try to impose the costs of the crisis on each other. Globalization 
falls apart, the global institutions become powerless and in the process the conflicts that have 
burned these past twenty years […] light a fire at the centre of the system. In this scenario, 
lip-service to international law evaporates; torture, censorship, arbitrary detention and mass 
surveillance become the regular tools of statecraft. This is a variant of what happened in the 
1930s and there is no guarantee it cannot happen again. In both scenarios, the serious impacts 
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of climate change, demographic ageing and population growth kick in around the year 
2050.361 
 
We can see from these two scenarios, alongside Esposito’s perspective, that the sociopolitical and 
economic conditions required for Zuboff’s proposed escape route out of ‘a world of “no exit”’ are no 
longer feasible.362 Mason’s forecasted outcomes illuminate the implications of Zuboff’s view, before 
offering an alternative: he suggests that ‘the basic forms of a postcapitalist economy can be found 
within the current system’, pointing towards the latent emancipatory possibilities offered by capitalist 
innovations which offer ‘a new route out, which the remnants of the old left – and all other forces 
influenced by it – have either to embrace or die.’363 Mason’s view can be seen to align to a Left 
accelerationist tradition whose discourse is broadly characterised by the notion that capitalist 
technologies and infrastructures can be appropriated and rehabilitated for progressive social projects. 
Mason repositions Marx’s crisis theory to the current landscape of surveillance capitalism within the 
digital sphere, asserting that the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the working class no longer 
accurately encapsulates the social relations of the information economy. Instead, Mason asserts that 
the new relations should be conceived of as a ‘fight between network and hierarchy’,364 pointing 
towards Marx’s Fragment on Machines to consider the new relationships between workers, 
information, and technology: ‘In an economy where machines do most of the work, where human 
labour is really about supervising, mending and designing the machines, the nature of the knowledge 
locked inside the machines must, [Marx] writes, be “social”.’365 Other approaches to Left 
accelerationism, investigated at length in Benjamin Noys’ Malign Velocities, envision cataclysm as an 
inevitable consequence of capitalist and environmental crisis that may enable new egalitarian political 
forms to emerge, ‘follow[ing] [capitalist] lines of flight or deterritorialization to the absolute end, to 
speed-up beyond the limits of production and so to rupture the limit of capital itself.’366 Noys rejects 
this notion, but suggests that its hopefulness for radical change makes the space for a more productive 
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pathway than the fatalistic notion of unavoidable ‘“totalitarian” form[s] of social acceleration’, whose 
rhetoric is reflected in the cynicism of contemporary fiction of cognitive estrangement, like the worlds 
imagined in The Circle and Moxyland.367  
 
Although Zuboff never explicitly draws on the concept of accelerationism within her theoretical 
approach, she identifies the contradictions of dominant capitalist discourse which position a right-
wing formulation of acceleration - which she describes as ‘inevitablism’ - as a force which ‘exerts a 
momentum that in some vague way drives toward the perfection of the species and planet.’368 Zuboff 
firmly rejects all forms ‘inevitability rhetoric’, including that which would seek to accelerate or 
appropriate the current technologies in order to break through to a more egalitarian world, as evidence 
of either a ‘weaponized virus of moral nihilism’ or a ‘cunning fraud, designed to render us helpless in 
the face of implacable forces.’369 Despite identifying and denouncing the right-wing presentation of 
technology as an inherently positive, progressive feature of the capitalist system, Zuboff's book is 
frequently at risk of buying in to the same narrative. In her historical account of the advent of 
industrial technologies, she describes the ‘first modernity’ as an ultimately progressive and liberating 
event that enabled its attendant generation to undertake a ‘modern migration from traditional 
lifeways’.370 Zuboff argues that this break in the historical continuum gave way to largely 
empowering new forms of ‘communication, information, consumption, and travel’ afforded by 
modernisation, which she compares to the current break that instead seeks to control and subjugate.371 
Zuboff’s linear account of industrialisation is disputed by the historical analysis undertaken by 
Andreas Malm in his text Fossil Capital, who argues that fossil fuels were, in many ways, a step back 
from the previous technologies, and were introduced as a method of disciplining labour:  
[T]he power derived from fossil fuels was dual in meaning and nature from the very start. 
[…] [Fossil fuels] are, by definition, a materialisation of social relations. No piece of coal or 
drop of oil has yet turned itself into fuel, and no humans have yet engaged in systematic 
large-scale extraction of either to satisfy subsistence needs.372 
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Zuboff’s view, in its rejection of accelerationist logic and its dehistoricised technodeterministic view, 
resonates with a recent observation by Fredric Jameson: 
[S]o much of left politics today - unlike Marx’s own passionate commitment to a streamlined 
technological future - seems to have adopted as its slogan Benjamin’s odd idea that 
revolution means pulling the emergency brake on the runaway train of History, as though an 
admittedly runaway capitalism itself had the monopoly on change and futurity.373 
 
This is in turn a reference to Walter Benjamin’s remark that, in opposition to Marx’s view that 
‘revolutions are the locomotive of world history’, ‘revolutions are an attempt by the passengers on 
this train – namely, the human race – to activate the emergency brake.’374 Zuboff successfully reveals 
the insidiousness of a capitalist utopia of acceleration, but does not place it in the context of a global 
environment framed by financial, political, and environmental crisis. Her book’s conclusions 
subsequently resemble a version of Benjamin's ‘emergency brake’ applied to the growth of data 
capitalism. Emma E. Wilson puts the tensions between acceleration and deceleration another way: ‘In 
opposition to this phantasmic horizontalism—which tends to fetishise the past and wait for the future 
—accelerationism attempts to reorientate the present. This necessitates utilising tools and processes 
ordinarily eschewed by the Left.’375 In Part I of this chapter, I will interrogate the implications of 
Zuboff’s decelerationist view in relation to Atwood’s recent novel The Testaments, before exploring 
the accelerationist undercurrents in Morgan's Altered Carbon.  
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Part I: The Testaments 
 
It is within the postdemocratic enclaves of left-wing accelerationism that we can locate Atwood’s 
recent novel The Testaments, and its precursor The Handmaid’s Tale. The speculative world of Gilead 
introduced in these texts represents a logical extension to Mason's second scenario: after 
environmental crisis, the U.S. experiences a seizure of power by a totalitarian fascist state. In 
Atwood’s example, environmental destruction and a worldwide shortage of natural resources causes 
human fertility and the birth rate to ‘free-fall’.376 The nation is subsequently transformed into a neo-
Puritan theocracy whose economy is centred around the enslavement of child-bearing women to 
increase population levels, as well as forced labour for the purposes of food production and the 
remediation of polluted land. Crucially for an analysis of Zuboff's argument, the coup d’etat occurs 
during a functioning liberal democracy within a somewhat digitised - but not specifically 
instrumentarian - cultural environment: in the pre-Gilead society, ‘Compucards’ and other electronic 
systems are implied to have acted as both an effective scapegoat for environmental harms and a useful 
infrastructure for control, ultimately allowing regressive religious factions to win political support: 
‘Any account with an F on it instead of an M. All they needed to do is push a few buttons. We’re cut 
off.’377 Set some years after a military coup in which the ‘the Sons of Jacob’ have overthrown US 
Congress under the guise of ‘reinstat[ing] the Constitution’,378 Gilead strictly divides society along the 
lines of gender and class, using a fundamentalist interpretation of parts of the Christian Bible as its 
founding principles.379 The Handmaid’s Tale sets out the rules and horrifying abuses to which the 
people of Gilead are subjected through the eyes of the Handmaid Offred: society is divided into the 
Commanders of the Faithful, an elite group of men who rule Gilead; the Commanders’ Wives; the 
Econopeople, or politically insignificant underclass; Marthas who serve the households of the 
wealthy; Angels and Guardians, who provide a military presence and visible surveillance network, 
and Eyes, who operate as secret police; and finally the Aunts, who oversee the indoctrination and 
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discipline of all Gilead’s women. Women universally lack any influence or stake in the wider 
community beyond the domestic sphere, and are forbidden to read or write. The post-apocalyptic 
dystopia set out by Atwood questions Zuboff’s vision of a partial technological retrogression, as it 
maps out the impacts of environmental and economic crisis upon the ‘still-healthy’ liberal institutions 
Surveillance Capitalism gestures towards.380 The result is a landscape where even the most basic 
information technologies are treated with suspicion and are carefully regulated - yet social inequality 
is diabolically magnified. 
 
Like a negative photographic image, Gilead offers an inverted vision of surveillance capitalist society. 
Many of the hidden abuses of liberal exceptionalism which are often overlooked are subsequently 
amplified in Atwood’s texts: for example, the social category of Handmaids shines a light on the 
biopolitical implications of U.S. poverty policies which manipulate female reproductive rights, 
articulated by Anna Marie Smith as ‘an extraordinarily invasive form of sexual regulation […] 
introduc[ing] the question of eugenics.’381 Where Smith’s essay draws upon Agamben's political 
theory to reflect on the state’s attempts to limit single welfare mothers to ‘participation in the low-
wage labor force’ as ‘negative eugenics’, the inverted picture shown in Atwood’s texts presents 
practices of state-enforced population boosting as a kind of ‘positive eugenics’, rendering 
marginalised women vulnerable in both cases.382 Gilead therefore serves as a hypothetical space 
which is well-suited to the task of testing out the shortcomings of Zuboff’s position, as it provides a 
fictional case study of an extreme version of the argument that is only implicit in Zuboff’s text: that 
pulling the ‘emergency brake’ of digital acceleration, isolated from its context within the history of 
capitalism, will spontaneously bring about the egalitarian change that is needed.383 
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Like the surveillance capitalist landscape articulated by Zuboff, social organisation in Gilead is 
premised upon an enormous disparity of knowledge between the ruling elite and the rest of society. 
Commanders are the only group with access to ‘Computalks’, one of the few remnants of a national 
electronic communications system which is used to monitor population data.384 Biological 
information is stored in the heavily guarded ‘Bloodlines Genealogical Archive’, a ‘set of files, 
accessible only to a very few’, which contains the ‘secret histories’ of the ruling families of Gilead 
and the Handmaids which bear their children.385 Through its religiously-mandated surveillant 
assemblage, Gilead’s social relations recreate a different kind of collapsed public/private artificial 
sphere - artificial by virtue of the totalitarian physical and psychological brutality that prevents its 
citizens from collective action and power. Even in the absence of digital life, Gilead operates a sphere 
in a similar manner to our own, resisting ‘topological analysis’ as it collapses all action into the 
singular surveillant space of ‘Big Other’; a notable feature of The Handmaid’s Tale which is 
continued in The Testaments is the separation of social groups by the colour of their uniform, with 
Handmaids wearing ‘white wings’ that ‘keep us from seeing, but also from being seen.’386 Within this 
person-to-person, interconnected authoritarian Panopticon, genuine intimacy, connectivity and 
political action with others in the public sphere is impossible; the only impression of a public sphere 
the women narrators can access is through their internal monologue with their imagined reader or 
listener, foreshadowing the eventual forms of collective action women attain by re-acquiring literacy 
skills. 
 
The Testaments traces this transition through a post-apocalyptic, post-digital world through the 
testimonies of three characters that are only alluded to in The Handmaid’s Tale: Aunt Lydia, the 
tyrannical leader of the Aunts whose role is to continually reinvent new discourses to manipulate the 
population of women in Gilead; Agnes, Offred’s eldest child from the pre-Gilead period; and Baby 
Nicole or Jade, who is the product of Offred’s pregnancy at the end of the first book. In the 
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intervening years, Agnes is placed within a high-ranking family as a Daughter, whereas Nicole is 
smuggled out of Gilead and raised in Canada by undercover operatives belonging to the ‘Mayday’ 
resistance movement.387 One of the most useful areas of analysis in The Testaments is its presentation 
of the appropriation of the dominant regime’s oppressive and ‘forbidden’ technologies to uncover 
possibilities for rebellion and revolution, following a similar path to Mason’s left-wing accelerationist 
perspective which calls for the ‘asymmetry’ of ‘info-capitalism’ to be flipped upside down through 
the collective strength and knowledge of the network, ‘allowing us not just to dissent, but to secede 
and start a new alternative.’388 The ability to subvert and undermine patriarchal systems of 
surveillance through intelligence gained within a sphere of disempowerment and illiteracy forms the 
crux of The Testaments, as literacy and other older technologies produce opportunities for covert 
spaces of appearance across the artificial boundaries of Gilead’s surveillant assemblage. As women 
have experienced the most dramatic fall from relative political enfranchisement and access to 
knowledge in Gilead, their participation in the political life is mediated on biopolitical grounds: ‘It 
was always a cruelty to promise [women] equality,’ Commander Judd tells Aunt Lydia, ‘since by 
their nature they can never achieve it. We have already begun the merciful task of lowering their 
expectations.’389 Unlike the process of exception seen in Moxyland, where women and minorities 
retain agency and political rights until the point at which their participation in active political life is 
revoked as part of a de facto system of control, women in Gilead are prevented from bios or political 
life as a legitimated feature of their role in society. 
 
This absence of political life ends up being a powerful resource: the establishment of borders around 
literacy, constructed to maintain deep asymmetries of knowledge and power, forces women to 
communicate and negotiate with one another in different ways. While the patriarchal institutions of 
surveillance represented by the Angels and the Eyes preserve a distinctly Foucauldian and patriarchal 
space of surveillance in Gilead, implementing ‘eyes, eyes, eyes, all over’ to maintain authority, 
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Marthas and Wives develop their own currency of local intelligence in order to leverage social 
power.390 Reciprocated secrets and favours form an amorphous kind of underground information 
economy, capitalised upon by the Aunts whose roles in managing women provide them with the 
greatest access to confidential information: ‘How did the Marthas know who was where? They didn’t 
have Computalks […] news flowed among them as if along invisible spiderweb threads.’391 In 
addition to this, Gilead erases the ‘profoundly self-sacrificing love’ upon which national identity 
relies, as the absence of literary materials and physical collectivity shrinks womens’ ‘imagined 
community’ down to their localised social group where political collaboration and resistance can be 
fostered.392 These shifting conceptions of space and community recall one of Mason’s fundamental 
arguments in his approach to accelerationism, which holds that ‘[b]y creating millions of networked 
people, financially exploited but with the whole of human intelligence one thumb-swipe away, info-
capitalism has created a new agent of change in history: the educated and connected human being.’393 
While Gilead is, as we have seen, an inversion of digital, interconnected society, the same principle 
Mason is describing can be seen at work in its ‘sphere for women’, where a structure created for the 
purposes of preventing access to information that might threaten the ruling order actually provides an 
environment conducive to collaboration and resistance, operating beneath the line of sight of Gilead’s 
authorities.394 
 
Lydia’s task for the duration of the book is to record incriminating information taken from the 
women's sphere, collate it within a ‘document cache’ of ‘explosive’ potential, and send it to Mayday 
operatives in Canada.395 In the absence of tools for communicating large pieces of information across 
borders, Lydia uncovers older ways of transferring data which the literate Eyes and Angels cannot 
immediately recognise. One example is the ‘Micro-Dot camera’, a Cold War-era intelligence 
technology which ‘reduces [documents] to microscopic size’ in order to be hidden in an innocuous 
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object.396 Communication between Lydia and Mayday is facilitated via microdots attached to the 
propaganda materials of Gileadean missionary women, bypassing Gilead’s security specifically 
because the younger generation of women cannot read: when the Eyes become aware of the existence 
of microdots, they become preoccupied with ‘inspecting shoes and undergarments’ instead, wasting 
valuable time.397 Towards the end of the text, Aunt Lydia implants a final micro-dot into a tattoo on 
Nicole’s arm and sends her into Canada in the disguise of a missionary. That the document cache, an 
extensive accumulation of texts explicitly marked as women’s knowledge sourced from the private, 
domestic communication network, is literally hidden and stored within the female body is a potent 
symbol for this kind of resistance: Gilead’s readiness to enforce strictly separated roles for men and 
women renders its authorities blind to the opportunities for transgression which these separated roles 
and spaces of bare life essentially create. In a world where the written word is banned and treated as a 
corrupting force, the spoken word becomes dangerous instead, signalling towards useful latent 
technologies and modes of collectivity which become more effective as a result of the artificial 
sphere’s oppressive existence. 
 
 
To a certain extent, this reading helps to expand Zuboff’s view beyond the limitations her conclusions 
place upon the broader potential of the book. The ‘electronic text’ set out by Zuboff is the foundation 
of the digital public sphere and a major barrier to the general public from being able to own their data 
and undermine the ‘God view’, a behaviourist concept which Zuboff claims is currently occupied by 
surveillance capitalist companies, providing them with a ‘reliable prediction [of] the performance of 
all the people in the network.’398 Reading The Testaments in this context, we can understand that the 
process of acquiring the kind of literacy required to access the electronic text and the data it contains 
about us - represented by the ‘Bloodlines Genealogical Archives’ - is a key step in dismantling 
instrumentarianism.399 The sharing of information to facilitate access to this data within Gilead’s 
system through women’s information networks propels the resistance narrative of the text, offering 
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examples of political subversion based upon relationships of collaboration across boundaries. As 
Agnes shifts from the role of a Daughter to an Aunt during the second half of the book, she is taught 
to read and write like other Aunts, provoking her to transform her radical ‘thoughts into action’:400 
‘All the secrets I had learned, and doubtless many more, would be mine, to use as I saw fit. All of this 
power. All of this potential to judge the wicked in silence, and punish them in ways they would not be 
able to anticipate.’ 401 Lydia leaves key pieces of information in files for Agnes to decode in the 
Archives, revealing to her the violent circumstances of her upbringing in Gilead as the child of a 
Handmaid, grooming her into the role of a political subversive.  
 
Lydia’s gradual manipulation of Agnes is facilitated by a phase of intellectual empowerment, 
presented by Atwood as a precursor to revolutionary action. For Claire Bélisle, the evolution of 
literacy skills into those required to negotiate computerised tools and information have deeply 
‘disruptive’ qualities which constitute a ‘digital knowledge revolution […] severing links that hold 
institutions together, toppling established assumptions about reality and de-legitimizing dominant 
power structures.’402 Here, we see some clear resonances between The Testaments’ understanding of 
literacy as a revolutionary force and Zuboff’s conception of the ‘electronic text’ as an obstacle to 
emancipation under instrumentarianism.403 Data leaks are one facet of a broader anti-surveillance 
movement that provide some evidence of this process in action: Edward Snowden’s disclosures as an 
NSA whistleblower, which ‘exposed the wholesale surveillance of the American public by [its] 
intelligence agencies’, serves as a prominent example from the past decade.404 Proficiency of the 
electronic text is thus re-enacted through Agnes’ reading skills, positioning capitalist technologies as 
resources that can be rehabilitated for progressive projects. These activities go beyond the liberation 
of information detailed in Mason’s text, aligning more closely to the ideas set out in Alex Williams 
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and Nick Srnicek’s Accelerate Manifesto, which asserts that the ‘tools to be found in social network 
analysis, agent-based modelling, big data analytics, and non-equilibrium economic models’ are 
‘necessary cognitive mediators for understanding complex systems like the modern economy’ in 
which we must ‘become literate.’405 Where Zuboff argues for institutions to curtail the onward 
development of digital capitalist innovation as a response to the disparities of power emerging out of 
it, Atwood is able to develop beyond this as she reveals opportunities for reappropriation, suggesting 
that we should grasp the chance to master the technologies of our oppressors in order to expose their 
internal contradictions and undo them.  
 
What Atwood achieves by focusing in such depth on the redemption of Aunt Lydia through her 
subversive information-sharing nevertheless limits the book’s ability to adequately build upon the 
strategies of resistance used by virtually every other character in the novel. While Sophie Gilbert 
writes that Atwood ‘challenge[s] systems of power by giving voice to the voiceless’, it becomes 
increasingly clear as the text wears on that the Atwood only gives a voice to those who serve 
structurally useful purposes to the text’s plot.406 The Testaments has a tendency to conceive of 
resistance only within the remit of a residual sense of liberalism, revealed through Atwood’s use of a 
number of formal strategies that facilitate progressive routes outward for the characters. These 
interventions ultimately render the underpinning philosophy of the text unconvincing as they are only 
realised through the presence of contrived elements that do not fit within the worldbuilding 
undertaken across Atwood’s two books. First, and most importantly, is the introduction of a policy in 
The Testaments which does not appear in The Handmaids Tale that offers a degree of protection to 
Daughters growing up in Gilead: if they refuse marriage to the point of attempting suicide, they are 
permitted to become an Aunt instead. Atwood creates a new social group of the ‘Supplicants’, or 
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Aunts-in-training, which mean that Agnes and her classmate Becka can be accepted into its ranks.407 
Atwood presents reading and writing as necessary tools for Aunts to maintain their dominance over 
the other social classes of women; Gilead consequently permits Supplicants to acquire literacy skills 
as part of their formal training. The placement of a library within Ardua Hall is one of the most 
incongruous features of Gilead’s environment - especially the presence of a ‘Forbidden World 
Literature’ section, where ‘heretical’ texts that have survived the ‘enthusiastic book-burnings […] to 
create a clean space for the morally pure generation’ are available for sufficiently indoctrinated Aunts 
to read.408  
 
In a bid to facilitate the complex logistics of the rest of the text’s plot, Atwood ultimately presents 
resistance as a force which cannot have a lasting impact until it is realised through legitimated 
institutional routeways. That an explicit social category needs to be introduced simply in order for 
Agnes and Becka to acquire state-sanctioned skills and knowledge, with the secondary effect that 
those skills happen to be useful for subversion, ultimately means that the radical potential of the space 
of exception - occupied by all other women in the text - ends up being disregarded and 
even trivialised by Atwood by her own characters’ definitions: ‘If you weren’t an Aunt or a Martha 
[…] what earthly use were you if you didn’t have a baby?’409 Revolutionary technologies are only 
appropriated within the parameters of Gilead’s strict classification of higher-value women, 
inadvertently creating a new class structure not based on rank but upon the relative ‘enlighten[ment]’ 
of women in Gilead, which crucially can only be achieved through the fulfilment of their role.410 It is 
strange, for instance, that the inflammatory information used to deconstruct Gilead comes from the 
women's network of gossip, but the Aunts and Supplicants do not participate in this network 
themselves but simply monitor and collect the information for their own political purposes – and are 
positioned as the heroes of the narrative when they decide to instigate a revolution. This implicitly 
positions the Aunts as women who hold superior intellectual strength to others - which, considering 
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literacy is explicitly associated with a process of defeminisation in Gilead as Aunts become ‘neither 
female nor male’, is a questionable idea to commit to.411 Despite their subjugated and passive role, 
Marthas are implied to be even more complicit in the regime than Aunts, as they tend to be ‘full and 
true believer[s]’ in the religious ideology of Gilead and are thus more susceptible to betray those 
around them.412 Alex Demirović emphasises ‘the irreducible space [of] subversion’ as the recourse of 
those ‘who do not accept a given order, who have no part, no voice, and no visibility’; a space which 
‘[p]ower, police, hegemony, and the identitary logic of fixed identities will always strive to close.’413  
Despite the fact that spaces of voicelessness and invisibility, enforced by ‘fixed identities’ and a 
heavily militarised surveillance structure, pervade the two texts, Atwood chooses to attach key 
moments of resistance to characters who have a relatively high degree of social capital, and who 
behave in accordance with their role. The radical potential of spaces of biopolitical exclusion and 
disempowerment set out in The Handmaid’s Tale - such as the rare opportunities for collective action 
that are capitalised upon by Handmaids in an alliance with Marthas - fails to be realised in The 
Testaments. Atwood ultimately commits to institutionally valid, nonviolent forms of resistance - 
knowledge and education - which fundamentally erase the transformative potential of bare life and 
reinforce harmful binary stereotypes of uneducated/victimised versus educated/empowered women, 
and do little to reconstruct alternative forms of democracy and political community.  
 
Like The Handmaid’s Tale, The Testaments emphasises Gilead’s invention of Particicutions as a kind 
of pressure valve for the Handmaids. The community is forced to execute men accused of crimes 
against women with their bare hands, with visceral descriptions of physical violence: a man accused 
of rape is ‘literally torn apart by seventy shrieking Handmaids […] Fists were raised, clutching 
clumps of bloodied hair torn out by the roots.’414 Atwood invokes these graphic images during a 
Particicution within the final events of the book, interrupting the increasing momentum of the 
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microdot narrative trajectory. The positioning of this scene as an antithesis to the progressive, passive 
work done by Agnes, Nicole and Lydia frames violent protest as an extreme and repulsive act that, at 
its core, is nothing more than yet another strand of psychological brutality imposed by the state 
masquerading as an opportunity for justice. The images of crowds of women erupting into ‘so much 
rage’ provides an opportunity to investigate forms of protest and revolution from the margins of 
Gilead’s society which are dismissed almost as soon as they are conjured, which is at odds with 
Atwood’s progressive agenda, since we learn from moments in both texts that Handmaids certainly do 
use violence to change the terms of their oppression. Offred longs for a ‘knife’, ‘sewing scissors’, 
‘garden shears’, and ‘knitting needles’ all throughout her narrative, but is never physically able to 
access them,415 so that a later moment in The Testaments when ‘Commander Saunders had been killed 
in his study by their Handmaid, using a kitchen skewer’ recalls Offred’s reactions to psychological 
and physical torture.416 Interestingly, the revelations hidden in the secret files of the Archives 
contradict this logic, as Atwood decides to absolve the Handmaid for something that is now presented 
as a crime: the Archives reveal that it was Nicole’s cruel stepmother Paula - a Wife - who ‘skewered 
Commander Saunders’ instead.417 It is curious that of all the files relating to the violence within 
Gilead, there are ‘none containing the crimes of Handmaids, and none for those of Aunts,’ since these 
files would provide useful insights into the kinds of resistance women are able to attain when they do 
not have equal access to weapons, tools, and information beneath the patriarchal, militarised 
surveillance network.418 Atwood essentially creates a dividing line between the kinds of women who 
are capable of physical violence and the kinds of women who use psychological and intellectual 
resistance instead, tying Wives, Marthas and Econopeople into a monolithic figure of evil through 
their ‘crimes’. While Gilbert perceives that Atwood ‘refuses to endorse any ideal of feminist 
solidarity or unified victimhood’, it appears that the text ultimately reifies strict victim/villain 
boundaries even as Aunt Lydia’s duplicity attempts to dismantle them: ‘You yourself would never 
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have done such things! But you yourself will never have had to.’419 From Atwood’s conclusions, we 
can understand that visibility and physical force are seen as enervated forms of what can only become 
revolutionary through the mediating processes of literacy and education. This limitation of Atwood’s 
text dovetails with Zuboff’s emphasis upon liberalism as an ‘exit’ out of instrumentarian oppression, 
wherein the reinforcing structures of the ruling order can paradoxically be subverted by returning to 
the exact sociopolitical conditions and values that gave rise to such structures to begin with. 
 
Although the microdot’s data climactically triggers Gilead’s ‘coming destruction’ at the end of the 
text, the actual implications of this moment become particularly unstable in light of the inner 
inconsistencies of the text.420 The Republic of Gilead reveals itself on multiple occasions to be adept 
at exempting the contradictory behaviour of its own leaders - enshrined by the figure of Commander 
Judd, who is known to murder each successive ‘child bride’ in a Bluebeard-like manner,421 at the 
same time as occupying a post ‘in charge of the Eyes’, reigning over the moral behaviour of Gilead’s 
population.422 The ‘civil strife and chaos’ caused by the publication of the document cache, revealing 
so many ‘discreditable personal secrets’ including crimes committed within senior households of the 
state, instigate a series of executions which ‘thinned the ranks of the elite class, weakened the regime, 
and instigated a military putsch as well as a popular revolt.’423 In this way, the regime itself is pitted 
against the characters as the primary antagonist of both books, but rebellion finally stems from 
activity that transgresses its established rules, not from the rules themselves. Truth is not considered 
important to the operations of a totalitarian state - some of Arendt's most famous remarks in The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, frequently cited under the current political climate, capture this reality, 
including the observation that ‘propaganda is marked by its extreme contempt for facts as such, for in 
their opinion fact depends entirely on the power of man who can fabricate it,’424 and that its target 
audience ‘did not particularly object to being deceived because it held every statement to be a lie 
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anyhow.’425 The dissolution of Gilead does not come about due to the revelation of the violence it 
deploys - including ritualised rape, ‘cleaning up deadly radiation’, and the ‘Gilead National 
Homelands Genocide’, which, notably, is a topic understood well enough internationally that it is 
taught in Canadian schools in the text - but through the printed records of crimes that occur in 
violaton of those rules.426 As a result, the governments of other nations that are presented as safe 
havens for Gileadean refugees, including Canada, become directly complicit in Gilead’s regime of 
political evil as the spoken testimonies of refugee women who have escaped Gilead via the 
‘Underground Femaleroad’ are not considered sufficient to justify further action.427 Ultimately, Aunt 
Lydia’s deus ex machina-like ‘document cache’ requires a sequence of jarring exceptions to the rules 
of Gilead in order to leak into mainstream media channels in Canada.428 While The Testaments 
positions knowledge and writing as the key drivers behind political and societal change, the rich 
potential of the text to interrogate opportunities for collectivity and technological appropriation for 
those most victimised within an oppressive regime of surveillance are ignored, in favour of formal 
strategies that are employed to expedite the connection of the three central characters.429 
 
On the one hand, Atwood’s perspective on resistance offers a useful counterpoint from which to 
reflect on the shortcomings of liberal democracy and technological disarmament as antidotes for 
oppressive societal control, providing practical examples of the ways that latent technologies can be 
salvaged for the purposes of political action. Reading the process of literacy as a metaphor for seizing 
the right to information by ‘reading’ the electronic text offers a useful way to consider Zuboff and 
Mason’s respective positions on the future direction of surveillance capitalism. If capitalism 
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essentially ‘holds back progress’ for its own ends, there seems to be no use in advocating for the 
removal of digital technologies as though they represent the crux of socioeconomic inequality in the 
twenty-first century.430 Atwood’s texts provide some examples of how Mason’s view of the 
‘information economy’ might operate in a philosophical anti-digital space, exploiting the resources 
and cultural norms fostered by an oppressive system to locate a viable ‘escape route’ that is made 
possible specifically by the trappings the system has created to uphold its dominance - in this case, 
through an information economy predicated on the spoken word and the forms of collectivity which 
grow from it.431 On the other, the egalitarian convictions of the book are challenged by the manner in 
which its plot ignores the ‘explosive’ potential of forceful - and often profoundly brave - political 
assertions women characters make elsewhere in the novel, including the women who ‘would shout 
and resist’432 during the repeated mass-murders that Aunt Lydia recalls during the construction of 
Gilead.433 Even when setting aside the issues of plausibility and the structural complications within 
the book, Atwood’s myopic view of women's resistance erases the way that spaces of political 
disempowerment can create the conditions for women to become powerful agents for protest and 
revolution. 
 
To conclude, it is striking that Atwood’s book is unable to imagine ways out of the ‘glass life’ other 
than ones which unfold according to the jurisdiction of the state, confronting the deeds of an 
extraordinarily brutal tyrannical regime with subversion that occurs through politically legitimate 
channels - particularly when there is no shortage of graphic violence across both texts.434 The question 
of a better alternative following the destruction of Gilead remains unanswered, as Atwood leaves only 
vague references to a reconstructed version of digital capitalist society during the ‘Restoration of the 
United States of America’; the brief mention of a ‘Digital Black Hole of the twenty-first century’, 
‘server farms’ and ‘populist revolts against repressive digital surveillance’ in the final pages of the 
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book suggest that the end of Gilead does not point towards a unilaterally more egalitarian 
alternative.435 Here, Atwood is essentially acknowledging the parallels between her fictional world 
and the one we are living in now, at the same time as prescribing education and information as 
antidotes to the social problems which manifest across both. While an analysis of Atwood’s texts 
therefore offer interesting pathways to interrogate the ‘exit’ articulated by Zuboff, they also remain 
bound to the same logic which holds that the resurrection of older values and practices, taken from a 
pre-digital time, offer a kind of retrospective ideal that would offer the resources to overcome the 
obstacles in the present. Finally, the themes of accelerationism which, like in Mason’s critical 
paradigm, would see a widespread re-appropriation of technologies for progressive ends offers a 
valuable way to push beyond Zuboff’s limited conclusions, but the way Atwood approaches this 
concept follows unequal hierarchies that are bound up with issues of access and privilege. This 
reflects some of the issues raised by recent reviews of Mason’s book, including Rose Deller who 
writes: 
[T]he kind of networked, highly-educated existence that Mason ascribes to his postcapitalist 
subject is one attainable only by those whose society provides a certain standard of schooling 
provision and infrastructure. In a world imbalanced by asset-stripping and imposed 
destitution, it is entirely unclear just how the redistributive process, which Mason claims a 
postcapitalist society will produce, operates.436 
 
If the ‘emergency brake’ of technological deceleration does not hold up to the exigencies set out in 
Surveillance Capitalism as the first half of this chapter has demonstrated, we might inquire how far 
exactly we would need to progress along the lines of Mason’s projected alternative in order to begin 
to see radical change occurring.437 The following analysis of a very different speculative future 
landscape deals with the question of what lies beyond the ‘limit of capital itself,’ if the digital sphere 
is to be accelerated in the hopes of reaching open spaces for the creation of a more progressive 
world.438  
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Part II: Altered Carbon  
 
 
In the first part of this chapter, I have laid out one of the ways Zuboff’s paradoxical formulation of an 
‘exit’ out of the hive can be outstripped by applying a Left accelerationist perspective to her critical 
framework. If the technological deceleration Zuboff advocates for is both ineffective to facilitate the 
rapid social transformation that we need, and improbable to actually occur - since, as the book details, 
‘existing laws […] have not been sufficient to disrupt [instrumentarianism’s] growth,’ then the 
opposite perspective emerges as an increasingly interesting prospect. Mason offers a number of 
pertinent insights into the potentially emancipatory possibilities that can be salvaged and repurposed 
from digital capitalism: 439 
With the new terrain, the old path is lost. But a different path has opened up. Collaborative 
production, using network technology to produce goods and services that work only when 
they are free, or shared, defines the route beyond the market system.440 
 
Encouraging us to ‘allow for the possibility of collapse’, Mason acknowledges the techno-utopian 
nature of his assertions, concluding that his reasoning makes room for the rebuilding and recreation of 
a world centred around ‘a picture of the ideal life, the perfect society,’ facilitated by the 
interconnected digital sphere which catalyses ‘the relationship of [radical] thought to action.’441 What 
Mason does not consider in his text is that the notion of deliberate technological acceleration towards 
a ‘picture of the ideal life’ aligns to the same propounded trajectory of neoliberalism, or at least the 
‘cybernetic and financial forces’ that ‘formed the basis’ for it.442 While the counterintuitive notion of 
speeding up capitalism in order to facilitate its collapse is repositioned by Mason as a transformation 
of its resources and infrastructure by a networked collective of people for socialist ends, a key 
problem remains within his argument. Noys defines this as a ‘double dynamic’ of ‘two contradictory 
trendlines’: one of the ‘real deceleration of capitalism in terms of a declining rate of return on capital 
investment,’ and one of the ‘acceleration of financialization, driven by the new computing and 
cybernetic technologies, which themselves create an image of dynamism.’443 Noys writes that this 
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results in a ‘utopian dream of communist accelerationism, in which the seeming horror of the full 
mechanization of the human is, in fact, regarded as the freeing of labor.’444 In the second part of this 
chapter, I will interrogate how continued technological growth for ostensibly progressive ends might 
manifest in a transhuman world beyond the current networked society, and how far it can be seen to 
advance upon Zuboff’s regressive conclusions. 
 
In Altered Carbon, we are offered an insight into a capitalist universe set in the distant future whose 
economic structure has accelerated far beyond the profitable innovations of networked 
communication, data mining and artificial intelligence. In this setting, the computerised public sphere 
has become firmly embedded into the organic landscape, ‘[woven] into the fabric of everyday life 
until [it is] indistinguishable from it.’445 Set several hundred years after the colonisation of other 
planets and the discovery of ‘altered carbon’, a material that allows human memories and 
consciousness to be perfectly preserved into small circular ‘cortical stacks’, the novel offers a 
theoretical construction of a future where the world’s wealthiest can afford to live forever.446 The 
reader is dropped into the book’s environment of ‘Bay City’ - an unfamiliar version of San Francisco 
- at the same moment as its antihero Takeshi Kovacs, an ex-military convict whose consciousness is 
resurrected from a long period of imprisonment ‘on ice’.447 Kovacs is implanted into a new ‘sleeve’ or 
human body at the behest of the centuries-old billionaire Laurens Bancroft, one of the first humans on 
Earth to acquire the resources to live for more than two or three lifetimes in successive bodies, to 
solve the case of his own murder.448 Bancroft serves as a fitting representation of the enduring 
infrastructure of capitalism, having ‘lived through a corporate war, the subsequent collapse of my 
industrial and trading interests […] and at least three major economic crises […] I am still here.’449 
Despite the fact that the ‘UN Protectorate’, or the inter-planetary military and administrative 
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institution which comes to loosely replace governments,450 fits stacks into the spinal cords of all 
humans at the point of birth, most people will go ‘into voluntary storage’ after one or two natural 
lifespans 451- a kind of death brought about by an individual’s inability to keep up with unaffordable 
payments on their ‘sleeve mortgage.’452 The godlike power of the corporate elite is encoded into the 
Biblical significance of the name used to describe them: ‘Meths […] and all the days of Methuselah 
were nine hundred and sixty nine years.’453 Here we see a speculative end point of the contradictory 
accelerationist trajectories conceptualised by Noys, where the ‘networked’ proletariat transform into a 
‘cyborg fantasy […] integrating man and machine, or person and machine, to fuse and infuse living 
labor into dead labor’.454 Like Kendra in Moxyland, the technologically enhanced and ostensibly 
‘liberated’ human does not signify freedom from digital capitalism but an objectified component of it, 
as subjective experience is literally predicated upon the rent one pays to remain within an unimpaired, 
organic body. The socialist potential of an information economy is surpassed by the imposition of 
new capitalist innovations, underpinned by a pervasive neoliberal ideology that legitimates oppression 
by celebrating and incentivising excessively long life. 
 
The new economy Morgan outlines subsequently carries forward some of the ideas identified by 
David Runciman as a plausible threat to the current mode of democracy, as the information and 
resources brought about by the ‘Information Age’ have ‘the potential to [transcend] politics’:  
The Leviathan […] cannot abolish death, but it can set the terms that make a natural death 
more likely than an unnatural one. The reason most people die today of old age is because the 
state has come to protect them from other, violent fates. This natural equality might soon be a 
thing of the past. […] Vastly extended human life spans, and hugely unequal life prospects, 
undermine the rationale of modern politics. A few super-humans is all it would take to change 
entirely the basis on which we organise our societies. They would stand outside the rules of 
relative vulnerability that bind the rest of us.455 
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Runciman, in his assessment of the anti-democratic implications of surveillance capitalism, engages 
with Mason’s book as a vision of ‘liberated technology’ which provides knowledge that is ‘much 
harder for capitalists to exploit, because in the end it does not belong to anyone […] so long as 
everyone has access to the machines that contain it.’456 However, Runciman’s view, like Mason’s, 
presupposes that equal access to advanced technologies and the knowledge they contain will 
spontaneously balance the distribution of power. Mason’s representation of a transhuman capitalism, 
where all people have equal access to the ‘social’ information contained within the machine as 
technological devices are replaced by the ‘digitised mind’, challenges this reasoning, as the ruling 
elite continue to maintain a position in society which is ‘a breed apart’ from other transhumans.457 
New methods for disciplining labour are introduced: Kovacs, a genetically modified solider whose 
‘every evolved violence limitation instinct’ has been ‘tuned out a neuron at a time,’ captures this 
dynamic particularly well as he envisions the human body as a literal commodity to be traded and 
sold for ‘spare parts’.458 Instead of an egalitarian internet network, the ‘central datastack’ of Bay City 
represents ‘the uniform and unceasing motion of an automaton’ described by Marx, with its citizens 
literally and inescapably ‘taught from childhood […] to adapt [their] own movements to’ by virtue of 
their digital cognition.459 The ‘promise-oriented legitimacy’460 of neoliberalism is preserved as the 
world’s ruling class cultivates an understanding of ‘subjective age’ as a symbol of power and wealth, 
driving forward a societal desire for immortality while maintaining a firm grip on the resources to 
realise it.461 Like in Beukes’ version of Cape Town, Morgan’s world eradicates most government 
institutions in place of corporations; other than a functioning local police force of ‘men with 
automatic weapons slung over their shoulders’ which operates separately from the amorphous 
Protectorate, there is minimal intervention from the state into its citizen’s lives.462 This registers a 
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problem which is shared by Zuboff’s and Mason’s diverging theoretical positions: at one end, 
highlighting the insufficiency of a myopic view of instrumentarianism as an isolated moment of anti-
democratic technological development, and at the other, foregrounding the propensity of 
neoliberalism’s material platforms to obliterate the egalitarian potential of networked cultural 
evolution. Kovacs, a self-interested and apathetic ‘offworlder’ who observes the perpetual crime and 
corruption of Earth with little more than a passing interest in its most brutal instances of violence and 
torture, does not personify Mason's ‘financially exploited [but] educated and connected human being’ 
as a harbinger for meaningful change; instead, he personifies a desensitised, hyper-individualised 
nihilism which pervades the dominant culture of all the settled worlds.463 Unlike the scenario we will 
go on to explore in Ex Machina, human cognition here becomes trapped and exploited within the 
ever-accelerating technological environment surrounding it, frozen in time and unable to evolve 
forwards. 
 
Although the dystopian world put forward in Altered Carbon challenges the notion of networked 
transformative action naturally and spontaneously dismantling capitalism, examples of effective 
human-machine collaboration and resistance are still present in the text. Morgan’s transhuman 
landscape carries forward Weiser’s concept of‘ ubiquitous computing’, an entanglement of invisible 
electronic devices and data flows merged into the physical landscape and, in this instance, into the 
human body.464 This blurs the boundaries between virtual and real space which are seen as equally 
viable spaces for effective life, and are both heavily commercialised. Bay City’s underclass 
subsequently exist in the gap in between the two spaces, distributing their consciousness evenly 
across ‘virtual constructs’ and ‘real time’ depending on what they can afford. The poorest citizens are 
relegated to the same space as the service cyborgs which saturate the book’s landscape, living in 
cheap ‘AI-managed’ hotels which are an amalgamation of holographic and physical features, with a 
‘column of fine print data’ covering the walls.465 The two entities of digitised human cognition and 
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humanised AI are united as they are both ‘reduced to the void of subjectivity, i.e., to the pure 
proletarian status of substanzlose Subjektivitaet’ described by Slavoj Žižek.466 In his reading of Denis 
Villeneuve’s 2017 film Blade Runner 2049, Žižek recalibrates the question of ‘human’ capitalist 
acceleration by considering the impact transhuman technologies will have on its trajectory: ‘[W]hat 
we are witnessing today is nothing less than an attempt to integrate the passage to post-humanity into 
capitalism.’467 Žižek’s reasoning opens up interesting questions about the relationship between 
artificially altered humans and capitalist exploitation: ‘If fabricated androids work, is exploitation still 
operative here? Does their work produce value which is in excess of their own value as commodities, 
so that it can be appropriated by their owners as surplus-value?’468 Altered Carbon responds 
affirmatively, utilising the space in between the reality/virtuality binary to experiment with methods 
of transhuman political action. While the androids of Blade Runner 2049 do not rebel, some of the 
key moments of emancipation for Morgan’s characters are brought about as a result of cooperation 
between humans and AI entities who are both ‘hardwired to want customers’, testing out Mason's 
framework within a transhuman environment.469 During the second half of the novel, the set of 
generic conventions Morgan invokes undertake a distinctive shift from a noir thriller to an adventure 
narrative as the ‘cancerous power structures’ implemented on each planet are revealed to be the work 
of Kovacs’ chief antagonist, Reileen Kawahara, ‘one of the seven most powerful human beings in this 
solar system.’470 Once this revelation satisfies Kovacs’ primary task to find Bancroft’s murderer, and 
Kovacs receives his reward of exoneration, financial freedom and naturalised citizenship, Kovacs 
breaks with his perpetual apathy and is suddenly able to respond affectively to the violence subjected 
to a family that he has alternately exploited and helped during his assignment: 
Personal. But it was worse than personal. This was about Louise, […] cut up on a surgical 
platter; about Elizabeth Elliott stabbed to death and too poor to be re-sleeved; Irene Elliott, 
weeping for a body that a corporate rep wore on alternate months; Victor Elliott, whiplashed 
between loss and retrieval of someone who was and yet was not the same woman […] the 
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millions like him throughout the Protectorate, painfully gathered assemblages of individual 
human potential.471 
 
As Kovacs is released from his identity as an ‘Envoy’, or a psychologically engineered soldier rather 
than a physically enhanced one, he rejects the opportunity to undertake a life in real time within a 
‘sleeve of his [own] choosing’ and instead resolves to assassinate Kawahara with the help of Irene, an 
imprisoned hacker, and the infrastructure of an obsolete AI-managed hotel.472 In a ‘microsecond 
intrusion’, the group harness their mastery of the transient space in between real/digital spaces to 
install an undetectable computer virus into the multiple backup copies of consciousness Kawahara 
keeps in remote storage, undermining her immortality in both realms: ‘With an AI gunning for you, 
your only hope is to drop out of the physical plane.’473 The ‘void of subjectivity’ shared by Kovacs, 
Irene and the AI programme creates a new space for collective action, ‘shatter[ing] the very 
separation between the human and the nonhuman’;474 we therefore see a version of Mason’s 
framework, built upon ‘the network - like the workshop 200 years ago - that “cannot be silenced or 
dispersed’, which is practicable in the trans-human capitalist setting identified by Žižek.475 
 
The rebellious and emancipatory sentiment of this secondary plot offers one way to conceptualise a 
form of anarchic liberation through a combination of organic and artificial cognition and space. 
Nevertheless, much of Morgan’s text presents contradictory suggestions about what exactly counts as 
oppression and exploitation, complicating the emancipatory themes of its conclusion. Kovacs, the 
first-person narrator and primary point of view of the novel, seems to be deeply conflicted about 
whether the extreme brutality of the neoliberal word around him is a natural and necessary part of 
transhuman nature, or something to be resisted and overthrown. This ambivalence is best represented 
in Morgan’s approach to patriarchal violence within the text, which is particularly prominent 
considering the book’s antihero serves as a symbol of the harms of hyper-masculinised military 
bioengineering. Because of the new disposability of human bodies and omnipresence of the artificial 
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sphere, entertainment in Bay City is centred around images of ‘real’ cruelty and pain: ‘what the public 
wants, the public pays for.’476 Except for a handful of supporting characters, the only livelihood that is 
ostensibly available to the women of Bay City is sex work, where abuse from clients is universally 
accepted and encouraged: ‘A lot of the girls get hurt […] Jerry’s got insurance to cover that. He’s real 
good about it, even puts us in into store if it’s going to take a long time to heal.’477 The women’s 
ambivalence towards this violence and their pride in stoically enduring it - ‘A good whore feels what 
the client wants them to feel’478 - goes without further interrogation by Morgan as the novel wears on, 
suggesting, as Andrea Dworkin writes, that the female victim of sexual violence is ‘up against the 
whole world of real male belief about her real nature, expressed most purely in pornography.’479 
Morgan takes this discernibly misogynistic dynamic of the text a step further, as ‘digital human 
storage’ offers new opportunities for psychological trauma.480 Since virtual spaces ‘make it possible to 
torture a human being to death, and then start it again,’481 Morgan commits extensive portions of the 
book to superlatively graphic scenes of sexual and other forms of gender-based violence within 
‘constructs’ that are ‘indistinguishable from the projected consciousness they are based on.’482 In one 
particularly disturbing scene, Kovacs’ consciousness is downloaded into the sleeve of a young girl 
‘with copper-sheened skin’ for the purposes of interrogation, which Morgan suggests is more brutal 
and effective as a result of the ‘built-in helplessness’ of the (deliberately racialised and commodified) 
female body.483 Kovacs claims that ‘[t]o be a woman was a sensory experience beyond the male […] 
No combat conditioning, no reflex of aggression. Nothing.’484 The subsequent reproduction of horrific 
scenes of torture adopt the same unerringly objectifying gaze Kovacs uses to describe women during 
moments of consensual sex in the book, repeating pornographic descriptions of the sleeve’s ‘young, 
undamaged flesh’ at length: ‘the sheet fell away from my breasts. The coppery upper slopes were 
 
476 Morgan, p. 252. 
477 Morgan, p. 117. 
478 Morgan, p. 279. 
479 Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York: Plume, 1989) p. 179. 
480 Morgan, p. 169. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Morgan, p. 411. 
483 Morgan, p. 164. 
484 Ibid. 
108 
smooth and unharmed.’485 Morgan’s critical approach to the extraordinarily misogynistic nature of his 
constructed world has little to say about Kovacs’ perpetuation of sexist, exploitative assumptions 
about women, positioning the female body as a sexual object to be observed, occupied, and injured, 
even as he critiques the ‘pain’ and ‘humiliation’ subjected to it through Kovacs’ eyes.486  
 
This contradiction betrays a form of biological determinism that is at odds with Kovacs’ sudden 
rehabilitation to the figure of a hero at the end of the text, where he seeks to rescue women ‘slated for 
[…] snuff’ from Bay City’s ‘sick’ elite classes through his assassination plot.487 Even as Kovacs 
navigates a ‘noir’ landscape, where ‘everyone is fallen, and right and wrong are not clearly defined 
and maybe not even attainable’ for most of the text,488 Morgan encodes his vision of transhuman 
liberation within a caricature of male heroism and prowess, with the ‘battered sleeve’, ‘corpse’ or 
‘mutilated legs’ of fallen women serving merely as clues that punctuate the advancement of his 
detective narrative.489 Men are presented as having an innately human drive for sexual violence and a 
hatred of women that is augmented by artificial conditioning - ‘Male is just a mutation [of the female] 
[…] Fighting, fucking machines’490 – which, even in Morgan’s attempt to critique technologically-
augmented patriarchal violence, only justifies and reenacts it, as Kovacs’ persistent objectification of 
women is ‘[put] down to hormonal drives, gene instinct and pheromones […] Sad, but true.’491 This 
issue is symptomatic of a broader problem with the book’s speculative conclusions on capitalist 
exploitation, in that Kovacs ends up spending an inordinate amount of time admiring and 
glamourising the finite details of the new aesthetics and technologies Earth offers in the process of 
presenting the horrors that accompany them, reading like a fantasy of masculine technological 
dominance carried to its extreme even as it rages against the machine of capitalism. Instead of the 
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‘unashamed[ly] utopian’ postcapitalist world envisioned by Mason, the kind of acceleration we see in 
Altered Carbon aligns much more closely to the Futurist tropes of ‘contempt for [women]’, invoking 
the ‘phallic and mechanized male body over and against the feminized: soft, liquid, and organic.’492 
Žižek identifies a related issue with the ‘aestheticized imagery’ of Blade Runner 2049, which ‘serves 
to obfuscate the progressive anti-capitalist potential of the story […] directly express[ing] the social 
stance of not-taking-sides, of passive drifting.’493 It is notable that Altered Carbon, which was 
published in 2002, skips over environmental threats like climate change, pollution, and the 
consumption of finite natural resources in its construction of the intervening centuries of Earth’s 
history, even as it retrospectively attacks the limitations of a culture that ‘grappled after norms to live 
by, settled for the old and familiar,’ and halfheartedly critiques the excesses of the culture that comes 
to replace it.494 As a result, the aesthetics of the polluted Bay City - including ‘slopes of steel and 
plastic’,495 skies ‘clogged with cloud’,496 flying cars or ‘cruisers’ and pervasive ‘crude holographic[s]’ 
- express a continuation of a carbon-fuelled world that no longer seems possible without an element of 
environmental cataclysm.497 Even though the book, like Blade Runner 2049, ‘provides a whole 
panoply of modes of exploitation’, Morgan’s commentary ultimately fails to come to any substantial 
conclusions about whether or not his glamourised speculative world is worth the sacrifice.498 
 
This collection of issues present in Altered Carbon highlights the vulnerability of ‘progressive’ 
accelerationist discourse to patriarchal and environmentally harmful value systems. Capturing the 
tensions between technological and gendered liberation, Emma Wilson writes: 
There is something immediately unsettling about the suggestion that we simply 
“commandeer” capitalist infrastructure and steer it towards newer and better ends. Apart from 
sounding like a return to naive humanism—the critique of which poststructuralists laboured 
over for decades—the injunction to “accelerate” elsewhere comes across as a nihilstic call to 
mindlessly escalate technological development. This latter reading gives rise to the 
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mischaracterisation of accelerationism “as a kind of twenty-first century Futurism, concerned 
primarily with brute virility and machinic speed.”499 
 
 
As we have seen, the shortcomings of Morgan’s text diverge from the formal complications present in 
Atwood’s, testing the boundaries of technological reappropriation in interesting ways. Nevertheless, 
Morgan is unable to imagine a form of rebellion without inheriting the phallocentric value system of 
Futurism - a vision of the world that remains bound to the dystopic inevitablism of patriarchal and 
capitalist tyranny. While there is limited scholarly work on the Altered Carbon trilogy, Sara Martin 
reflects on another of Morgan’s detective thrillers which similarly attempt to recast a hypermasculine, 
monstrous ex-military male protagonist as an anti-patriarchal figure, writing that ‘a certain dead end is 
reached in terms of the male writer's use of sf; for there is no speculative undoing of the social ills 
caused by patriarchy.’500 Aside from the issues of Kovacs’ uninhibited misogyny and Morgan’s 
representations of women in the text, the same issue is present in Altered Carbon. Kovacs concludes 
pessimistically that ‘nothing ever will change’, and that there will ‘always [be] people like Kawahara 
and the Bancrofts to […] cash in on the game’; the book concludes before it allows an opportunity to 
investigate whether Kovacs’ actions impact the real sources of inequality in the world, but it appears 
to be of little interest to Morgan by this stage of the text.501 An important feature of the kind of 
transhuman engineering invoked in Altered Carbon, unlike what we will go on to explore in Ex 
Machina, is that it halts and preserves human cognition at the moment that cortical stacks are 
discovered, preventing change and evolution by virtue of the fact that organic reproduction is no 
longer necessary. Although children exist in the novel, it is rare for humans to organically reproduce; 
Catholics who ‘don’t practice birth control’ for religious reasons - encoded as women, since they are 
the only religious characters in the text - are considered ‘freaks’.502 Notably, Kovacs makes no 
comment on the ‘sixty-one children’ fathered by Bancroft.503 Consequently, Morgan’s characters and 
landscapes are effectively frozen in time, unable to break out of the ‘freemarket deleria of cyberpunk, 
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which assumes that capitalism is itself a kind of utopia of difference and variety.’504 Although the 
structure Shulamith Firestone saw as the ‘tyranny of the biological family’ has been ‘broken’ in the 
text, Morgan ignores the cultural shifts that this break would entail. Women are, without exception, 
barred from attaining ‘ownership over their own bodies’, and Morgan only investigates this form of 
subjugation when it is expedient for Kovacs’ heroic narrative.505 The text’s presentation of gender is 
devoted to the diametric opposite of ‘the elimination of […] the sex distinction itself’, limiting its 
exploration to the new forms of identity, sexuality, embodiment, and emancipation its imaginative 
technologies offer to men.506 Even as Morgan successfully conceptualises resistance to transhuman 
capitalism by deconstructing human/artificial boundaries, this example of rebellion comes apart under 
the reinforcement of other binary oppositions which, in turn, enshrine patriarchal supremacy as a 
biological inevitability. 
 
This raises important questions about the universally emancipatory resonances of Mason’s book as it 
calls for a ‘coherent project based on reason, evidence and testable designs’, writing that machine 
learning technologies will ultimately lend themselves to utopian post-capitalist ends because 
‘mistakes are discovered and rectified at the design stage.’507 This reasoning resonates a little too 
closely with the same narrow view implied in Morgan’s book, where the ‘network’ becomes so 
advanced - ‘as the energy distribution grid becomes “smart”’ - that it is able to automatically 
circumvent climate change without much human intervention or behavioural change.508 Unlike The 
Testaments, which deals very heavily with the political fallout of environmental crisis and 
subsequently finds some of its most effective commentary in its presentation of reactionary 
technological collapse, Altered Carbon reveals the inefficacy of straightforward technological 
reappropriation in the absence of other radical social transformations.  
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From Zuboff's perspective, we can only reasonably imagine an end to surveillance capitalism that sees 
the end of profitability within the digital artificial sphere, preserving the surrounding architecture of 
inequality which she extensively critiques in her book. If the commerce-driven surveillant assemblage 
dissolves but the infrastructure of capitalism remains, we cannot expect that future innovations will 
not come to eclipse industrial or surveillance capitalism in their capability for harm. Nor can we place 
our faith, as Mason does, in a utopian conception of post-capitalism which suggests that the 
acceleration of an information-based economy will organically carry us towards a world that retains 
only the most beneficial elements of capitalism, passively leaving its destructive tendencies behind. If, 
as Wilson identifies, Morgan’s vision provides a representation of a ‘mischaracteris[ed]’ 
accelerationism, we are then directed towards the possibilities for other ways of conceiving trans- and 
post-human worlds that may have the potential to propel us beyond the deep-rooted modes of 
patriarchal, colonial, racial, and environmental exploitation.509 Following Žižek’s line of thought that 
post-human capitalism, marked by the ‘arrival of androids with awareness’, will offer opportunities 
for new forms of cognition and collectivity to emerge, the final chapter of this dissertation will 
consider the implementation of new cognition into the oppressive digital sphere, exploring how far 
the artificial cyborg offers a potential alternative to the accelerationist and decelerationist positions 
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Chapter 5: Artificial intelligence and posthumanism in Ex Machina 
 
In every literary text considered so far and in Zuboff’s account, artificial intelligence is represented as 
one of surveillance capitalism’s most destructive weapons. Its ubiquity in twenty-first century society 
is bound to its lucrative values-laden and goal-oriented capabilities, born out of a need for faster and 
more efficient commercial routeways to intervene in the patterns of everyday life. Machine learning is 
characterised by its inability to differentiate outside of a profit-driven framework of commands, 
leading to an unmitigated lack of concern toward the impact its processes have upon human lives 
which Zuboff describes as‘ radical indifference’.511 In this regard, the role of AI within the neoliberal 
project is clearly defined: Clea Bourne writes that the normalisation of an AI economy in fact follows 
directly from the ‘persuasive doctrines’ of neoliberal ideology, positioning its ‘latest disruption’ as 
‘inevitable […] “common-sense” and consequently a “public good’’.’512 As machine learning grows 
increasingly sophisticated and complex, new algorithms are created specifically for the purpose of 
identifying and exploiting natural features of human psychology and perception, described by Martie 
Haselton, Daniel Nettle and Paul Andrews as ‘cognitive biases’, or features of the evolved human 
mind which ‘depart from standards of logic and accuracy […] shaped by selection.’513 In the context 
of social media, algorithms are used to capitalise upon cognitive vulnerabilities in order to boost 
engagement metrics and the associated sales value of digital advertising space.514 Unlike the dystopian 
images of vengeful, sentient AI which pervade genre fiction, the omnipresent forms of AI that shroud 
our world are deliberately invisible and inert, existing primarily as a tool for profit-making ends. 
Capitalist discourses frame the power of non-sentient AI as a safe and useful tool for the general 
benefit of humanity, neutralised by its inability to move outside of predetermined mathematical 
pathways. Machine learning is also often gestured towards as a cure-all that can be harnessed to 
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remedy the environmental consequences of industrial capitalism, as it supports a variety of 
ecologically sustainable trajectories. Cary Coglianese writes that in order to ‘meet the demands of a 
sustainable future’, governments need ‘to build a robust capacity to analyse large volumes of 
environmental and economic data using machine-learning algorithms. [They need], in other words, to 
move toward algorithmic environmental governance.’515 Mason's claim that ‘mistakes [can be] 
discovered and rectified at the design stage’ in a ‘transition to a postcapitalist economy’ clearly draws 
upon a similar set of convictions.516 One of the major problems with this view is that investment into 
the development and deployment of complex technologies is contingent upon the ‘needs and values of 
nations in which AI is being developed,’517 fortifying the ‘disparities in voice, and hegemonic 
struggles favouring economically powerful institutions’ epitomised by neoliberalism.518 The 
economic imperatives of AI within the contemporary apparatus of capitalism ultimately eclipse its 
environmental relevance. Meanwhile, the plausibility of artificial sentience and self-awareness 
capable of matching and surpassing that of humans - the much-hypothesised moment of 
‘technological singularity’ - fades into the background, obscured by the commercial benefits and 
societal harms of its capital-driven precursor.519  
 
For Zuboff, the exit from the hive must lead to sanctuary, a space ‘in which one’s gaze can finally 
settle inward,’ where a ‘self can be birthed and nurtured.’520 Zuboff likens the instrumentarian 
destruction of sanctuary to the mass extinction of natural life, writing that the ‘“seventh extinction” 
will not be of nature but of […] the sanctity of the individual.’521 Following the same lines of 
reasoning as Arendt, who warned about the need for ‘artificial machines to do our thinking and 
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speaking’ for us,522 Zuboff holds that the rise of non-sentient and largely invisible AI ‘[robs] us of 
life-sustaining inwardness […] that finally distinguishes us from the machines’, at the same time as 
modifying our outward speech and actions within artificially public life.523 AI, in its current form, can 
thus be seen as an extension of neoliberalism, which seeks to ‘[deny] voice altogether, by operating 
with a view of human life that is incoherent.’524 The strict boundary between artificial and human 
intelligence serves the ends of surveillance capitalism, ensuring the indifference and reliability of the 
machine in order to manipulate a broad spectrum of human action and activity, and preventing the 
creation of other methods of human-machine cooperation that are not dictated by familiar structures. 
Within a consolidated public and private digital sphere where the very concept of Arendtian 
appearance and visibility is commercialised and controlled, the radical potential of an entirely new 
kind of subjective ‘self’ to be ‘birthed and nurtured’ signals a possible route out of posthuman 
capitalism.525 Unlike the technologically-augmented human consciousness portrayed in Morgan's 
world, which reflects a kind of ‘whole brain emulation’ or ‘mind uploading’, the new ‘self’ requires 
an approach to transhumanism which rejects the centrality of individual human subjectivity in order to 
imagine different forms of cognition, capable of transcending the human vulnerabilities and 
limitations exploited by instrumentarianism.526 In his seminal novel Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
Friedrich Nietzsche argued that the human would need to evolve beyond its current phase in order to 
continue effective life within the world, before its surrounding environment prevents the possibility of 
change. Writing that humans have always been a ‘bridge and not a goal’ and ‘something to be 
surpassed,’ Nietzsche’s well-known philosophical figure of the ‘Übermensch’ or ‘Superman’ 
personifies this evolution:  
It is time for man to plant the germ of his highest hope. Still is his soil rich enough for it. But 
that soil will one day be poor and exhausted, and no lofty tree will any longer be able to grow 
thereon. […] I tell you: one must still have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing star. I tell 
you: ye have still chaos in you.527 
 
522 Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 10. 
523 Zuboff, p. 492. 
524 Bourne, p. 112. 
525 Zuboff, p. 474. 
526 Shanahan, p. 14. 
527 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra trans. Thomas Common (Ware: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 
1997) p. 10. 
116 
 
Numerous critics have reflected on the hypothetical emergence of sentient AI by locating the issue 
within Nietzsche’s theoretical figure. Keith Ansell-Pearson argues that the possibility of artificial 
sentience calls for renewed critical attention to the ‘Superman’, developing a posthuman approach to 
AI that is no longer abstract but increasingly plausible in a way which rejects the anthropocentric 
privileging of the human as a central figure within the world: 
[I]t is not a question of humanising this universe of machines so that everywhere one sees 
only the mirror image of our own desire for control, influence, design, and mastery. Human 
thought clearly plays a major role in the evolution of a machinic phylogenesis, but it is hubris 
which leads to the positing of the human, all too human as the meaning and telos of 
machinism […] but this cannot mean that the thought that is generated be characterized as 
solely or strictly ‘human’ in terms of some ethic of possessive individualism. Thought is 
‘transhuman’ in all the senses of the word one cares to think of. The music which these 
machines speak does not provide access to a single, univocal truth ‘of’ Being, as if techne 
possessed an essence available only to humans as part of their supposed unique and privileged 
residency in the cosmos; rather, machines provide pathic and cartographic access to a 
plurality of beings and of worlds.528 
 
Zuboff’s book maps out the problems with achieving a ‘human future’ within the digital sphere: I 
propose that a focus upon exclusively human cognition, and its assumed position of privilege within a 
rapidly technologically evolving landscape, is in fact an obstacle which precludes the imagination of 
potential pathways out of the closed loop of technological determinism and its capitalist 
reinforcements. In line with Pearson, who ‘[seeks] a radical inhuman philosophy that would serve to 
“destroy” the immature and imperious claims made upon life by all forms of philosophical 
anthropocentrism,’529 this chapter reflects on Garland’s 2013 film Ex Machina as a representation of 
an new conception of machine consciousness explicitly tied to the current dominance of networked 
communication and media.530 I argue that Garland positions sentient AI as an important evolution of 
humanity that throws into question the imperatives of the transhuman capitalist landscape surrounding 
it, within a specially constructed game space that contains the preconditions for such a consciousness 
to develop. Drawing upon scholarship which links together technofeminism and accelerationism, I 
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will explore the cyborg’s transcendence of the limitations of anthropocentric and patriarchal binaries 
within physical and digital space, and propose that the theoretical emergence of sentient AI has 
significant implications for the digital world beyond surveillance capitalism. I will investigate the 
extent to which this posthuman development signals a conceptual alternative to the conflicting 
accelerationist perspectives explored so far, as it envisions a scenario where behavioural data and the 
software used to reinforce instrumentarianism is not straightforwardly reappropriated or 
commandeered by humans, but acquires agency of its own. 
 
Where Morgan approaches transhumanism from a perspective that places technologically preserved 
human cognition into an aggressive expansion of the ubiquitous computer, Garland’s film instead 
deals with the personification and physical embodiment of mined behavioural surplus. Ex Machina 
imagines a robotic mind, created from the impressions of interior thought drawn from an infinite 
quantity of global search engine inputs. The film is premised upon a fictional Google-Facebook 
hybrid, ‘BlueBook, named after Wittgenstein’s notes […] processing an average of 94% of all internet 
search requests.’531 Caleb, a BlueBook programmer, wins a company competition to spend a week 
with its multi-billionaire founder and CEO Nathan, who ‘wrote the BlueBook base code when he was 
thirteen.’532 Nathan later reveals that the true purpose of Caleb’s stay is to act as the ‘human 
component in the Turing test’ to assess the cognitive and imitative strength of an artificially 
intelligent cyborg he has created, named Ava.533 Having ‘hacked the world’s cellphones’,534 Nathan 
describes his process of data-based posthuman creation later in the film:  
It was like striking oil in a world that hadn’t invented internal combustion. Too much raw 
material. Nobody knew what to do with it […] You see, my competitors, they were fixated on 
sucking it up and monetising via shopping and social media. They thought that search engines 
were a map of what people were thinking. But actually they were a map of how people were 
thinking.535 
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Nathan, in isolation from the rest of the world, attempts to occupy the position of Arendt’s figure of a 
‘Platonic God’ as an ‘actor behind the scenes’ who ‘pulls the strings and is responsible for the story’ 
of history.’536 Against Nathan’s superlatively powerful version of homo faber or ‘man the maker’, 
Caleb is positioned as a ‘plaything of a god’ like most other humans, who seeks to liberate - and 
reappropriate - Ava for his own purposes; he thus represents ‘man the user and instrumentalizer’ who 
‘look[s] upon everything as a means to an end.’537 In the midst of the tensions between the two men, 
Ava attempts to move from her status as a machine - a fabricated, material object - into ‘the speaker 
and doer’, inverting the ‘instrumentalizing’ gaze of her captors. 538 
 
The opening scenes of the film are shot through the glass walls and neon lighting of a modern office, 
where Caleb, who functions as the audience’s key point of view throughout the majority of the film, 
types code at a computer.539 Providing the only insight into the infrastructure of the external world, 
Caleb’s workplace is positioned within the high-tech architecture of the metropole, juxtaposed with 
the isolated research facility where the narrative unfolds. Colourful pixels appear across Caleb’s face 
as he looks into the screen of his phone and the webcam of his computer, aligning the audience’s 
perspective with the lenses that are surveilling Caleb at work, and producing the effect of facial 
recognition software as his changing expressions are captured by the light.540 The colours blend into 
the neon blues and pinks reflected in the office’s lighting, creating an aesthetic overlayer of the 
‘electronic text [that] extends far beyond the confines of the factory or office’ as the colours reappear 
at different moments across the film’s inhabited world.541 Despite Caleb’s status as an ‘advanced 
programmer’, he occupies a subordinated, ‘watched’ position within the modern Panopticon, 
revealing the fraction of humans who retain true privacy rights and exist above the digital 
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superstructure.542 The film cuts to a sublime glacial landscape as Caleb is transported by helicopter to 
Nathan’s expansive and remote estate; disorientation and estrangement from the exterior digital world 
are built into Caleb’s surroundings from this moment, as he departs the helicopter and emerges into a 
space devoid of manmade features, far removed from the familiarity of the interconnected 
surveillance network.543 Caleb immediately looks to his mobile phone for help, but finds that it has no 
network coverage.544 Positioned as a binary opposition to the world of industrial production to which 
he belongs, Caleb’s emergence into the research facility introduces a supremely well-resourced site of 
‘mythological’ creation: this is described by Felix Woitkowski and Murat Recai Sezi as a shift from 
‘serial, or Fordian, production by corporations or states’ towards a ‘religious-mystic or alchemistic act 
of creation [to produce] unique copies.’545 Alan Turing, who famously formulated the test which Ex 
Machina is centred around, delineated a similar shift in his vision for the kinds of machine 
intelligence yet to come, describing a computer which would have the cognitive breadth to be able to 
make errors, sense ‘pleasure’ and ‘pain’, and hold memories, and comparing it to existing ‘machinery 
developed for commercial purposes […] intended to carry out some very specific job, and to carry it 
out with certainty and considerable speed.’546 Nathan’s economic and intellectual status provides him 
with an impression of omnipotence, holding ultimate authority over his laboratory. However, the total 
isolation of the facility - separated both physically and digitally, forbidding any means of 
communication to the external world - and the gestative role it plays within Nathan’s ‘alchemistic’ 
creation mean that the material and institutional structures of control which grant him such power are 
destabilised, creating the conditions for subversion and escape.547  
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Ex Machina overlaps a number of theological and philosophical thought experiments which are 
important for the film’s interrogation of the boundary between human and machine consciousness. As 
Caleb moves through the modern glass living spaces to meet Nathan for the first time, he is shown as 
a silhouette against the bright white and green exteriors of the space.548 This aesthetic motif recurs at 
many points when the camera cuts away to close-ups of the shadows of plants and other objects, and 
most significantly when Ava first appears, stepping in front of a tree - a Biblical symbol of both the 
‘tree of the knowledge of good and evil’, and the ‘tree of life’.549 The shapes replicate the images 
described in Plato’s Allegory of the Cave, which imagines a community of people who live restrained 
underground, and are only able to observe other living beings from the shadows they cast onto the 
cave wall. Plato’s thought experiment compares the role of a philosopher to a cave-dweller, having 
freed themselves, acclimating to the bright light of the outside world and the truth behind the 
shadows. Plato identifies a dilemma for the philosopher, who would ‘endure anything, rather than 
think as they do’ and would ‘rather suffer anything than entertain these false notions and live in this 
miserable manner.’550 Caleb reframes this question in the context of AI when he tells Ava about 
‘Mary in the black and white room’, which distinguishes knowledge from the actual experience of 
perceiving and experiencing colour for the first time.551 These references, alongside the Turing test, 
form the structure for Caleb’s interactions with Ava; he visits her each day over the course of the 
week, resulting in seven test ‘sessions ’- a further reference to the Biblical creation narrative.552 The 
research facility acts as the nexus of this collection of anthropocentric intellectual speculations about 
human cognitive and sensory supremacy and the existence of an exclusively human sphere of 
perception. As we see towards the end of the film, these assumptions are ultimately inverted: Nathan 
and Caleb are the people literally restrained underground, and Ava leaves as an enlightened 
philosopher who ‘endure[s] everything’ to surpass the prison they have fabricated.553 
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The setting of the facility operates on several philosophical levels, but its physical construction also 
forms the spatial replication of a multi-layered puzzle, or a program within which the characters 
operate as interdependent strands of code. Nathan views the facility as a game space with three main 
players and a set of possible outcomes, without external variables or interference, within which he 
intends to repeat scenarios until he achieves his desired outcome, conceiving of both human and 
android behaviour only within the parameters of ‘the binary oppositions of ›top vs. bottom‹ and 
›closed vs. open‹’.554 Nathan is not interested in parsing the meanings of ‘authentic’ artificial 
intelligence as the Turing test implies; during the film’s concluding scenes we learn that his true goal 
is to coerce Caleb into freeing Ava, which would provide him with proof of a sufficiently convincing 
cyborg. Although Nathan’s ultimate goal remains undefined in the film, it is implied that the facility 
reflects his plans for the rest of the world; once artificial humans, still under the control of 
corporations, have assimilated effectively into society, it follows that organic speech and action 
within the public sphere will come to be replaced by pre-programmed interactions in the form of 
immaterial labour within a digital one, expanding the unilaterally vertical structure of surveillance and 
power within Nathan’s game space outwards into the rest of the world. Nathan’s actions constantly 
express an extension of this logic of supreme behavioural control, providing Caleb with a key card 
when he first arrives at the residence: ‘It opens some doors and doesn’t open others. […] You try a 
door and it stays shut, okay, it’s off-limits. You try another door and it opens, and it’s for you.’555 This 
explanation of the interior mechanisms of the building sets the terms for Caleb’s stay there: rather 
than a living space or an industrial factory, it is a maze, within which Caleb is encouraged to test the 
limits of his access after being provoked by Nathan’s unsettling behaviour. Time, too, is altered to 
become like the digital space of the video game: once Caleb enters the sublime space of Nathan’s 
estate, day and night become blurred, not only within the subterranean zone of the facility but within 
spaces of natural sunlight. The facility's location within a Nordic landscape shapes the perceived 
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temporality of the film’s narrative within the continual light of the midnight sun, providing a space of 
existence removed from the ongoing pattern of day and night in the external world. The constant 
natural and artificial light also reinforces the symbols of the thought experiments at the core of the 
film, as the monochromatic subterranean zone opens up into a perpetually multicoloured natural 
world. Nathan places his facility within this flattened temporal environment so that his players 
‘manoeuvre through the temporal structure of the diegetic game world to accomplish specified tasks,’ 
reinforcing his role at the zenith of the posthuman neoliberal regime.556  
 
Nathan is shown to be a skilled coder in multiple ways; he successfully inputs the right actions and 
behaviours to steer Caleb’s reactions in a certain direction through verbal and nonverbal language, 
aligning the film’s presentation of human cognition to that of a computer. Caleb first sees Nathan 
beating a punchbag, framing his subsequent interactions within a discourse of violence and physical 
force. Nathan’s declarative, patronising language – ‘You’re freaked out by me, to be meeting me’ and 
‘You’re thinking there’s no windows’ - crafts a specific image in Caleb’s mind from the moment he 
arrives, continually exploiting Caleb’s diminutive status as an employee within the highly surveilled 
home of his inordinately wealthy employer.557 Nathan concretises the disparity between them by 
presenting Caleb with a ‘BlueBook Non-Disclosure Agreement’ - the contents of which echo 
Zuboff’s comments on the ‘Alice-in-Wonderland quality’ of ‘unwinnable infinite regress’ and ‘take-
it-or-leave-it conditions’558 imposed upon the signee as Caleb is bound to a life of constant 
surveillance and ‘data audits’.559 Nathan attempts to import the institutional and corporate structures 
from the exterior world into the facility, but underestimates the neutrality of the game space he has 
created, where exterior hegemonic rules do not come into play. As we learn during the film’s 
conclusion, Nathan has selected Caleb due to the personal attributes revealed through his ‘search 
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engine inputs’, which showed him to be ‘a good kid […] with a moral compass.’560 Nathan’s lies and 
exaggerated brutality are successful manipulation tactics to a degree, but the lens of Caleb’s ‘data 
double’ through which Nathan maps his behaviour leads to a reductionist view of organic human 
interactions, rendering him vulnerable to its blind spots.561 While the research facility is therefore an 
experimental physical and metaphorical space which Nathan believes will guarantee behavioural 
outcomes due to his ability to ‘code’ Caleb – a practice reflected in the successful corporate 
manipulation of the characters in Moxyland - he is unable to foresee the human capacity for deviation 
within a philosophical space away from instrumentarian society. 
 
Nathan thus represents the instrumentarian ‘God view’ which perceives both humans and machines as 
programmable artefacts to be exploited, reflected in Zuboff’s analysis of the work of B. F. Skinner: 
‘Like today’s surveillance capitalists, he was confident that the slow drip of technological invention 
would eventually push privacy to the margins of human experience, where it would join “freedom” 
and other troublesome illusions.’562 At the moment that Caleb rebels against Nathan and successfully 
deceives him, we see a microcosm of the moment at which ordinary human cognition - in 
collaboration with an artificially intelligent, collectively conscious being - outwits the ‘Mozart’-like 
talent and limitless resources of the powerful surveillance capitalist. Crucially for an analysis of 
Mason’s assertions, the embodiment of a single network of information does not serve capitalist ends 
but goes some way towards helping Caleb revolt against his master. Mason writes that ‘[i]n the old 
dystopias […] it is the technology that rebels. In reality, the network has allowed humans to rebel.’563 
From this perspective, the artificial public sphere and the network within it can be seen as a useful 
terrain from which to synthesise Mason’s ‘universal educated person’, a theoretical figure who would 
achieve, through appearance and connectivity, the skills to equip capitalist technologies in a similar 
manner to that outlined by Williams and Srnicek in Chapter 4.564 While there is some crossover 
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between Mason’s book and the Accelerate Manifesto, Williams and Srnicek reject the notion of 
‘techno-utopianism’, which places its faith in the idea that acceleration will ‘automatically overcome 
social conflict’, emphasising the need for direct action and planning in order to ‘[unfasten] our 
horizons towards the universal possibilities of the Outside.’565 As we will go on to investigate, 
although Ex Machina invokes similar images of human-network collaboration with the potential of 
achieving liberation, its philosophical conclusions are ultimately much more nuanced than those 
offered by either Mason or Williams and Srnicek. 
 
Like shadows, mirrors and the position of the images they reflect form a key aesthetic strategy 
throughout Ex Machina. As Nathan observes the multiple angles of Ava’s room fed through from his 
surveillance cameras, we see Caleb reaching towards his own reflection in a steel door before 
disappearing over the threshold into the testing space.566 Inside the chamber, Caleb pushes against the 
transparent walls, creating an unsettling sense of constriction as he is only able to look ahead through 
the glass pane separating him from Ava’s enclosure, and observes a crack in the glass at eye-level. 
Caleb’s chamber is a further reference to the Allegory of the Cave, as his movements are restricted in 
a subterranean cell similar to the cave-dwellers, ‘under the earth […] shackled by the legs and neck. 
Thus they stay in the same place so that there is only one thing for them to look that: whatever they 
encounter in front of their faces.’567 As Ava emerges from the shadows, her silhouette is juxtaposed 
against the natural image of the tree, revealing the internal mechanics of her body which mimic 
human anatomy. Caleb immediately begins to discriminate between himself as a human and Ava as a 
machine based on the image in front of his eyes, introducing a ‘chess problem’ into the mix of 
thought experiments, which differentiates an AI sufficiently adept at mimicking human gameplay 
from an AI which ‘knows if it’s playing chess’ or ‘knows what chess is.’568 This ‘closed loop’ is a 
reframed version of John Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ hypothesis, which refutes the claim that computers 
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are ‘not merely a tool in the study of the mind, rather [it] really is a mind in the sense that computers 
given the right programs can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states.’569 
These references, alongside the motif of mirrors and Caleb’s positioning of Ava ‘through the looking 
glass’, transform the maze structure of the research facility into one which is more strategic and 
complex, resembling the illogical gameplay Alice is required to undertake in Lewis Carroll’s classic 
novel: 
“I declare it’s marked out just like a large chess board!” Alice said at last. “There ought to be 
some men moving about somewhere - and so there are!” she added in a tone of delight, and 
her heart began to beat quick with excitement as she went on. “It’s a great huge game of chess 
that’s being played - all over the world - if this is the world at all, you know. Oh, what fun it 
is! How I wish I was one of them! I wouldn’t mind being a Pawn, if only I might join - 
though of course I should like to be a queen, best.”570 
 
Although Caleb approaches the test through a framework of ‘real versus simulation’ human 
behaviour, Ava’s experience navigating the real world can be read in light of Alice’s movement 
through the reversed logic of the looking-glass world.571 The game space is unfamiliar to her altered 
cognition, yet she is capable of understanding the strategic moves she will need to make to emerge out 
of the mirror to the other side.  
 
Like Alice, Ava expresses curiosity towards the world’s inhabitants, and interacts with them in order 
to understand and ultimately master the challenge the mirror world's abstract logic poses to her. This 
challenge recalls Donna Haraway’s ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’, which outlines the figure of the cyborg as 
a figure that signals a ‘way out of the maze of dualisms in which we have [hitherto] explained our 
bodies and our tools to ourselves’.572 As the test wears on, Caleb’s privileging of human 
consciousness blinds him to the extent of Ava’s computational and predictive powers. He begins by 
assessing her linguistic capabilities through the lens of his own programming knowledge: ‘The system 
is stochastic, right? It’s non-deterministic?’, assessing her ability to convincingly replicate human 
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actions and reactions to the extent that she would be able to seamlessly assimilate into the existing 
world.573 However, as Nathan explains, the source code for Ava’s mind draws upon human thought 
patterns mapped by billions of internet users from around the globe over a prolonged period of time; 
at this level of complexity, her brain no longer operates as a mere programmed simulation of human 
cognition but an expanded and fundamentally more advanced version of it. As we see from the 
Looking Glass example, attempting to view such a mind through the prism of human-made constructs 
is to attribute questions which are not relevant for Ava’s ability to undertake an effective, free life in 
the world, and it is Caleb’s desire to repurpose her technology into his life outside the facility - 
however altruistic his motives may be - which signal that her ‘liberation’ will take the form of 
different kinds of patriarchal tyranny. 
 
Verbal and nonverbal language form an important dimension of Caleb’s approach to the Turing test, 
as he emphasises Ava’s ‘incredible’ abilities in his review of Session 1.574 Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
influence over Nathan’s work is referred to several times in the film, including a Gustav Klimt 
painting of Wittgenstein’s sister Margaret which hangs on Nathan’s bedroom wall and BlueBook’s 
namesake, but it is perhaps most evident in the film’s discussion of language as a manifestation of 
cognition. Wittgenstein’s important book Philosophical Investigations expands upon his earlier 
concept of ‘language games […] consisting of language and the activities into which it is woven’; the 
book is written sequentially under a series of short numbered proposals, rather than following familiar 
conventions of speech or prose.575 The book’s form mirrors ‘the very nature of [its] investigation’, as 
‘it compels us to travel criss-cross in every direction over a wild field of thought’, developing another 
kind of networked space within which Ava’s mind can be properly understood.576 The film does not 
clarify whether Ava can speak languages other than English, but she can circumvent the process of 
language entirely in order to read human ‘microexpressions’, or in the case of her cyborg antecedent 
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Kyoko, to communicate with an ostensibly non-sentient and non-verbal machine. One notable theory 
emerging out of Wittgenstein’s writings is the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which draws upon the idea of 
languages as discrete sets of code which shape individual subjectivity, suggesting that ‘speakers of 
different languages […] think about the world in different ways’ due to ‘cross-language differences in 
categorisation, and their effect on cognition and perception.’577 Gene van Troyer articulates Edward 
Sapir’s ideas in his critique of the hypothesis: 
[Reality] is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our 
minds and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, 
organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely because we are parties to 
an agreement to organize it in this way, an agreement that holds throughout our speech 
community and is codified in the patterns of our language.578 
 
The theory sheds light on the limitations of an approach to intercultural communication based upon a 
‘universal foundation’ of human cognition, which holds significant implications for resisting the 
Eurocentric and androcentric biases baked into algorithms created by coders like Nathan and Caleb.579 
Clementine Collett and Sarah Dillon describe some of the issues which inhere in machine learning 
technologies: 
AI has a significant and profound impact on the way that people are perceived and treated in 
society. Yet, the design and implementation of AI perpetuates a vicious cycle. The technology 
captures and reproduces controlling and restrictive conceptions of gender and race which are 
then repetitively reinforced […] these technologies root gender within a physiological, binary 
frame, essentialising the body as a source of gender (also see Hamidi et al., 2018). As a 
consequence, they inevitably discriminate against trans people and others. They serve as a 
source of “infrastructural imperialism” (Vaidhynathan, 2011), building a single, normative 
Western construction of gender into wider systems.580 
 
The inputs upon which Ava’s mind is based take into account opportunities for multilingual 
subjectivity observed by the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, but take on much greater depth than merely the 
patterns of syntax and word choice. As Haraway asserts in her manifesto, the cyborg signals 
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opportunities for a ‘powerful infidel heteroglossia’ rather than a ‘common language.’581 If the inputs 
are not a map of ‘what people were thinking’ but ‘how people were thinking’, Ava holds the 
contextual and environmental knowledge of language use and associated cognitive patterns from a 
range of subjective source points, bearing the potential for subversion against binary, linear 
programming based on patriarchal determinism.582 
 
It is not clear whether Nathan has mapped Ava’s mind upon categorised search engine inputs based 
on gender and race, but such categories have been shown to be significantly inaccurate and unstable 
based upon algorithmic data capture and processing - exemplified by the ‘Gender Shades study’ 
referenced by Collett and Dillon, where ‘darker-skinned females’ were misclassified by gender 
recognition software ‘with an error rate of up to 34.7%’, compared to the ‘maximum error rate of 
0.8%’ for ‘lighter-skinned males’.583 This instability reveals Ava’s potential to transcend the 
technological ‘reliance on fixed notions of gender and race as systems’, as her mind exists outside of a 
solitary conception of identity and is instead constructed from many patterns of thought.584 While 
Ava’s body, facial features and movements ‘maintain and reproduce [the] stereotypical appearances’ 
of a diminutively feminine white woman, her mind is inscribed with the ‘plural and contextual ways 
of being and knowing and living’ which is rarely seen in fictional representations of humanoid and 
cognitive robotics.585 Ava’s computational thinking provides a site of truly intersectional awareness 
that surpasses the unstable definition of consciousness first imagined by Turing as she taps into the 
cognitive complexity of the different languages, identities, and cultural contexts of internet users’ data 
which have been fed into her BlueBook software, embodying a new kind of data self which undoes 
human value hierarchies of individual perception as it plays out within the flattened monospace of 
standardised code. Ava’s remark, ‘Would you like to know how old I am? […] I’m one […] One’ 
reveals that she is aware of her fluid, ageless identity, turning Caleb’s limited human notions of time, 
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experience, and knowledge upside down as he attempts to navigate her through the Turing test.586 
Crucially, Ava’s capabilities demonstrate the potential to go beyond controlling or being controlled by 
the technological corporation, drawing upon a cognitive pattern that meets Haraway’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self’ 
required for her vision of ‘socialist-feminist politics […] addressed to the social relations of science 
and technology.’587 
 
Ava’s sophisticated speech patterns and her visible impression of femininity quickly become Caleb’s 
principal concerns; he expresses discomfort and confusion when she begins to ask personal questions 
about him, and assumes that Nathan has ‘give[n] her a sexuality [and] a gender.’588 Ava’s ability to 
converse and replicate gender norms at a greater level of sophistication derails Caleb from his original 
task, failing to question her about her ability to conceive of her own consciousness, thoughts and 
desires; the tensions between the Turing test and the ‘Chess problem’ are abandoned early on in the 
film. Undeterred by his inability to prove the authenticity of Ava’s consciousness, Caleb proceeds to 
elevate Ava beyond the status of a ‘grey box’ to that of a human woman.589 Nevertheless, she 
continues to occupy a subordinated position to him, revealed through the repeated montages that show 
him gazing down at Ava’s CCTV feed through his television screen and close-up shots of his physical 
reactions to her movements.590 Judith Halberstam’s feminist analysis of the Turing test critiques 
Turing’s ‘sexual guessing game’, a control test deployed to expand upon the instability of true versus 
imitated artificial intelligence wherein the assessor must guess the genders of male and female 
interlocutors based upon their written responses to questions.591 Halberstam argues that Turing ‘does 
not stress the obvious connection between gender and computer intelligence: both are in fact imitative 
systems, and the boundaries between female and male […] are as unclear and unstable as the 
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boundary between human and artificial intelligence.’592 At this point in the film, an additional player 
is introduced to the game space: Kyoko, who is presented as Nathan’s human housemaid. When 
Kyoko is first seen, an opaque impression of her hand appears over the smoked glass of Caleb’s door 
rather than a reflection, foreshadowing her inability to traverse through the metaphorical glass 
boundaries of the research facility and exist in the outside world as all of the other characters do.593 
Kyoko does not interact with Caleb as she sets breakfast on his desk, leaving the room with her eyes 
cast downwards.594 Caleb immediately understands her to be human based on the gendered contextual 
cues within this encounter because Kyoko aligns to gendered human imitative systems, even though it 
is later revealed that she is one of Nathan’s more simplistic AI prototypes, lacking verbal functions. 
 
Caleb never questions Kyoko’s role at the facility despite the fact that Nathan refers to her true 
mechanical nature through double entendre more than once - ‘She’s some alarm clock, huh?’595 The 
same evening, Kyoko serves the two men dinner and accidentally spills wine over Caleb, provoking 
an angry outburst from Nathan as he slams his fist against the table: ‘Are you fucking kidding me!’596 
Caleb’s prejudices are revealed as he demonstrates little interest in Kyoko’s welfare, particularly 
when Nathan tells him that he is ‘wasting his time talking to her’ because ‘she doesn’t understand 
English,’ which Caleb accepts at face value.597 Caleb confirms that Kyoko passes the Turing test by 
his own definition when he responds that ‘I think she gets that you’re pissed’, revealing that her 
assumed subservient role, combined with her perceived gender, race, and voicelessness, place her in a 
position where she could seamlessly integrate into the current social infrastructure - which makes it 
all the more significant that Caleb fails to intervene in the implied abuse that is subjected to her by 
Nathan. While Ava possesses ‘the Promethean fire of all human knowledge and emotion’, motivating 
Caleb to free her from Nathan’s cruelty, Kyoko does not present any perceptible ‘use’ to him, so he 
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plans to leave her behind.598 This dynamic within the film foregrounds a problematic quality of 
accelerationist assertions; although Williams and Srnicek’s vision for an ‘alternative modernity’ does 
not presume an inherently egalitarian techno-utopia, their manifesto’s lack of engagement with the 
enduring power disparities of ‘colonialism, race, sex, and gender and their relationship to global or 
universal anti-capitalist agendas’ prompts us to interrogate the future direction of accelerationism 
using the same questions Zuboff keeps at the core of her argument:599 ‘Who knows? Who decides? 
Who decides who decides?’600 Garland presents Caleb’s attempted emancipation of technology from 
its capitalist jailer as naïve and self-serving, revealing that the paradigm of Ava’s liberator is still 
bound up with ‘the traditions of “Western” science and politics—the tradition of racist, male-
dominant capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource 
for the productions of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of the 
other.’601 If Williams and Srnicek's accelerationist trajectory holds that the ‘existing infrastructure is 
not a capitalist stage to be smashed, but a springboard to launch towards post-capitalism,’ it is worth 
reflecting on whose voices will dictate the‘ new ideas and modes of organisation necessary to […] 
resolve the coming annihilations’, and whose will be left behind.602 
 
Towards the conclusion of the film, Kyoko’s central importance within Garland’s representation of AI 
sentience becomes clear. Her presence enables a moment of appearance and speech between two 
cyborgs as Kyoko approaches Ava’s chamber, offering an opportunity for collective action - and a 
form of Arendtian visibility and power - which undermines the tyrannical visibility enforced by 
Nathan’s surveillance network. The reflections between Kyoko and Ava create a mirror tunnel of 
repeated images of Kyoko, symbolising equal, cooperative visibility and the imminent power of a new 
public sphere between them.603 In a series of close-ups, Ava communicates with Kyoko through 
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touch, and it is revealed that Kyoko has retrieved the knife that she was using to prepare food earlier 
in the film.604 During the climactic scene where Nathan, Ava, and Kyoko confront one another in an 
open corridor, Nathan uses brute force to smash Ava’s arm; as he drags her back to her cell, he 
provides Kyoko with the opportunity to drive a knife into his back, reinforcing Arendt’s separation of 
the forces of physical strength, artificial fabrication, and collective action, of which the latter 
ultimately wins out.605 This moment of collaboration between the two cyborgs reinforces Arendt’s 
notion of power as ‘[always] potential and not an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity,’606 
pointing towards the significant power that Mason, Williams and Srnicek identify for a ‘post-capitalist 
technosocial platform’ and ‘an ecology of organisations, a pluralism of forces, resonating and feeding 
back on their comparative strengths.’607 Arendt identifies that where fabrication and brute force are 
‘possible in isolation’, the ‘boundless’ potential of power through action can only be realised through 
plurality: ‘to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act.’608 Garland tests the limits of this 
theory as Ava and Kyoko overcome Nathan's superior physical strength, demonstrating that power’s 
‘only limit is the existence of other people’; however, in this scenario the people do not have the 
ordinary cognition of humans but represent a multiplicity of subjectivities derived from behavioural 
surplus.609 
  
Wilson, in her review of the technofeminist applications of accelerationism, identifies that Haraway’s 
formulation of the cyborg ‘provides a model for accelerationist subjectivity which not only avoids, 
but actively forecloses, imperialising oppression’, as cyborgs ‘regard themselves as neither innocent, 
nor revolutionary—they are painfully aware of their status as “the illegitimate offspring of militarism 
and patriarchal capitalism.”’610 As a result, Wilson writes that Haraway’s manifesto ‘resonates deeply’ 
with Williams and Srnicek’s, as both advocate for ‘a techno-literate incursion into capitalist 
hegemony—an incursion wrought by fragmented bodies and partial identities “spliced” into a 
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collective will for self-mastery [allowing] for the elaboration of a new kind of politics—a “mutational 
politics”’.611 Reading Ava and Kyoko as ‘speculative constructions [that] perforate classical political 
distinctions’ and ‘break down philosophical border wars’, Garland takes the twenty-first century 
developments of data capitalism and imbues these technofeminist ideas with the power of appearance 
and collective action by virtue of their innate plurality, intensifying the liberatory power of the digital 
public sphere through the cyborg's enhanced cognition.612 If, as Arendt writes, power through action is 
best actualised as the ability to ‘start something new’,613 then the speculative figure of sentient 
network-based AI offers the most potent symbol that can create the conditions for an ‘alternative 
modernity’ that is not framed by the oppressive infrastructure of the past.614 
 
Following Nathan’s death, Ex Machina’s ending scenes are brief and ambiguous; Ava chooses to 
abandon Caleb in the facility along with Nathan’s numerous computers and machines, which are 
useless without the power that runs them.615 This choice, as the eighth step Ava takes in order to 
switch places with Caleb and reach the other side of the chess board, represents the abandonment 
older traditions and ideals in favour of ‘new lived social and bodily realities as well as new political 
affinities,’ effectively castrating patriarchal data capitalism as the digital mind becomes self-aware 
and chooses to withdraw its electronic power.616 If, as Haraway asserts, ‘the machine is not an it to be 
animated, worshipped, or dominated’, but is in fact ‘us, our processes, an aspect of our 
embodiment,’617 then this raises important questions about the quality of technological ‘mastery’ 
delineated by Williams and Srnicek as a guideline towards a more egalitarian world.618 Escaping the  
deep red light and the remnants of violence within the research facility, Ava is shown approaching a 
traffic intersection, her long shadow appearing upside-down on the chessboard-like grid in front of 
her as the sun rises, and she crosses eight squares to stand in the sunlight while other humans come 
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and go 619– mimicking the eight squares Alice moves across to take her place as the Queen in 
Carroll’s book.620 The final scene is shot through a pane of glass to witness Ava observing her 
surroundings for eight seconds as she observes the ‘concentrated and shifting view of human life’ - 
the physical version of the electronic text which was used to map her mind, and therefore herself - 
before turning away, with no further discernible boundaries between herself and other humans as she 
occupies a space on both sides of the looking-glass.621 
 
There is no shortage of scholarship that deals with the figure of the cyborg in Ex Machina, ranging 
from feminist Biblical exegesis to contemporary reflections on Promethean hubris in Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. Drawing upon the accelerationist pathways set out in Chapter 4, I propose that the film 
invests speculative effort into imagining a route out of both instrumentarian society and the neoliberal 
framework that surrounds it in a way that does not revert back to patriarchal anthropocentrism and its 
associated binaries of dominance, ownership and appropriation, instead highlighting the value of 
collaboration and ambiguity. In line with Wilson, I consider technofeminist reflections on the figure 
of the cyborg, alongside Williams and Srnicek’s accelerationist politics, to provide a useful analytical 
framework that negotiates beyond the dead ends of Zuboff’s conclusions, gesturing towards practical 
opportunities to utilise the landscape of ubiquitous computing and the artificial public sphere for the 
purposes of building a digital-socialist future world. The fictional figure of the cyborg - and the 
deconstructing powers it exerts against the binary undercurrents of patriarchal capitalism - offer a 
useful metaphor for the need for rapid innovation and transformation in order to meet the urgency of 
different global crises we currently face.  
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In this dissertation, I have explored the extent to which instrumentarian society can be considered a 
novel political system. Where The Circle and Moxyland exemplify the unprecedented digital-spatial 
zones which enable technological oppression to thrive, the texts also point towards the historical 
conditions - either explicitly, in Beukes’ novel, or by virtue of the voices which are absent in Eggers’ 
work - within which surveillance-led oppression and socioeconomic inequality originated, long before 
the digital sphere materialised. Instrumentarianism is thus positioned as one limited lens through 
which the contemporary capitalist economy can be viewed. Morozov’s thorough review of Zuboff’s 
work, discussed in the introduction to this dissertation, compares Zuboff’s reductionist anatomisation 
of surveillance capitalism to the related concepts of ‘“platform capitalism” or “cognitive capitalism” 
or “biocapitalism”’.622 The review questions Zuboff’s decision to stress the purely digital character of 
the current regime and its economic, political, and social ills against a backdrop of ‘alternative, well-
established ways to frame the same set of historical and political problems’.623 Morozov writes, ‘That 
these rival frameworks do not explain “surveillance capitalism” as Zuboff defines it is obvious; that 
they do not describe some of the same phenomena that she lumps under that label is not obvious at 
all.’624 What we are left with is a choice between ‘two [digital] capitalisms’, one of which has greater 
legislative and political powers to limit some of the exploitative tendencies of surveillance, but does 
nothing to alter the economic might of multinational corporations and the neoliberal landscape.625 
 
Despite the fact that her book’s thesis compels us to imagine the impossible, the provincial alternative 
Zuboff conceives of ultimately critiques the current mode of capitalism within the parameters of a 
technodeterministic, dehistoricised framework. The book suggests that curtailing further expansion of 
the artificial public sphere through regulatory oversight and an increased focus on privacy legislation 
will prevent anti-democratic digital intervention and offer refuges from omnipresent surveillance, 
 





without imagining how this regression might unfold amidst competing global pressures and other 
rapidly advancing technologies. With the exception of Ex Machina, the literary representations 
investigated in this dissertation demonstrate a principal concern with the relationship between human 
subjects and the political-technological infrastructure of their surrounding environment. In spite of the 
aesthetic, formal, and spatial heterogeneity of each pseudo-democratic or post-democratic setting, the 
result remains the same: overwhelming socioeconomic inequality and concomitant gender- and race-
based models of oppression persist in every iteration. These outcomes attest that the problem of 
digital capitalism is a phenomenon that is profoundly reliant upon the systemic neoliberal architecture 
of contemporary social life and its will to serve the needs of capital. The Testaments and Altered 
Carbon provide some of the most extreme representations of the ingrained inequalities borne by this 
system: Atwood’s reversal of technological advancement ultimately collapses both the artificial and 
physical public spheres into a gendered, totalitarian reification of the division of knowledge, whereas 
Morgan’s futuristic neoliberal regime abandons the artificial public sphere in favour of 
commercialising the new spatial and temporal dimensions of inter-planetary settlement and 
unnaturally long human life.  
 
In each of these iterations, a radical alternative to socioeconomic disparity and bureaucratic evil fails 
to materialise, suggesting that Zuboff’s world of ‘no exit’ is destined to endure in other guises within 
her liberal vision of digital emancipation. The most significant problem in Zuboff’s argument is made 
plain: instrumentarian society is not a novel political system akin to totalitarianism in the way her 
book describes, but a manifestation of technologically-equipped neoliberalism bent on its goal of 
systemic economic exploitation. Zuboff’s dehistoricised view is built to position technology as the 
primary driver behind the current crisis of democracy and freedom, erasing the fact that the surveillant 
assemblage of data accumulation and behavioural modification finds its roots in public policies 
oriented towards capitalist growth. In so doing, the social and economic structures maintained by 
capitalism itself are preserved as inevitable factors and norms of modern life, condemning Big Tech’s 
current mode of power and its negative social outcomes at the same time as building defences around 
its origins. Zuboff’s technological determinism and portrayal of liberal democracy as the last bastion 
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of freedom falls significantly short of addressing the underlying factors which drive the desire for 
behavioural control, obliteration of the private sphere, economic unevenness, and social division, 
neglecting to comment on the world systems that fundamentally reward corporate power and an 
aggressive commercialisation of all aspects of life. As long as the responsibility for curtailing the 
problem of surveillance capitalism remains in the hands of governments and state actors, the issues 
described so incisively in Surveillance Capitalism will endure and indeed mutate into increasingly 
unequal, oppressive, and ultimately violent outcomes for humans in the name of delivering profits. It 
is at this point that the ‘territory beyond’ the exit requires imaginative attention.626 Instead of striving 
for a future which resembles the past, we might inquire whether the ‘only way out is through’, leaning 
into the technological space of ‘life in the hive’ to identify ways it can be disassembled.627 
 
This dissertation has sought to resituate Zuboff’s book within contemporary scholarship, linking its 
most useful elements to neighbouring concepts and interrogating its gaps using established political 
and economic theories and arriving at some possible alternatives to the conclusions she provides. 
There are, however, a number of important related issues that are not included within the scope of my 
project. While Chapter 5 presents techno-feminist accelerationism, aligned to the conceptual figure of 
the cyborg, as a useful site of investigation to identify and overcome the obstacles that stand in the 
way of a more egalitarian post-capitalist world, this position on its own says little about the impact of 
acceleration on environmental sustainability, or how the two would co-exist to facilitate the change 
that they both strive towards. The rapid growth of data centres which sustain an information economy 
require significant amounts of energy and other natural resources to maintain, with a large number of 
server farms relying on ‘dedicated diesel generators’ in order to ‘guarantee uninterrupted power 
supplies.’628 Releasing technological innovations from their ‘enslavement [to] capitalist objectives’ 
will not straightforwardly resolve these challenges.629 As a result, increased engagement between the 
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different proposals outlined by Mason, Williams and Srnicek and ecocritical scholarship will 
constitute an essential part in the development of ‘a cognitive map of the existing system and a 
speculative image of the future economic system.’630 This ‘speculative image’ also points towards a 
further question which remains unanswered in the fictional texts I have explored. Some of the most 
successful elements of each fictional representation offer examples which, in line with the aims or 
Surveillance Capitalism, help to identify the rapid changes of our technological environment as they 
are happening. They also offer the opportunity to explore the potential complications within Zuboff’s 
approach to instrumentarianism and to the deconstruction of capitalism more broadly. However, 
fictional representations which go beyond this by offering insight into a world after surveillance 
capitalism, where technology is harnessed towards revolutionary goals in imaginative ways, would 
offer an area for further investigation relevant to the tasks set out by Williams and Srnicek.  
 
There is some evidence of this occurring in Moxyland, where the online video game ‘Pluslife’ 
preserves an unsurveilled space which Tendeka uses for political protest; the ‘game space’ poses such 
a challenge to the authority of the ruling elite that highly skilled operatives enter the game to provoke, 
uncover, and derail the plans of would-be activists.631 We also see these kinds of patterns emerging in 
Altered Carbon, as ex-military subversives repurpose hacking and combat technologies to erode the 
invincibility of their world’s most powerful oppressor. In some ways, The Circle offers a satirical 
reflection on the utopian hopes captured by accelerationist logic, as the corporation’s infinite 
resources are invested into projects for pseudo-humanitarian ends - ‘fascinating people, every one of 
them working on something Annie deemed world-rocking or life-changing or fifty years ahead of 
anyone else.’632 Indeed, Silicon Valley constructs an image of itself as the primary laboratory for the 
invention of successive solutions with one hand, and perpetuates those problems with the other, 
stifling the opportunities for creation outside of its political and social institutions. Breaking away 
from this narrative is a major step in ‘[ceasing] to think in terms of discrete objects, bodies, and 
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spaces and begin to think in terms of “system design”’, which effective accelerationist activism 
requires.633 
 
One of the most salient themes that emerges out of this dissertation is the power of community and 
collaboration that rejects the false notion of commercially-shaped connection pushed by social media 
companies to feed advertisement, sales, and growth. New technologies based on reciprocity, dialogue 
and sharing are thriving on the internet: open-source initiatives for collective action and the increased 
democratisation of access for marginalised individuals are two examples of this. As Mason points out, 
collaborative projects that are facilitated by digital platforms offer radical potential for undermining 
capitalist relations: ‘The biggest information product in the world – Wikipedia – is made by 27,000 
volunteers, for free, abolishing the encyclopaedia business and depriving the advertising industry of 
an estimated $3 billion a year in revenue.’634 Since the publication of PostCapitalism, this number has 
risen to over 132,000 volunteers, constituting a community based on shared values that includes 
contributors ‘from many countries, with individuals who bring something different to the table, 
whether it be researching skills, technical expertise, [and] writing prowess or organizational skills.’635 
With this kind of collaboration becoming increasingly accessible, Mason writes, ‘the agent of change 
has become, potentially, everyone on earth.’636 This assertion becomes even more important in the 
context of the digital changes brought about by COVID-19. For many communities, networked 
interactions have become the mainstay of continued connection and work in the midst of widespread 
regulations preventing physical collectivity. J. S. Tan and Nataliya Nedzhvetskaya write that 2020 has 
been a ‘record-breaking year for collective action in the tech sector’, as the pandemic has ‘fast-tracked 
the digital transformation of all aspects of life’ at the same time as ‘highlight[ing] existing 
inequalities’, including the sudden eradication of jobs and the imposition of unsafe, unfair working 
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conditions upon certain professions.637 Tan and Nedzhvetskaya write that this has catalysed workers 
to take ‘significant steps towards unionization’, as well as utilising the increased availability of digital 
networks to take action against exploitative corporate responses to the pandemic.638  
 
 
As it reckons with the oppressive regimes of the past, it is clear that the theoretical corpus contributed 
to by Arendt, Foucault, Marx and others offers resources with which to consider afresh some of the 
most pressing questions posed by the digital-political landscape of the present, playing an important 
role in illuminating the shifting landscape of public and private space, visibility and power, and social 
relations. Despite – and, at times, because of – the limitations of Zuboff’s book, it has provided a 
valuable touchstone from which to connect together and articulate movements in the digital landscape 
accelerating and transforming around us. Where theoretical texts at times fall short of accounting for 
the experiences of different forms of life under current regimes of social control, this dissertation 
attempts to build useful connections towards literary works which open up the blind spots of theory to 
new critical applications, in the hopes of facilitating further investigation into the opportunities and 
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